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DRAWING A LINE IN THE PATENT SUBJECTMATTER SANDS: DOES EUROPE PROVIDE A
SOLUTION TO THE SOFTWARE AND
BUSINESS METHOD PATENT PROBLEM?
Susan J. Marsnik*
Robert E. Thomas**
Abstract: In June 2010, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Bilski v.
Kappos, a case that had the potential to rewrite the landscape for determining what types of computer-related and business method inventions would
receive patent protection. Just six weeks earlier, the European Patent Office’s Enlarged Board of Appeal delivered a decision on the same subject
matter that had the potential to produce similar change in Europe. Yet,
given these two opportunities to overhaul imperfect patent systems, neither decision provided more than incremental change. This Article explains why neither jurisdiction is able or willing to produce comprehensive
reform in this area, and seeks to illuminate the nature of patent reform
that is possible on the two continents.
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Introduction
The status of business methods and software as patent subject matter is one of the most controversial debates in patent law.1 These patents, or a subset thereof, are considered to be overly broad in scope,2
sources of many “patent troll” lawsuits,3 unlikely to advance the prior
1 See, e.g., John R. Allison & Starling D. Hunter, On the Feasibility of Improving Patent
Quality One Technology at a Time: The Case of Business Methods, 21 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 729,
736–38 (2006) (analyzing the PTO’s Second Pair of Eyes Review and concluding that patent reform efforts are inadequate); John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 987 passim (2003) (providing empirical evidence
that the quality of business method patent claims are not significantly inferior to other
patent claims); Wade M. Chumney et al., Patents Gone Wild: An Ethical Examination and Legal Analysis of Tax-Related and Tax Strategy Patents, 46 Am. Bus. L.J. 343, 357–71 (2009) (examining the patentability of tax strategy business methods); David S. Olson, Taking the
Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82
Temp. L. Rev. 181, 188–90 (2009) (citing software and business methods as fueling the
“continuing high volume of bad patents”); Carl Shapiro, Patent System Reform: Economic
Analysis and Critique, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1017, 1018 (2004) (noting criticism of the
quality of computer software and Internet business methods); Robert E. Thomas, Debugging Software Patents: Increasing Innovation and Reducing Uncertainty in the Judicial Reform of
Software Patent Law, 25 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 191 passim (2008) (arguing that business method and software patents may discourage rather than promote
innovation); Robert E. Thomas & Larry A. DiMatteo, Harmonizing the International Law of
Business Method and Software Patents: Following Europe’s Lead, 16 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 1,
45–46 (2007) (recommending adoption of European treatment of business method and
software patents).
2 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575,
1688 (2003) (arguing that the Federal Circuit has encouraged broad drafting of software
claims where narrow claims are optimal); Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope
and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 5 (2001) (concluding that broad
software patent scope is not optimal).
3 John R. Allison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the MostLitigated Patents, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2009) (providing empirical evidence that the most
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art due to lax disclosure requirements,4 and generally undeserving of
patent protection.5 Due to the questioned legitimacy of these patents,
there has been resistance to the unqualified ratification of business method and software patent subject-matter status on both sides of the Atlantic.6 Nevertheless, solutions to the perceived problems of business
method and software patents have been ephemeral. Like shifting sand,
proposals and approaches have been accepted and rejected at a seemingly increasing rate on both continents.7

litigated patents are held by non-practicing entities—so called “trolls” —and disproportionately cover software inventions).
4 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1688–89 (arguing that weak disclosure requirements allow broad claims that can stifle “subsequent incremental improvements”).
5 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Methods Patents Bad for Business?, 16 Santa
Clara Computer & High Tech L.J. 263, 275–77 (2000) (arguing that the limited benefits
from business method patents do not exceed their social costs); Thomas, supra note 1, at
210–11, 218 (extending Dreyfuss’ social welfare analysis to software patents).
6 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1689–90 (recommending policy changes to limit
the scope of software patents); see also Philip Leith, Software and Patents in Europe
154–55 (2007) (describing the highly organized opposition from open source and SME
groups that made moving forward on a software directive to liberalize treatment of software claims difficult); Reinier Bakels & P. Bernt Hugenholtz, The Patentability of Computer
Programs: Discussion of European-Level Legislation in the Field of Patents for Software 26 (European Parliament, Comm. on Legal Affairs and the Internal Mkt., Working Paper, 2002),
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/committees/juri/20020619/Software
Patent.pub.pdf (noting that “the crucial question” for EU legislation is “not whether software
patents should be allowed, but what software patents should be permitted”); Press Release,
Charlie McCreevy, European Comm’r for Internal Mkt. & Servs., Statement to the European
Parliament on Computer-Implemented Inventions (Mar. 8, 2005), available at http://europa.
eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/151&format=HTML&aged=0&
language=EN&guiLanguage=en (“The Commission’s intention in making its proposal
was to avoid patenting of pure software and clearly differentiate the EU from the US.”).
7 See Tanya Aplin, Patenting Computer Programs: A Glimmer of Convergence, 30 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 379, 382 (2008) (arguing that the U.K. courts’ reluctance to follow the
EPO approach represents an elevation of form over substance); Rosa Maria Ballardini,
Software Patents in Europe: The Technical Requirement Dilemma, 3 J. Intell. Prop. L. & Prac.
563, 565–73 (2008) (tracing shifting standards and tests in the EPO, United Kingdom, and
German courts); Christopher Laub, Software Patenting: Legal Standards in Europe and the US
in View of Strategic Limitations of the IP Systems, 9 J. World Intell. Prop. 344, 366–67 (2007);
Christopher de Mauny, Court of Appeal Clarifies Patenting of Computer Programs, 31 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 147, 150 (2009) (discussing Symbian case and its move towards seeking
compromise with EPO); Noam Shemtov, The Characteristics of Technical Character and the
Ongoing Saga in the EPO and English Courts, 4 J. Intell. Prop. L. & Prac. 506, 506–12 (2009)
(examining the differences in approaches in EPO and U.K. courts and noting that U.K.
decisions are irreconcilable with those of EPO and EPO decisions are often irreconcilable
with each other); Helen Wallis, Patentability of Computer-Implemented Inventions: The Changing
Landscape in 2008, 14 Comm. L.J. Computer Media & Telecomm. 4, 4–7 (2009).
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The shifts have been so dramatic that the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (CAFC) reaffirmed a seemingly discredited8 subjectmatter test for business method and software patent claims.9 This reaffirmation left the Supreme Court with the unenviable task of either ratifying a test that previous courts refused to embrace or developing a
viable solution that has eluded courts for decades.10 During oral arguments in Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court seemed willing to explore
all avenues for a possible solution to this conundrum.11 Justice Ginsburg queried whether the tied-to-technology requirement upon which
European patents rest could provide a workable subject-matter test for
business methods and software patents in the United States.12 Justice
Ginsburg’s query suggests that at least some members of the Supreme
Court did not find any of their options inviting and held some hope
that European law might provide a remedy that the Supreme Court
could use to rescue the United States’ patent system from its subjectmatter malaise.
In this Article, we address Justice Ginsburg’s query by examining
United States and European patent law to determine whether there is
viable legal or policy support for a patent subject-matter test that provides the patent law community with clear guidelines for distinguishing
“deserving” patents from “undeserving” patents. Now that the Supreme
Court has issued a decision that basically orders the CAFC to “reboot”
its patent process subject-matter approach—with little more than the
exclusion against abstract ideas and 1980s-era Supreme Court precedents—-the need for clear guidance in this area of patent law is even
more pressing.13 The European Patent Convention (EPC)14 appears to
contain provisions that address this problem. Courts have consistently

8 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 978–83 (2008) (Newman, J. dissenting), aff’d sub nom. Bilski
v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227–31(2010).
9 Id. at 963–66 (reaffirming use of the machine or physical transformation test to determine whether processes are valid statutory patent subject matter).
10 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223–25; In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 978–985 (Newman, J., dissenting).
11 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 12–13, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010)
(No. 08-964).
12 See id.
13 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225–26, 3229.
14 Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 52, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 254,
as revised Nov. 29, 2000 [hereinafter EPC 2000], available at http://www.epo.org/patents/
law/legal-texts/html/epc/2000/e/ma1.html.
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interpreted the EPC to require that all patents be “technical,”15 and to
exclude explicitly business methods and “programs for computers”
from patent subject-matter coverage in Article 52(2).16 The strong exclusion is chimeric, however, offering less hope for a solution than previously considered U.S. approaches.
The clarity of the EPC exclusion is severely muddled by modifying
language in Article 52(3)17 and by the complexity and fragmentation of
the European patent system.18 Unlike the centralized United States patent system, national patent systems in Europe coexist with the European
Patent Office (EPO), both of which apply and interpret the EPC.19
There are no pan-European courts that correspond to the CAFC and
the U.S. Supreme Court.20 In Europe both the EPO and national courts
have jurisdiction over patent subject-matter appeals.21 As one commentator put it, “[t]he resulting edifice is byzantine in complexity.”22 Although national courts strive to harmonize their decisions with EPO
Technical Board of Appeal decisions, significant conflicts have, nonetheless, developed. For example, the potential exists for a computer software patent granted by the EPO to be invalidated under current U.K.
law because of that country’s more restrictive interpretation of the
EPC.23 Realization of this potential would render one of the EPC’s main
tenets meaningless: namely, that patents granted at the EPO are valid in
contracting states as if they were granted by the national office.24
Elevating the probability of legal discord is the EPO Enlarged
Board of Appeal’s denial of the existence of conflicting decisions within
the EPO and the Board’s refusal to clarify the meaning of “technical” as

15 Thomas & DiMatteo, supra note 1, at 17 (“While there is no explicit requirement in
the EPC for technical character or a ‘technical contribution,’ the patent courts initially
interpreted the EPC as including such a requirement.”).
16 EPC 2000, supra note 14, at 271–72.
17 See id. at 272 (limiting Art. 52(2) exclusions to the extent that a patent or patent application relates to the excluded subject matter or activities “as such”).
18 William Cornish & David Llewelyn, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade marks and Allied Rights, 114 (6th ed. 2007) (describing the EPO and UK
patent systems and their interaction); infra Part IV(B).
19 See EPC 2000, supra note 14, at 258–59, 294–96.
20 See id. at 259–71 (outlining the structure of European institutions of patent review).
21 Cf. Cornish & Llewelyn, supra note 18, at 114 (describing the EPO and U.K. patent systems and their interaction).
22 Id.
23 See Guy Tritton et al., Intellectual Property in Europe 86 (3d ed. 2008).
24 Shemtov, supra note 7, at 514.
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applied to European patent subject matter.25 Therefore, in addition to
shaping patent subject-matter policy for business methods and software,
Europe must also resolve conflicting approaches within the EPC and
between countries with disparate and sometimes inconsistent approaches to patent policy. Europe cannot take these steps until there is a
European patent court with jurisdiction to settle these interpretive differences.
Another impediment to European reform is the extremely liberal
U.S. approach to software and business method patents. Implementing
clear guidelines and boundaries could handicap European inventors
and businesses relative to their U.S. counterparts, which enjoy the liberal U.S. treatment of software and business method claims. Hence,
clarity and well-defined constraints in Europe may occur only after the
United States has shifted its patent policy to include clear limitations on
software and business method patents. Thus, it appears highly unlikely
that Europe can provide the U.S. patent system with the guidance it
apparently seeks.
This Article’s analysis of U.S. and European approaches to the patentability of business methods and software supports this rather pessimistic conclusion. Conceptually, the only significant differences between these invention types and mental processes that do not receive
patent protection are speed, capacity, and accuracy. There is nothing
that computer software controlling an electronic device cannot perform that a human mind cannot also perform using paper and pencil
and sufficient time. Nevertheless, these differences coupled with technologically advanced computer equipment make software valuable and
capable of performing tasks that cannot be done practically by the human mind alone.
Part I of the Article discusses the nature of software and business
methods.26 Parts II, III, and IV, respectively, examine the development
and present state of patent law in the United States,27 European Patent
Office,28 and United Kingdom.29 The Article concludes by identifying
the implications of this discussion. Our analysis shows that there is no
unequivocal legal support for a patent subject-matter rule that excludes
25 Case G-3/08, Programs for Computers, [2010] O.J.E.P.O 17, 19–30, 31 (Enlarged
Bd. Appeal, May 12, 2010), available at http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj011/01_11/
01_0101.pdf.
26 See infra Part I.
27 See infra Part II.
28 See infra Part III.
29 See infra Part IV.
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all inventions that include software or business methods under either
patent system.30 There is also no unequivocal support for recognizing
software and business methods as patent subject matter.31 The problem
lies in the absence of clear, unambiguous legislative direction on either
continent.32 The manifestation of this lack of a solid policy foundation
in the United States has been the repeated adoption and rejection of
different judicial approaches.33 In Europe, on the other hand, the lack
of legislative direction combined with the absence of a centralized
court system has resulted in conflicting and shifting approaches in the
judicial treatment of software patent subject matter.34
I. Software and Business Method Patents
To appreciate the dilemma that courts and policy makers face in
addressing the software and business method patentability question,
understanding the nature of software is critical. Therefore, we begin
our analysis by discussing the general nature of software and business
method patents and their treatment under U.S. law. Conceptually, software and business methods are closely related. 35 Both are abstract
processes that do not independently produce tangible results.36 An ad30 See infra Parts II–IV.
31 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231 (rejecting prior test for patentable subject matter and permitting the Federal Circuit to develop a new test based on the abstract ideas exclusion); Case
T-208/84, Computer-Related Invention/VICOM, [1987] O.J.E.P.O. 14 (Technical Bd. Appeal
3.5.01, July 15, 1986) (noting uncertainty in claims involving business methods or software and
additional variables), available at http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj1987/p001_046.pdf.
32 See infra text accompanying notes 166, 366–406.
33 Compare Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231 (rejecting prior test for patentable subject matter
and permitting the Federal Circuit to develop a new test based on the abstract ideas exclusion), with State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp. Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (recognizing the patentability of a computer algorithm that produces a “useful,
concrete and tangible result”).
34 See, e.g., VICOM, [1987] O.J.E.P.O. at 14 (noting uncertainty in claims involving business methods or software and additional variables).
35 See Allison & Tiller, supra note 1, at 1012 (arguing, in a section entitled “A Bit of
Software Patent Déjà Vu,” that most criticisms of business method patents have already
been applied toward software patents); Thomas, supra note 1, at 193 n.6 (arguing that
“[b]usiness methods are part of the continuum [of patents] that includes software and
computer-implemented inventions”).
36 See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–73 (1972) (distinguishing between software
and traditional process claims, which do produce tangible results); Robert P. Merges, As
Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 Berkeley Tech L.J. 577, 578–79 (1999) (recounting that business method and
software inventions were previously considered too abstract for patent coverage); James
Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 2000, (Magazine), available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2000/03/12/magazine/patently-absurd.html?scp=2&sq=Patently+Absurd&st=nyt (arguing
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ditional similarity is that business methods are often implemented
through computer software.37 Under the “machine-or-transformation
test” championed in In re Bilski, business methods that are not computer or machine implemented are unlikely to survive a subject-matter
challenge.38 Whether business methods or computer software are statutory subject matter when “computer implemented” is a more difficult
determination. When “computer implemented,” the business method
is computer software.39 A major question that courts on both sides of
the Atlantic have struggled with is whether implementing software or a
business method through a computer or other machine is necessary or
sufficient to render such claims valid statutory subject matter.40 Or,
more generally, under what circumstances are business methods or
computer programs capable of becoming patentable inventions?
Therefore, determining whether and under what circumstances
software should be valid statutory subject matter under U.S. law, or statutorily excluded subject matter under European law, requires an understanding of the nature of computer software. Modern computers
consist of tangible physical components including one or more processing units, graphical and input-output subsystems, memory chips, storage devices, and other support systems.41 Software provides the means
that business method and software patents had crossed into the realm of thought and abstraction with nuts and bolts that are “vaporous and intangible”).
37 See Rebecca A. Hand, eBay v. MercExchange: Looking at the Cause and Effect of a Shift
in the Standard for Issuing Patent Injunctions, 25 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 461, 470–71
(2007) (“Many business method patents are, in fact, patents on the transfer of a known
business method to a software and/or Web-based implementation.”); see also Gregory A.
Stobbs, Business Method Patents § 3.01 (2002) (“Virtually all of the e-commerce patents, by their very nature, involve electronic communication technology, or Internet technology.”).
38 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 964–66 (2008), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct.
3218 (2010).
39 See Hand, supra note 37, at 470–71.
40 See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S. at 71–72 (analyzing whether a computer program useful only
in connection with a computer is not a patentable process); Ex parte Carl A. Lundgren, No.
2003–2088, (B.P.A.I. Apr. 20, 2004) (noting that business methods performed by a machine
have long been considered patentable subject matter); Case T-931/95, Controlling Pension
Benefit Systems Partnership/PBS PARTNERSHIP, [2001] O.J.E.P.O. 441, 450 (Technical Bd.
Appeal 3.5.01, Sept. 8, 2000), available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-lawappeals/pdf/t950931ep1.pdf (finding that the use of a computer in application of a method
does not change the essential nature of the claim nor does it endow a “purely non-technical
purpose with a technical character”).
41 See Jack M. Haynes, Computer Software: Intellectual Property Protection in the United States
and Japan, 13 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 245, 247(1995); Robert Plotkin, Fighting Keywords: Translating the First Amendment To Protect Software Speech, 2003 U. Ill. J.L. Tech.
& Pol’y 329, 369 n.149.
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by which human users interact with and control these myriad computer
systems.42 Software allows computer users to give instructions to computers to perform a variety of tasks.43 The term software also applies to
information stored on, used, and manipulated by computers.44 The
term software additionally includes the internal routines that allow different parts of the computer to interact with each other and to translate human input into instructions that computers understand.45
Conceptually, there is little to distinguish software patent claims
from claims involving abstract ideas, algorithms, and mental processes
that courts consistently rejected prior to the 1998 case before the CAFC,
State Street Bank v. Signature Financial Group.46 Computers and the human
mind operate similarly by processing algorithms.47 Mathematical algorithms, computer programs, and mental processes are ways of “defining
abstract relationships among concepts and [with] defining rules about
how those concepts should be manipulated.”48 Thus, for example, the
area of a rectangle can be characterized by the relationship between the
base and height of the geometric figure and defined as the product of
those two elements.49 There is no conceptual difference between calculating this area in one’s mind, with pencil and paper, and calculating
this area through the use of a programmed computing device. Many
psychologists model human thought processes as a series of computational steps.50 According to these psychologists, human thought proc-

42 Gregory A. Stobbs, Software Patents, § 2.02 (2000) (“[S]oftware is what empowers a computer to handle information and to control information flow.”).
43 Haynes, supra note 41, at 247 (“A computer is useless without software.”).
44 Stobbs, supra note 42, § 2.02 (“[S]oftware is information that is fed into the input,
placed in storage, and then delivered from storage to the computer.”).
45 Andrew Rodau, Computer Software: Does Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code Apply?
35 Emory L.J. 853, 867–68, 868 n.57 (1986) (noting that the term “software” is confusing
because it applies to many different aspects of the computing process including internal
and external computer functions).
46 See 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
47 See Ben Klemens, Math You Can’t Use: Patents, Copyrights, and Software 26
(2006) (suggesting that computers and the human brain operate similarly by following certain paths from problem statement to solution); Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The
Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39
Emory L.J. 1025, 1123 (1990) (reporting that computer scientist Allen Newell concludes that
“no meaningful distinction can be made between algorithms and mental processes”).
48 Samuelson, supra note 47, at 1123.
49 See id.
50 Id. (quoting Professor Newell as stating, “humans think by means of algorithms. Sequences of
mental steps and algorithms are the same thing.”).
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esses, mathematical equations, and computer programs are algorithms
that have no conceptual difference.51
The difference between computer processing and human mental
processes is thus more quantitative than qualitative. The computer is
faster, more capacious, and more accurate than the human mind.52
These improvements allow computers to accomplish tasks that cannot
be accomplished by humans working alone. Managing and manipulating scientific experiments, rocket launches, and graphical representations all require the speed, precision, and tremendous storage capacity
of computers.53 The 1981 Supreme Court case Diamond v. Diehr provides
a useful illustration of the value of computer technology.54 The Diehr
patent claim provided a novel way of curing artificial rubber.55 The mathematical formula for completing this process, called the Arrhenius
equation, was well known before submission of the Diehr application.56
Applying the formula in an industrial context was difficult, however, because it required continual monitoring and adjustments to determine
the precise time to terminate the curing process.57 Without computer
aid, humans could not collect process data and perform the required
constant calculations to determine the optimal time to terminate the
curing process.58 The Diehr patent claim included a computer that was
capable of accurately completing the repetitive calculations required by
the Arrhenius formula and applying adjustments to the industrial process.59
Mixed processes such as the Diehr method for curing rubber are at
the crux of the subject-matter problem. EPC law and U.S. commentators who wish to limit patent subject matter agree that pure mental
51 See id. at 1123–24 (“[A]n algorithm for representing how a legal problem can be
solved is just as ‘mathematical’ as an algorithm for addition, for finding the lowest common divisor for two numbers.”).
52 Laura R. Ford, Alchemy and Patentability: Technology, “Useful Arts,” and the Chimerical
Mind-Machine, 42 Cal. W. L. Rev. 49, 53 (2005) (explaining how modern computers are
able to carry out tasks traditionally performed by human mental processes at a speed and
level of accuracy that far exceeds human capabilities).
53 See Michael J. Malinowski & Maureen A. O’Rourke, A False Start? The Impact of Federal
Policy on the Genotechnology Industry, 13 Yale J. on Reg. 163, 166–67 (1996) (observing how
“[t]he Human Genome Project . . . advanc[ed] more rapidly than originally predicted”
due to “[i]nnovations in computer technology that enhance[d] the speed and precision of
research and decrease[d] human error”).
54 450 U.S. 175, 177–78 (1981).
55 Id. at 177.
56 See id.
57 See id. at 178.
58 See id. at 178–79.
59 See id.
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processes and inventions without industrial or technical applications are
not valid patent subject matter.60 European courts and these commentators have trouble answering the question of how much more than a
mental process is needed for an invention to receive a patent.61 In Diehr,
the Court ruled that an invention that employed a mathematical algorithm was patent subject matter in large part because it was part of an
industrial process.62 Such industrial processes, while employing software
and mathematical algorithms, satisfy the Bilski machine or physical
transformation test because the process as a whole takes industrial raw
materials as input and produces a finished manufacture as an output.63
Computers primarily interact with information when not connected to an industrial process.64 Most computer end-users employ application programs, either purchased or custom-made, to perform desired tasks.65 Common computer uses include word processing, database
management, statistical and financial analysis, photograph and video
editing, and game playing.66 A program that solely applies a mathematical formula to data and delivers a result does not qualify as statutory subject matter.67 Nevertheless, if the computer running the program is
connected to a plotter or computer monitor that draws a graph of the
calculation results, at least one court has held that the physical output is
enough to render the entire process valid statutory subject matter.68
If providing physical manifestations of data analysis is sufficient to
qualify a process containing a computer program as statutory subject
matter, however, there are virtually no constraints on software subjectmatter patentability. The nature of computers and software engineer60 See EPC 2000, supra note 14, at 108 (excluding business methods and computer programs as patentable subject matter); Thomas F. Cotter, A Burkean Perspective on Patent Eligibility, 22 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 855, 860–61 (2007) (arguing that the disfavored mental steps
doctrine still has merit).
61 See, e.g., Case T-208/84, Computer-Related Invention/VICOM, [1987] O.J.E.P.O. 14,
14–23 (Technical Bd. Appeal 3.5.01, July 15, 1986), available at http://archive.epo.org/epo/
pubs/oj1987/p001_046.pdf (interpreting the “as such” modifier in EPC Art. 52 in the context of a computer-aided design program whose only contribution over the corresponding
mental process was speed, and remanding case to Examining Division to consider redrafted
claims).
62 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192–93.
63 See id.
64 See Stobbs, supra note 42, § 2.02.
65 See id. § 1.04.
66 See id. § 2.02.
67 Benson, 409 U.S. at 71–72 (noting that granting a patent on such a claim would
amount to granting a patent on a mathematical formula or pure idea).
68 See Arrhythmia Research Tech. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1060–61 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
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ing means that most software can include output capabilities.69 Modern
programming and computer design employ a modular approach to
manage the complexity of large programs. 70 Analogous to automobiles—which are built with tires, engines, brakes, and other components that perform specific discrete tasks—computer application programs are also built from multiple components that perform discrete
tasks.71 Software functions may specify how the program handles data
input-output routines or may provide methods for performing mathematical and statistical operations.72 These functions are offloaded to
specialized systems that handle input-output and other functions. The
programmer only needs to know the commands required to evoke the
subsystems to produce desired results: there is no need to know exactly
how the specialized subsystems achieve such results.73 The programmer’s ability to ignore redundant or highly specialized tasks is facilitated by the availability of off-the-shelf and generic function libraries.74
These libraries can be used to provide capabilities for any program that
requires the included tasks.75 Programmers only need to understand
the operation and syntax of library functions.76 In fact, it is possible to
create a word processor and other common computer applications using function libraries and just enough programming code to integrate
the functions into a cohesive whole.77 Most software programs thus run
on “generic” computers and utilize standard methods for interacting
with the external world that are available in off-the-shelf libraries, such
as input-output, printing, and audio-visuals.78 Thus, it seems that programmers need to focus on solving discrete problems rather than engaging in elaborate software engineering, unless available libraries are
inefficient or deficient in some significant respect. Therefore, much
software innovation is at the abstract information or algorithmic level.79
Additionally, software patents suffer from excessive breadth.80 Software patent applications do not include source code—the program writ69 See Stobbs, supra note 42, § 2.02.
70 Thomas, supra note 1, at 219.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Klemens, supra note 47, at 41.
74 Id.; see, e.g., Walter Savitch, Absolute C++ 92 (1st ed. 2002) (“C++ comes with libraries of predefined functions that you can use in your programs.”).
75 See Thomas, supra note 1, at 219.
76 See id.
77 Id.
78 See id.
79 See id.
80 See Klemens, supra note 47, at 73.
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ten in a human language—and the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) often approves claims consisting of little more than a
rudimentary flow chart.81 As a result, software patent holders lay claim
to broad areas of software practice without well-identified claim boundaries, with virtually no implementation details, and with few clues about
the quality of claim implementation.82 This practice appears inconsistent with patent law, which requires a claim’s application to provide sufficient detail such that someone of ordinary skill in the relevant art is
able to practice the invention.83 This is the quintessential means by
which knowledge is disseminated through the patent process.84
The relaxation of disclosure requirements for software patent
claims in the United States, codified in U.S. Code chapter 35, section
112,85 is due to necessity.86 Ironically, merely providing software source
code would more fully satisfy the Section 112 disclosure requirements
than the current practice. Source code consists of human-readable instructions that, when translated into a computer-readable format, give
the computer detailed instructions that set forth the order in which the
computer executes program steps and functions. 87 Source code is
equivalent to a detailed blueprint of the program’s construction and
functions. Including software source code or detailed outlines of how a
program operates would easily satisfy Section 112 enablement and best
mode requirements.88
Nevertheless, the CAFC has ruled that disclosing outcomes—or
“functions” —without identifying detailed procedures—or “means” —
meets the Section 112 burden for computer software.89 Section 112 disclosures, in addition to creating a publicly accessible record of the invention, provide a check over the breadth and scope of claims.90 To
avoid overly expansive claims, patent law provides protection solely for
the means of achieving identified functions—the “means-plus-function
test.”91 But requiring software patents to meet the means-plus-function
81 See id. at 21–22.
82 See id.; Cohen & Lemley, supra note 2, at 24–25.
83 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (setting out the enablement and best mode requirements).
84 See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 2, at 17–19.
85 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
86 See Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1549 (1997).
87 See Stobbs, supra note 37, § 2.06 (b)–(c).
88 Thomas, supra note 1, at 234.
89 See Fonar, 107 F.3d at 1548–49; see also Cohen & Lemley, supra note 2, at 24 n.87.
90 See Fidel D. Nwamu, Does Your Claim Conform to Means-Plus-Function Format Under Section 112, Paragraph Six?: O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 6 J. Intell. Prop. L. 189, 194–95 (1999).
91 See id.
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criteria limits their efficacy.92 In programming, there are usually many
different ways to accomplish a desired result.93 Programmers may use
different routines, approaches, and languages to accomplish the same
programming task.94 Different programmers will address a given problem in many—often significantly—different ways reflecting style, emphasis, priorities and skills.95 Nonetheless, each of these programs produces the same result—or function—while employing a distinctly different means.96 Requiring software claims to satisfy the means-plusfunction test would mean that software patents would only be infringed
when the source or machine code of the alleged infringing program is
identical to the patented program.97 The myriad ways to replicate the
patented program’s function without duplicating code would not be
infringing. 98 Therefore, limiting software patents with a means-plusfunction test would substantially reduce the value of patents meeting the
means-plus-function standard.
The discussion in this section has identified some of the dilemmas
software patents create. In particular, allowing limited software patent
disclosure results in overly broad patent scope, which is anticompetitive.99 Although excluding computer software from statutory
subject matter would appear to address these problems, the European
experience indicates that such a prohibition is extremely difficult to
implement.100 In the next section, we examine how U.S. courts have
dealt with software patent claims and why the issue presents such a conundrum. The striking similarities between U.S. and European courts
struggling with determining the patentability of software patent claims
is particularly enlightening.

92 See Fonar, 107 F.3d at 1548–49 (discussing how source code is not sufficient to allow a
software engineer to replicate the code because source code is machine-specific and it is
more “important . . . to have a description of what the software has to do”).
93 See Klemens, supra note 47, at 43.
94 Thomas, supra note 1, at 235.
95 See Klemens, supra note 47, at 43 (“In view of the astounding number of choices
available in such an exercise, the two programmers’ solutions could be vastly different.”)
96 Id.
97 See Thomas, supra note 1, at 234–35.
98 See id. at 235–36.
99 See Klemens, supra note 47, at 73; Burk & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1688–89.
100 See infra Parts III–IV.
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II. U.S. Judicial Treatment of Software Patents
A. The Exclusion of Abstract Ideas From Statutory Subject Matter
Whether software and business methods can be classified as statutory subject matter depends on the location of the boundaries of patent protection. The constitutional authorization for patents envisioned
boundaries by granting Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress
of . . . Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”101 Initial U.S. patent legislation identified statutory subject
matter, but did not enumerate any subject-matter exclusions.102 The
courts accepted the responsibility of defining the limits of patent protection.103 They were cognizant of the dangers of allowing inventors to
obtain overly expansive coverage of their claims and designed tests to
curtail the scope of overreaching patent claims.104 In particular, courts
understood that allowing overly broad statutory subject matter could
impede industrial innovation.105 These tests precluded patent claims
for abstract ideas, functions and effects, and mental steps,106 and the
exclusions lasted well into the twentieth century.107 In 1972, the Supreme Court included “laws or principles of nature, mental processes,
mathematical expressions and formulas, and abstract intellectual concepts” among excluded subject matter because “they are the basic tools
of scientific and technological work.”108
The primary policy objective behind the early judicial approach to
statutory subject matter was to limit the anti-competitive impact of patents while maintaining innovation incentives.109 Because granting exclusive rights is anti-competitive, the courts attempted to limit the subject area of patent coverage to technological-industrial innovations.110
Exclusive rights and the concomitant competitiveness losses are the
101 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
102 See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1 (1790) (identifying statutory subject matter as
“any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not
before known or used.”).
103 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 195–98 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing tests used to identify valid statutory subject matter).
104 See id.
105 See LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852) (noting that excessive patent scope
would retard innovation and development in a manner contrary to patent policy).
106 See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
107 See id.
108 Id.
109 See supra notes 99–103 and accompanying text.
110 See In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970).

242

Boston College International & Comparative Law Review

[Vol. 34:227

costs that society incurs in return for encouraging innovation in the
useful arts and furthering rapid dissemination of new knowledge.111 If
the patent grant is overly expansive, however, the anti-competitive effects of granting exclusive rights impede innovation without significantly increasing the volume of knowledge in the public domain.
Early cases illustrate this judicial sensitivity. In 1852, the U.S. Supreme Court provided detailed rules and rationales for limited patent
protection in LeRoy v. Tatham based on patent policy from the United
States and England.112 The Court, in correcting the trial court’s jury
instructions in a patent infringement case, enunciated policy principles
that limited the scope of patent law.113 The trial court had instructed
the jury that a patent claim for producing lead pipe should be validated
regardless of whether the machine used was novel because the innovation consisted of “bringing a newly discovered principle into practical
application.”114 The Court stated as a foundational rule that inventors
could not patent abstract principles and natural laws.115 To prevent inventors from overreaching with respect to abstract principles and laws
of nature, the Court stated what has since been termed the means-plusfunction test.116 In essence, an inventor could not obtain a patent on
the result or effect of a process—in this case, the production of lead
pipe by exploiting a particular property of lead—but could obtain exclusivity solely on the means by which the process achieved its effect.117
The Court reasoned that this limitation was needed to keep the abstract
principle in the public domain.118 Allowing such exclusivity would discourage rather than promote advancement in the useful “arts and
manufactures.”119

111 See Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23 Berkeley Tech.
L.J. 1009, 1010 (2008) (“The rationale for patenting long favored in judicial opinion is the
‘quid pro quo’ theory: that patents are a bargain of sorts, between the inventor and the public, exchanging public disclosure of the claimed invention in return for the grant of a period of exclusive rights.”).
112 See Leroy, 55 U.S. at 175–76.
113 See id.
114 Id.
115 See id. at 174–75.
116 See id. at 175; see also Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 268 (1853) (“[I]t is well settled
that a man cannot have a patent for the function or abstract effect of a machine, but only
for the machine which produces it.”).
117 LeRoy, 55 U.S. at 175–76.
118 Id. at 175.
119 Id.
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The ruling in LeRoy was not unanimous.120 In a strong dissent,
three justices argued that inventors who discover a way to exploit a natural law for a particular purpose should be entitled to exclusivity over
all uses of the natural law to achieve the useful outcome.121 The dissent
argued that the true innovation was in recognizing the application of
the natural principle for a useful purpose, and thus, limiting exclusivity
to the method or mode was contrary to patent policy.122 The implicit
assumption in the dissent was that inventors should be rewarded for
their ingenuity. The majority opinion’s limitation of exclusivity provided inadequate incentives or rewards.123 The dissenting opinion also
dismissed the majority’s concern about social welfare losses, arguing
that exclusivity would be limited both in scope and term.124 Inventors
would be free to use the abstract principle for any other function, and
inventors could use the principle for any function at the conclusion of
the patent term.125 Thus, according to the dissenting opinion, welfare
losses would not be significant.
Despite the LeRoy dissent’s argument for broader patent scope,
subsequent courts adopted the more restrictive subject-matter requirements of the LeRoy majority. The 1853 Supreme Court case
O’Reilly v. Morse exemplified this trend.126 The Court in O’Reilly was particularly concerned with the over-expansive nature of claims based on
abstract ideas.127 Henry O’Reilly challenged the validity of patents held
by Samuel Morse on the invention and improvement of telegraph
technology.128 The specific patent in question contained eight claims,
the eighth of which was the subject of the controversy.129 Morse claimed
as follows:
Eighth. I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery, or parts of machinery, described in the foregoing
specifications and claims; the essence of my invention being
the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call electro-magnetism, however developed, for
120 See id. at 177.
121 Id. at 187.
122Id.
123 See LeRoy, 55 U.S. at 187.
124 See id.
125 Id.
126 See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 passim (1853).
127 See id. at 135.
128 See id. at 63–65.
129 See id. at 85–86.
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making or printing intelligible characters, letters, or signs, at
any distances, being a new application of that power, of which
I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer.130
The Court invalidated the claim due to its excessive breadth.131 The
Court reasoned that validating the claim would mean that “it matters
not by what process or machinery the result is accomplished.”132 Morse
would nonetheless have the exclusive right to that new invention or
improvement. The Court, identifying social welfare-reducing implications of granting Morse exclusivity, stated that a competitor’s improved
“invention may be less complicated—less liable to get out of order—
less expensive in construction, and in its operation. But yet if it is covered by this patent the inventor could not use it nor the public have the
benefit of it without [Morse’s permission].”133 Therefore, if the Court
had granted Morse such broad exclusive rights, other inventors would
have no incentive to conduct research in this area because the Morse
patent would prevent the inventor from exploiting and profiting from
the broad invention without Morse’s permission.134 Thus, unless Morse
had the capability and willingness to duplicate the efforts of such inventors, there would likely be less innovation in the field of the Morse patent for the duration of the patent term, leaving society worse off.135
Additional social welfare losses result from broad patent scope. As
the O’Reilly Court noted, not only would it have a chilling effect on
competing inventors, but a patent grant for Morse’s eighth claim would
reduce the flow of knowledge into the public domain.136 Morse would
be free to improve and advance the subject matter of the patent without revealing such advancements to society. He would “need place no
description of the new manner, process, or machinery, upon the records of the patent office.”137 Moreover, at the end of the patent term,
“the public must apply to [Morse] to learn what it is.”138 Therefore,
validating the expansive eighth claim could provide Morse with both
patent protection during the patent term and trade secret protection at
patent expiration. This result, while benefiting Morse greatly, would
130 Id. at 86.
131 Id. at 113.
132 O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 113.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 See id.
136 See id.
137 Id.
138 O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 113.
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leave society with no gain from incurring the costs of granting Morse
exclusivity in this industrial area.139
In 1876, the Supreme Court revisited the question of identifying
the boundaries of patentable subject matter in Cochrane v. Deener.140
Cochrane remains relevant because of its characterization of patent
processes. In the case, claimant Cochrane had multiple patents on a
process and machinery to produce refined flour.141 His process patent
claim covered the entire process of grinding and filtering flour with the
use of air current to remove impurities.142 Similar to Morse’s broad
process claim,143 Cochrane did not limit his claim to any particular machine. He claimed priority for any process employing the collective
elements of his claim to refine flour.144 The defendant had an improved method of refining flour that used a different type of machinery to effectuate the same function.145 The defendant believed that this
difference was sufficient to avoid infringement.146 Unlike O’Reilly, however, the Court did not conclude that Cochrane’s claim was overly
broad.147 In ruling that the defendant’s method was infringing, the
Court concluded that any alternative process that duplicated the steps
of the patented process would infringe that patent regardless of whether the steps were accomplished in a different manner.148 The particular
method used to accomplish the function was irrelevant.149 This conclusion encouraged broad patent claims in its aftermath. Nevertheless, if a
claim was too broadly drawn, the O’Reilly ruling would disqualify the
claim from statutory subject matter.150
The Cochrane Court addressed the patent scope concern by providing a narrow definition of patent processes. The Court reasoned as follows: “[A] process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the
subject matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or
thing.”151 Under this reasoning, a claim would describe a patent qualify139 See id.
140 Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 786–88 (1876).
141 Id. at 781–85.
142 Id. at 785.
143 O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 85–86.
144 Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 784–86.
145 Id. at 785–86.
146 Id. at 786.
147 See id. at 787–88.
148 Id. at 788.
149 See id.
150 See O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 113.
151 Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 788.
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ing process so long as the claim was sufficiently detailed to describe a
series of steps or actions taken to physically transform a material object
to a different state or thing.152 Abstract ideas and mental processes
would not satisfy this test, nor would computer programs that were not
part of some larger process.153 Thus, the Cochrane physical transformation test provided a safe harbor for claims that might be subject to challenge for being abstract or overly broad.
For some time, the Cochrane process definition limited the scope of
process patent claims.154 Interestingly, at least one recent commentator
has dismissed this interpretation of Cochrane as relying on incorrect dicta.155 The basis for such criticism, however, appears to stem solely from
the fact that contemporary federal court decisions have rejected the
Cochrane physical transformation test.156 An alternative view is that the
courts have adopted a policy mandate to limit the scope of statutory
subject matter due to the anti-competitive nature of patents.157 Thus,
limiting statutory subject matter to the types of inventions Congress
conceived of when enacting the first patent act would be consistent
both with this policy objective and congressional intent.158 The physical
transformation test furthers this objective by limiting patent protection
to industrial and manufacturing innovations.159 Whereas the test is flexible enough to accommodate new types of innovations within established categories, it does not allow protection for innovation in different or new categories of innovation such as business methods or computer software. Arguably, expansion of patent protection to new
categories of innovation is in the sole domain of Congress.160 Thus, limiting the spread of patent protection is more emblematic of judicial

152 See id.
153 See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–93 (ruling that a process patent that contained a mathematical algorithm as its sole novel element was valid subject matter because it was part
of an industrial process for creating artificial rubber molds).
154 See Samuelson, supra note 47, at 1037–38; Katharine P. Ambrose, Comment, The
Mental Steps Doctrine, 48 Tenn. L. Rev. 903, 907–08 (1981).
155 See Ambrose, supra note 154, at 907–08 (“[C]ourts interpreted dicta in the landmark case of Cochrane v. Deener to mean that patentable processes must operate on physical
substances, and the courts therefore denied patents to methods requiring only the use of
the human mind and writing implements.”) (citations omitted).
156 See id.
157 See Thomas & DiMatteo, supra note 1, at 6.
158 See id. at 6–9.
159 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–93; Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 787–89; see also Thomas, supra note
1, at 193–97.
160 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. But see Thomas, supra note 1, at 194.
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restraint than allowing the unfettered expansion of statutory subject
matter that has occurred in recent decades.
The judicial policy of constraining statutory subject matter continued in the twentieth century. Until recent decades, patent claims that
consisted of steps that take place in the human mind or require human
intervention were excluded from statutory subject matter.161 “Mental
steps jurisprudence,” which developed in a series of cases over several
decades, construed valid subject matter as excluding claims that require
human calculation, measurement, and interpretation.162 In 1951, the
Court of Appeals in In re Abrams delineated the rules for applying the
mental steps doctrine.163 The case identifies three possibilities: first, all
steps of a process claim are mental; second, the claim consists of both
mental and non-mental steps but the novelty lies entirely in the mental
steps; and third, a mixed claim for which the novelty resides in nonmental steps and the mental steps are incidental parts of the process but
are needed to limit or define the claim.164 Under the doctrine, only
claims that fall in the third category qualify as statutory subject matter.165
B. The United States Supreme Court’s Cautionary Approach to Software Patents
The U.S. Congress has assiduously avoided addressing whether
computer software is patentable, thereby leaving the judicial system to
shape policy.166 With the rapid development of computer technology,
the Supreme Court first considered the subject-matter question in 1972
in Gottschalk v. Benson.167 The claim considered was for a “method for
converting binary-coded decimal (BCD) numerals into pure binary
numerals.”168 This sweeping method was not tied to any particular machine or programming language. In fact, the claim method could be
performed mentally or on paper without a computer. 169 As a result, it
was easy for the Supreme Court to dispose of the claim because it was
161 See Ambrose, supra note 154, at 903; Cotter, supra note 60, at 860–61; Samuelson,
supra note 47, at 1037.
162 See Samuelson, supra note 47, at 1034.
163 See 188 F.2d 165, 166 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
164 See id.
165 See id.
166 See Benson, 409 U.S. at 73 (noting that “considerable problems are raised which only
committees of Congress can manage, for broad powers of investigation are needed, including hearings which canvass the wide variety of views which those operating in this field
entertain.”).
167 Id. at 64.
168 Id.
169 See id. at 66–67.
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“so abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of
the BCD to pure binary conversion.”170
Although disposal of the BCD claim was straightforward, the Court
was concerned about whether its opinion would be interpreted as
standing for the proposition that computer software could never be
patented. The Court stated that “[w]e do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our prior
precedents,” and “[we do not hold] that the [Benson] decision precludes a patent for any program servicing a computer.”171 Nevertheless,
the Court, observing that “pure” software patent claims had previously
been denied, noted that there existed considerable practical confusion
in dealing with some software patent claims camouflaged as “a process,
or a machine or components thereof . . . rather than as a program itself.”172 In other words, whether or not Congress chose to extend statutory subject matter to cover pure software programs, congressional action was still required to give the USPTO and courts guidance on how
to handle hybrid claims.173
The Court was clearly uncomfortable with accepting the reins of
policy makers. Rather than give the public guidance as to how to treat
patent claims, the Benson Court issued an impassioned plea for Congress to accept its responsibilities to develop patent policy in the legislative forum.174 Thus, while identifying its machine or physical transformation test as the relevant precedent,175 Benson emphatically refused to
assert that the test applies to all software patent claims.176 The Court
intentionally left the decision ambiguous in the hopes of eventual congressional intervention.
With the failure of Congress to accept the Court’s invitation to
take action, the Supreme Court issued its second ruling on software
patentability. In 1977, in Parker v. Flook,177 the Court considered a process claim that calculated an alarm limit. In certain industrial applications, operators—whether human or machines—need to receive notifi170 Id. at 68.
171 Id. at 71.
172 Benson, 409 U.S. at 72.
173 See id. at 73.
174 See id.
175 See id. at 70 (“Transformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or
thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular
machines.”).
176 See id. at 71 (“We do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not
meet the requirements of our prior precedents.”).
177 See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1977).
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cation when certain process variables reach or exceed a designated
threshold—the alarm limit—in order to make adjustments to maintain
efficiency or to avoid dangerous conditions. 178 The Flook claim, although machine independent, provided a method for continually adjusting the alarm rate based on changes in process variables.179 The only novel element of the process was the use of an algorithm for calculating alarm rates.180
In rejecting the patentability of the Flook claim, the Court did not
directly consider whether computer software per se is patentable. The
Court, acknowledging in a footnote that one could argue that Supreme
Court precedent requires processes to change materials to a “different
state or thing,” refused to apply those precedents to the Flook claim.181
Moreover, the Court left open the question of whether it considered
software as part of the category of unpatentable algorithms. Instead, the
Court’s new test basically required examiners to remove the algorithm
from consideration before evaluating the patentability of the claim.182
Under this test, courts and examiners must first consider the algorithm
“well known” in the prior art to avoid biasing the overall evaluation of
the claim.183 Then, subject to this constraint, the reviewer must determine whether the process claim as a whole is new and useful.184
The respondent argued that this treatment conflated the Section
102 and 103 novelty and usefulness requirements with the Section 101
subject-matter determination.185 The Court deflected this claim by observing that certain discoveries such as laws of nature are outside what
Congress intended to protect.186 Therefore, courts must refuse to allow
patentability to be determined solely by non-patentable subject matter.187 Whereas inclusion of a law of nature or algorithm does not by
itself disqualify a claim from patent protection, neither can it be the
sole factor that is new and non-obvious.
In Flook the Supreme Court attempted to create limits for softwarebased creations without violating its self-imposed constraint of not rul-

178 See id.
179 See id. at 585–86.
180 See id.
181 See id. at 588 n.9, 594.
182 See id. at 591–92.
183 See Flook, 437 U.S. at 591–92.
184 See id. at 591.
185 See id. at 592.
186 See id. at 593.
187 See id.
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ing on the patentability of computer software.188 The Court’s ruling,
that any software that could be classified as an algorithm could not provide the claim element that met patentability requirements, provided a
bulwark against clever claim drafters getting patents that would be rejected if framed differently.189 Nevertheless, this approach increased
rather than reduced ambiguity. Without defining “algorithm,” it was
unclear whether the term encompassed all computer programs or just
a subset.190 Nonetheless, Flook was successful in putting limits, albeit for
a short time, on the scope of patentable process claims.191
The Supreme Court quickly rejected the Flook constraints in 1981
in Diamond v. Diehr.192 The Diehr process claim consisted of “a process
for molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision products.”193 The contribution of this claim was the ability to measure the
temperature of the rubber inside the press continually, and to recalculate the Arrhenius equation based on this data in order to determine
the precise time to complete the curing process.194 Applying the Flook
test to this claim required evaluating the artificial rubber-curing process
under the assumption that the non-patentable Arrhenius equation was
well known in the art.195 Employing this approach in his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens concluded that the claim contained no innovation
other than the continual monitoring of the process, and was thus not
statutory subject matter.196
The majority of the Supreme Court rejected this analysis based,
ironically, on an application of the machine-or-physical-transformation
test.197 The Court reconciled Benson and Flook by characterizing those
claims as attempts to obtain patents on mathematical formulae.198 It
distinguished the Diehr claim as a more efficient method for curing
rubber, an industrial process of the type that patents were designed to
188 See id. at 595.
189 See Flook, 437 U.S. at 590.
190 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 219 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining how “the inclusion of
the ambiguous concept of an ‘algorithm’ within the ‘law of nature’ category of unpatentable subject matter has given rise to the concern that almost any process might be so
described and therefore held unpatentable”).
191 Compare Flook, 437 U.S. at 591–94, with Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192 (rejecting the constraints in Flook).
192 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192.
193 Id. at 175.
194 Id. at 178–79.
195 See id. at 208–09 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
196 See id. at 209.
197 See id. at 192 (majority opinion).
198 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185–87.
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protect.199 Critical to the Court’s analysis was that this process, considered in its entirety, transformed the state of a substance.200 The Court
refused to use physical transformation as a necessary condition for patentability, but did recognize it as a sufficient condition to satisfy the
subject-matter requirement.201
Most significantly, the Court rejected the Flook approach of not
allowing patents for which a non-patentable algorithm was the sole
source of innovation.202 This reversal made it significantly easier for patent lawyers to draft valid patent claims that were faster or more efficient than—but the same in all other respects as—existing technology.203 In a passionate dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, castigated the majority opinion for
increasing uncertainty and ambiguity in the treatment of patent claims
containing computer programs and mathematical algorithms. 204 Of
even greater importance, however, was the Diehr dissent’s argument
that the majority opinion eviscerated the holdings in Benson and Flook
as well as “the settled line of authority reviewed in those opinions.”205
Whereas the Supreme Court in Benson and Flook attempted to provide
some limits to the patentability of software, the dissenting justices in
Diehr argued that the majority’s approach essentially opened the floodgates to software patents.
Specifically, the dissenting justices saw little substantive difference
between the alarm-limits patent claim invalidated in Flook and the rubber-curing patent in Diehr.206 None of the process steps or components
were unusual except the application of the Arrhenius algorithm to
temperature readings in order to choose an optimal time to end the
curing process.207 The novelty in this process consisted solely of “updating the original estimated curing time by repetitively recalculating that
time pursuant to a well-known mathematical formula in response to
variations in temperature within the mold.”208 The only noticeable dif199 See id. at 184.
200 See id. at 192.
201 See id.
202 See id. at 185–88.
203 See id. at 187–88.
204 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 193 (majority opinion), 219 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
205 Id. at 205 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
206 Id. at 209 (“Their method of updating the curing time calculation is strikingly reminiscent of the method of updating alarm limits that Dale Flook sought to patent.”).
207 Id. at 208 (“There is no suggestion that there is anything novel in the instrumentation of the mold, in actuating a timer when the press is closed, or in automatically opening
the press when the computed time expires.”).
208 Id. at 209.
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ference between this process and the alarms limit process in Flook is
that the Diehr process automatically opened the rubber mold once designated conditions were made, whereas the alarms limit process claim
did not include automatically setting off an alarm.209
It is hard to reconcile the different results in Flook and Diehr given
the strong similarity between the two cases. Flook stood for the proposition that adding insignificant post-solution activity was insufficient to
make a mathematical algorithm patentable.210 Yet it is difficult to rationalize Diehr’s implicit conclusion that signaling the opening of a
rubber mold after obtaining the solution of a mathematic algorithm
does constitute a significant post-solution action.211 The use of the Arrhenius algorithm in an unequivocal industrial process clearly influenced the Diehr Court.212 But perhaps the similar post-solution action of
generating a signal in both cases makes the industrial application a distinction without substance.213 With the Diehr Court’s “entire process”
approach it appeared easier to get patent approval for an algorithm
embedded in a useful process.214 The most significant constraint was
that the claim could not encompass all uses of the algorithm.215 Nevertheless, if a particular industry, such as rubber manufacturing, relies on
a particular algorithm, this constraint does not prevent an inventor
from preempting the automatic or computerized use of the equation as
happened in Diehr.216 Thus, the Diehr decision opened the door to
broad patent claims that relied on algorithms.
The final, oft-cited Supreme Court patent subject matter case of the
twentieth century had nothing to do with computer algorithms or process claims. Nevertheless, the 1980 Supreme Court case Diamond v. Chakrabarty217 is sometimes misquoted as standing for the proposition that
U.S. patent law holds no boundaries for human inventiveness.218 The
defendant, Chakrabarty, invented a micro-organism that consumed
209 Cf. Flook, 437 U.S. at 585–86.
210 See id. at 590.
211 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184.
212 See id. at 185–88.
213 See id. at 184; Flook, 437 U.S. at 594–95.
214 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–89.
215 See id. at 188; see also Benson, 409 U.S. at 71–73.
216 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–93.
217 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
218 See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp. Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Indeed, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that Congress intended §
101 to extend to ‘anything under the sun that is made by man.’” (quoting Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. at 309)).
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crude oil, a trait that presumably would be useful in oil spill cleanups.219
The issue was whether or not a micro-organism was disqualified from
statutory subject matter because it is a life form; or, alternatively, whether it qualified as statutory subject matter as either a manufacture or as a
composition of matter.220 The Supreme Court reasoned that the microorganism, although a life form, was not a product of nature but rather a
creation of man, and as such, was statutory subject matter.221 The Supreme Court cited Committee Reports published in connection with
the adoption of the 1952 Patent Act, which indicated that Congress intended statutory subject matter to “include anything under the sun that
is made by man.”222
Although the language is sweeping, the context of the Court’s
quote makes it clear that the Court did not intend to apply the language
to computer software. The Chakrabarty Court clearly stated that statutory
subject-matter scope is not unlimited.223 Citing their Flook decision, the
Court reiterated that laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract
ideas are excluded from statutory subject matter.224 It is quite telling that
the Court cited Flook as the most recent authority for these limitations.225
There is no contradiction between the two cases. Both cases purported
to deal with new, unforeseen categories of creation: computer programs
in Flook226 and man-made organisms in Chakrabarty.227 Although specific
details may have been unforeseen, existing categories covered each of
these claims. The Court classified the Flook computer program as a mathematical algorithm—an abstract idea228—and the Charkrabarty microorganism was either a manufacture or composition of matter.229 Thus,
the claims’ classifications—either a process or a manufacture or composition of matter—dictated the respective claims’ treatments. A manufacture or composition of matter claim is clearly valid patent subject matter
even if the invention had never been anticipated.230 Process claims,
219 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305.
220 See id. at 307.
221 See id. at 309–10.
222 See id. at 309.
223 See id. (“This is not to suggest that § 101 has no limits or that it embraces every discovery.”).
224 See id.
225 See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
226 See Flook, 437 U.S. at 585–86.
227 See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305.
228 See Flook, 437 U.S. at 594–96.
229 See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309–10.
230 See id.
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however, were subject to the more limited treatment described in the
Supreme Court’s Benson-Flook-Diehr line of cases.
C. Federal Court Treatment of Computer Software
Federal courts’ expansive treatment of computer and software patents in the computer age contrasts strikingly with the Supreme Court’s
cautionary approach.231 Prior to the 1960s, the U.S. judiciary was consistent in limiting the scope of statutory subject matter.232 Nonetheless,
the United States Court of Patent Appeals (CCPA) and its successor, the
CAFC, delivered a series of decisions that rapidly removed the set of
limitations that various courts adopted and followed during the nineteenth century and most of the twentieth century.233 The change can
be attributed to a different interpretation of the policy basis behind the
Patent Act. With respect to software, courts had interpreted Section 101
narrowly prior to the 1960s.234 Courts interpreted “useful arts” to include processes that were “technological” in nature.235 Federal courts
did not question prohibitions against abstract ideas and laws of nature
because the potential for such patents to deter progress was clear.236 By
contrast, the policy bases for other statutory subject-matter exclusions,
such as the mental steps exclusion, were rather opaque. 237 Consequently, starting in the 1960s, federal courts—perhaps adopting a more
expansive view of statutory subject matter, or perhaps demanding

231 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 205 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing the approach of the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals to Section 101 statutory subject matter questions as
“expansive”); In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 893–94 (Baldwin, J., concurring) (describing the
majority opinion’s rejection of well-established subject matter limits as “radical”).
232 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 195 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that, “[p]rior to 1968,
well-established principles of patent law probably would have prevented the issuance of a
valid patent on almost any conceivable computer program”).
233 See id.
234 Id.
235 See Samuelson, supra note 47, at 1112 (quoting professor D. Chisum as stating “the
general purpose of the statutory classes of subject matter is to limit patent protection to the
field of applied technology, what the U.S. Constitution calls the ‘useful arts,’” and also
quoting professor Chisum as noting that as practical and useful as they may be, “discoveries . . . in nontechnological arts, such as the liberal arts, the social sciences, theoretical
mathematics, and business and management methodology” are not patentable).
236 See Benson, 409 U.S. at 67 (discussing how abstract ideas and laws of nature are excluded from statutory subject matter because “they are the basic tools of scientific and
technological work”); LeRoy, 55 U.S. at 175 (“A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental
truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either
of them an exclusive right.”).
237 See, e.g., Ambrose, supra note 154, at 911.
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greater rigor in shaping decisions—reviewed such exclusions critically
and rejected them for lacking legislative support.
One of the first rules to fall under this enhanced level of scrutiny
was the mental steps exclusion. In 1968, in In re Prater, the CCPA considered a claim rejection based on In re Abrams’ “three rules” for dealing with mental steps.238 The court noted that the defense attorney’s
brief proposed the three rules and that the Abrams court had never
adopted the three rules for testing claims containing mental steps.239
The court continued by dismissing the Cochrane physical transformation
test as dicta.240 This decision and the CCPA’s reaffirmation of its reasoning in its rehearing of In re Prater, put into question the continued viability of the mental steps exclusion.
In 1970, in In re Musgrave, the CCPA answered this question by rejecting the mental steps doctrine and its point of novelty approach.241
The CCPA reiterated its rejection of the Abrams mental steps rules.242
The CCPA continued by specifically rejecting the “point of novelty”
analysis incorporated in the Abrams rule as “logically unsound.”243 This
rejection was particularly noteworthy because the Supreme Court in
Flook had recently employed a point of novelty analysis in rejecting a
patent claim containing an algorithm.244 In addition, the CCPA explicitly rejected mental steps as a statutory subject-matter exclusion.245 The
CCPA reasoned that a claim that required subjective judgment would
likely be rejected under other Patent Law provisions but would not be
excluded from statutory subject-matter treatment.246
In dealing with claims that included algorithms, similar to those
that the Supreme Court reviewed in Flook and Diehr,247 the federal
courts found substantial leeway in shaping the law. In 1992, in Arrhythmia Research Technology v. Corazonix Corp.,248 the CAFC—the CCPA’s successor court—faced the task of determining the validity of a mixed patent claim that was remarkably similar to the mixed claims in Flook249
238 See In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378, 1381, 1386 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
239 See id. at 1386.
240 See id. at 1388.
241 See In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 886.
242 See id. at 889.
243 Id.
244 See Flook, 437 U.S. at 594.
245 See In re Musgrave, 431 U.S. at 889, 893.
246 Id. at 893.
247 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 181, 185; Flook, 437 U.S. at 587.
248 958 F.2d 1053, 1056, 1059–60 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
249 437 U.S. at 585–86.
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and Diehr.250 The patent claim at issue in Arrhythmia Research dealt with a
medical problem related to heart attack victims, who are at high risk of
suffering from ventricular tachycardia, a condition which can lead to a
large diminution in the flow of blood from the heart.251 Although
drugs are effective in treating the condition, these drugs have serious
side effects and optimally should be taken only when absolutely
needed.252 Based on well-known relationships between patients’ electrocardiographic signals and heart conditions, treating physicians could
identify patients who were at particularly high risk for ventricular tachycardia. Specifically, patients with certain anomalous wave characteristics
in the ventricular contraction cycle—referred to as “late potentials” —
were at high risk.253 The Stinson patent claim’s innovation was its ability
to filter and isolate late potentials present in electrocardiograph readings and set off an alarm if the late potentials exceeded a specified
threshold.254 In summary, the invention consisted of reading electrocardiograph signals, converting the reading to a data format readable
by a generic computer, and analyzing the data using mathematical algorithms for the presence of late potentials by comparing the value of
analyzed data to a predetermined level.255
The Arrhythmia Research process claim was analogous to the alarmsrate process claim in Flook and the rubber-curing process claim in Diehr.
In all three cases, the point of novelty resided entirely in the dataprocessing component of the claim.256 The electrocardiograph readings that indicate the presence of late potentials were well known, as
were the threshold levels that warranted initiation of patient treatment.257 The novelty in the Stinson patent claim, then, was processing a
noisy digital signal to produce a reading that provided a more accurate
measure of the level of late potentials.258 Analogous to the Flook alarmslimit claim,259 the Stinson claim accepted input data, evaluated it using
250 450 U.S. at 177–81.
251 Arrhythmia Research, 958 F.2d at 1054.
252 See id.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 1054–55.
255 Id. at 1055. The patent application also included an apparatus claim covering a device that performed the same functions.
256 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 205 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Flook, 437 U.S. at 585; Arrhythmia Research, 958 F.2d at 1058.
257 Arrhythmia Research, 958 F.2d at 1059.
258 See id. at 1058–59 (describing the process as “a method of detection of a certain
heart condition by a novel method of analyzing a portion of the electrocardiographically
measured heart cycle”).
259 Flook, 437 U.S. at 585–86.
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mathematical algorithms and provided a reading of the target variable.260 Unlike the rubber-curing claim in Diehr, the Stinson process was
not part of a traditional industrial process that produced a physical end
product.261 Thus, there was no significant difference between the Stinson process and algorithm-based process claims in Benson and Flook that
the Supreme Court held were not statutory subject matter.262
Nonetheless, the CAFC held that the Stinson claim constituted
statutory subject matter.263 In applying the physical transformation test,
the CAFC erroneously concluded that the Stinson process transformed
matter from one state to another.264 In referring to the electrocardiograph signals that provided input data for the analysis, the CAFC mistakenly asserted that such signals were not abstractions, but were “related to the patient’s heart function.”265 But such signals are absolutely
abstractions. Although related to the patient’s heart function, these signals are simply a measure of that function, just as a digital thermometer
measures temperature. Once translated into digital form, the electrocardiograph signal is much more akin to financial data in a spreadsheet
than it is to the function of a patient’s heart. Just as the information in
a spreadsheet provides an abstraction of financial information, the
electrocardiograph signal provides an abstract representation of the
patient’s heart function.266 The CAFC also concluded that manipulation of electrical signals satisfied the physical transformation test.267
Thus, according to the CAFC, the act of converting readings from a
measuring device into a form that a generic digital computer could
recognize also satisfies the physical transformation test.268
Judge Rader’s concurrence in Arrhythmia Research provided a
somewhat prescient insight into the direction that the CAFC was headed. Rather than accept the tortured attempts of the Arrhythmia Research
260 Arrhythmia Research, 958 F.2d at 1058–59.
261 Compare id. at 1059, with Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176–77.
262 Compare Arrhythmia Research, 958 F.2d at 1059, with Flook, 437 U.S. at 594, and Benson,
409 U.S. at 72-73.
263 Arrythmia Research, 958 F.2d at 1060.
264 See id. at 1059.
265 See id. The CAFC, in addressing the validity of the Stinson apparatus claim, bizarrely
concluded that a number representing a measure of heart activity was not a mathematical
abstraction because it provided an indication of the risk of ventricular tachycardia. See id.
at 1060.
266 See id. at 1059.
267 See id. (“These claimed steps of ‘converting,’ ‘applying,’ ‘determining,’ and ‘comparing’ are physical process steps that transform one physical, electrical signal into another.”).
268 Id. at 1060.
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majority to stretch the physical transformation test to cover the Stinson
process, Judge Rader advocated dropping all subject-matter tests that
had no statutory basis in Section 101 of the Patent Act.269 Judge Rader
noted that most of the tests relied on “vague and malleable terms” such
as “law of nature,” “natural phenomena,” “formulae,” or “algorithm.”270
He noted that “[w]hen attempting to enforce a legal standard embodied in broad, vague, non statutory terms, the courts have floundered.”271 Judge Rader noted the specific difficulty courts had in interpreting and applying the prohibition against patenting mathematical
algorithms.272 He identified two 1982 CCPA cases that had dramatically
different interpretations of that term.273 In In re Pardo, the CCPA narrowly defined mathematical algorithm, 274 whereas in In re Meyer,275 the
CCPA broadly defined mathematical algorithm, “to include any mental
process that can be represented by a mathematical algorithm.”276 In any
event, Judge Rader argued that Diehr had already jettisoned the mathematical algorithm exclusion, leaving laws of nature, natural phenomenon, and abstract ideas as the only non-statutory subject-matter
exclusions.277 Therefore, courts should look to the plain meaning of
Section 101 to determine valid statutory subject matter.278 The CAFC
soon followed Judge Rader’s exhortation.279
In In re Alappat, the CAFC began moving towards the complete elimination of statutory subject-matter tests by jettisoning the Supreme
Court’s physical-transformation test.280 The In re Alappat claim was a
computer program that could run on any conventional digital computer, known as a rasterizer. A waveform data sequence provided the
input, which the rasterizer processed and filtered to produce output
data that was amenable to display on a cathode ray tube.281 Consistent
with Judge Rader’s concurrence in Arrhythmia Research, the CAFC reiterated that Diehr recognized laws of nature, natural phenomena, and ab269 See Arrhythmia Research, 958 F.2d at 1066 (Rader, J., concurring).
270 Id. at 1062–63.
271 Id. at 1063.
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 Id.; In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 916–17 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
275 In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 796 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
276 Arrhythmia Research, 958 F.2d at 1063.
277 Id. at 1066.
278 See id.
279 AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’n, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1359–61 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
280 See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed.Cir. 1994) (en banc).
281 Id. at 1537.
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stract ideas as the only exclusions from statutory subject matter.282 The
CAFC then concluded that a claim that includes software is nonstatutory only to the extent that the claim as a whole “represent[s] nothing more than abstract ideas.”283 Thus, unless a claim was unequivocally
a mathematical algorithm, it qualified as statutory subject matter.284 To
satisfy this standard for statutory subject matter, the inventor need only
show that the claim produced “a useful, concrete, and tangible result.”285 The rasterizer in In re Alappat clearly satisfied this standard.286
In re Alappat’s “useful, concrete and tangible” test removed all remaining ambiguity as to whether claims must satisfy the Cochrane physical transformation test to be considered statutory subject matter.287 Although the BCD claim in Benson would likely fail the useful, concrete
and tangible test, the alarm-limits claim in Flook might satisfy the test
based on In re Alappat’s broad definition of “concrete and tangible.”288
In addition, In re Alappat made it easier for clever claims drafters to
frame software programs employed in conventional digital computers
as machines.289 Drafting a claim as a machine rather than a process
makes satisfying the concrete and tangible requirement trivial.
AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc. and State Street Bank &
Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. removed all remaining Section
101 impediments to software patents.290 The State Street Bank claim was a
computerized accounting system used to allocate returns for mutual
fund shareholders.291 The AT&T patent identified a method for recording certain information about long-distance telephone callers that
was useful for billing purposes.292 These cases went a step beyond Alappat in that the subject patent claims consisted entirely of business applications.293 Prior to State Street Bank, it was generally accepted that meth282 Id. at 1542.
283 Id. at 1543 (emphasis omitted).
284 Id. at 1544 (“[T]he proper inquiry . . . is to see whether the claimed subject matter
as a whole is a disembodied mathematical concept . . . which in essence represents nothing more than a ‘law of nature,’ ‘natural phenomenon,’ or ‘abstract idea.’”)(emphasis
omitted).
285 Id.
286 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544.
287 Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 787–88; see In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544.
288 See Flook, 437 U.S. at 585–86, 591; Benson, 409 U.S. at 72; In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at
1544–45.
289 See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1545.
290 See AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1359–61; State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1375–76.
291 State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1370.
292 AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1353.
293 See id.; State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1370.
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ods for conducting business were not valid subject matter for patents:
this exclusion was known as the business method exception. State Street
Bank rejected the business method exception, reasoning that reliance
on Section 101 and patent law in general are sufficient to evaluate such
claims.294 Instead, State Street Bank employed In re Alappat’s useful, concrete and tangible result test to evaluate the mutual fund accounting
method as constituting statutory subject matter.295
AT&T explicitly extinguished Diehr’s physical-transformation test.
Excel Corporation based its defense to AT&T’s infringement claim on
the patent’s failure to effect a physical transformation.296 Ignoring the
physical transformation discussion in Diehr,297 the CAFC instead focused on the use of the term “e.g.” in Diehr to infer that physical transformation was only one of multiple ways software could satisfy Section
101 statutory subject-matter requirements. 298 The court then proclaimed that the useful, concrete and tangible result test had supplanted the physical-transformation test, stating “[w]hatever may be left
of the earlier test, if anything, this type of physical limitations analysis
seems of little value.”299 Thus, software and business methods no longer
receive special statutory subject-matter scrutiny. Any software claim
drafted in terms of a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter may overcome the Section 101 hurdle.300
Support for the CAFC’s expansion of statutory subject matter was
not universal.301 Whereas Congress and the Supreme Court stayed on
the sidelines, the United States Board of Patent Appeals (BPA) attempted to reign in patent coverage of business method patents. In
2001 in Ex parte Bowman, the BPA considered an invention that claimed
a “method of evaluating an intangible asset of interest.”302 A representative claim consisted of choosing relevant variables, plotting the variables
on a two-dimensional chart and then using the chart to ascertain the
294 State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1375–76.
295 Id.
296 AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1358.
297 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182–84.
298 AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1358–59.
299 Id. at 1359.
300 Id. at 1359–61.
301 See Kevin M. Baird, Business Method Patents: Chaos at the USPTO or Business as Usual?,
2001 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 347, 358 (discussing the “Business Method Patent Improvement Act of 2000,” a congressional bill proposing changes to current patent prosecution procedures when dealing with business method patents); Thomas & DiMatteo, supra
note 1, at 8–9 (2007) (describing failed efforts by legislators to limit the patentability of
business method and software patents).
302 Ex parte Bowman, No. 1999-0583, 2001 WL 1646047, at *1 (B.P.A.I. June 12, 2001).
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value of the asset.303 Although it might appear that such an invention
would be subject to a Section 112 challenge for being vague, the BPA
ruled that the Bowman claims met the Section 112 disclosure requirement.304 Instead, the BPA rejected the Bowman claims because the invention was not tied to any technological art and therefore “is nothing
more than an abstract idea.”305 The BPA opined that the term “technological arts” was synonymous with the term “useful arts” that appears in
the Patent Clause of the Constitution.306
The technological arts requirement did not last. In 2005, in Ex
parte Lundgren, the BPA, in determining whether “a method of compensating a manager” is statutory subject matter, considered applying
two tests: the technological arts test and the “useful, concrete and tangible” test.307 The BPA rejected the technological arts requirement, noting that Ex parte Bowman lacked precedential value, and the Board
found no valid support for the requirement.308 The BPA then concluded that the invention was statutory subject matter because it satisfied the three requirements of the useful, concrete, and practical
test.309
Two BPA judges disagreed with this decision. Judge Smith interpreted the constitutional mandate for patents as restricted to inventions associated with science or technology.310 Although he did not
champion the technological arts test, Judge Smith noted that this test at
least required an invention to be tied to a computer.311 He further
noted that the method for compensating managers was a method that
could have been executed at the time of the drafting of the Constitution.312 Judge Smith could not imagine that the drafters would have
considered such an invention to be within the bounds of what they
considered to be statutory subject matter.313 Judge Barrett, in agreeing
with the majority that the technological arts test lacked validity, nevertheless disagreed that the Lundgren invention was statutory subject mat303 Id.
304 Id.; see 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (requiring patent claims to be sufficiently detailed in
order to enable someone skilled in the art to replicate the invention).
305 Ex parte Bowman, 2001 WL 1646047at *3.
306 See id.
307 Ex parte Lundgren, No. 2003–2088, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1386 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 28,
2005).
308 Id. at 1387.
309 Id. at 1386.
310 Id. at 1388 (Smith, J., dissenting).
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 Ex parte Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1388 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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ter.314 In reaching this conclusion, Judge Barrett embraced the previously discarded physical transformation test.315 In essence, Judge Barrett agreed with Judge Smith that a disemboweled invention that could
be executed separately and independently of any machine was not statutory subject matter.316 Thus, the two judges would not validate any
business method patent claim that was not computer implemented.
The judges’ position corresponds to the European approach under the
EPC. In the parlance of the EPO, a business method not implemented
on a computer would be a business method “as such,” and thus fail the
technicality requirement of Article 52.317
D. The Bilski Case
In 2008 the CAFC took up the statutory subject-matter question
once again in In re Bilski.318 The CAFC’s Bilski decision was likely influenced by dicta in two 2006 Supreme Court decisions that expressed
doubts about whether CAFC rulings with respect to business method
patents were correct. In eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, and Breyer voiced concern about granting permanent injunctive relief in business-method-patent infringement cases.319
Their rationale was that such patents are potentially vague and of “suspect validity.”320 In LabCorp v. Metabolite Laboratories, three justices questioned the validity of the State Street Bank holding.321 In a dissenting
opinion, Justices Breyer, Stevens, and Souter flatly rejected the CAFC’s
useful, concrete, and practical test because “[i]f taken literally, the
statement would cover instances where this Court has held to the contrary.”322 Thus, the CAFC appeared to have a mandate to curtail patent
coverage of business method patents.
The CAFC accepted this mandate in In re Bilski.323 The Bilski invention covered a method of hedging risk in commodity trading.324 Like
314 Id. at 1389 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
315 Id.
316 Id.
317 See EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 52.
318 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130
S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
319 eBay Inc v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 397 (2006) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
320 Id.
321 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs. Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 136 (2006) (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
322 Id.
323 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961.
324 Id. at 949.
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the Bowman325 and Lundgren326 claims, the Bilski invention did not require a computer for execution. It “merely manipulates [an] abstract
idea and solves a purely mathematical problem.”327 The CAFC identified its task in examining claims that included mathematical algorithms
to be that of determining whether the claimed use “would pre-empt all
uses of that fundamental principle.”328 The CAFC considered this task
daunting due to the complexity of modern claims.329 The CAFC, however, recognized that the machine or physical transformation test discussed in Diehr and earlier cases would be effective in rejecting overreaching patent claims.330 Moreover, the CAFC determined that the
machine or physical transformation test was valid law despite the Supreme Court’s refusal to explicitly adopt the test in Benson, Flook, and
Diehr.331 Thus, In re Bilski wiped clean several decades of CAFC and
CCPA jurisprudence while taking a step that the Supreme Court
seemed reluctant to take. On the appeal for In re Bilski, the Supreme
Court would respond to the CAFC’s reasoning.
On June 28, 2010, nearly eight months after hearing oral arguments in Bilski v. Kappos,332 the Supreme Court issued its long-awaited
decision on the last day of its term. Although the justices were unanimous in finding Bilski’s invention not patentable, they divided on the
legal reasoning and where to draw the line concerning the patentability
of business methods. Five justices reasoned that Section 101 does not
preclude the patentability of all methods of doing business, stating that
“a business method is simply one kind of ‘method’ that is, at least in
some circumstances, eligible for patenting.”333 Four justices concluded
that “although a process is not patent-ineligible simply because it is useful for conducting business, a claim that merely describes a method of
doing business” is not patentable.334
The majority—while not rejecting the CAFC’s revitalized machineor-physical-transformation test—refused to endorse the CAFC’s effort
to resolve the subject-matter question, and ultimately failed to articulate

325 Ex parte Bowman, 2001 WL 1646047 at *2.
326 Ex parte Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1387.
327 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 950.
328 Id. at 954.
329 See id.
330 See id.
331 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 189–90, 191–92; Flook, 437 U.S. at 589–90; Benson, 409 U.S. at 71.
332 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
333 Id. at 3228.
334 Id. at 3232 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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a test or set a clear standard.335 Rather, the Court returned responsibility to the CAFC to develop “less extreme means” than the machine or
physical-transformation test to limit business method patentability. The
Court advised the CAFC to try a variety of approaches “including (but
not limited to) application of our decisions in Benson, Flook, and Diehr.”336
Such approaches cannot rely solely on the machine or physicaltransformation test, however. The Court admonished the CAFC that
the test “is not the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process.’”337 Tracking earlier Supreme Court patent subject-matter jurisprudence, the Court asserted that the test “is a useful
and important clue, an investigative tool, for determining whether
some claimed inventions are processes under §101.”338 The Court went
on to explain that while it may have been sufficient for evaluating processes “similar to those in the Industrial Age,”339 they doubted its usefulness for the “Information Age”340 in which “new technologies may call
for new inquiries.”341 Therefore, rather than approving the CAFC’s
gutsy attempt to curtail business method patent claims—or taking a
similarly bold step to provide clarity—the Court cautiously relied on its
Benson, Flook, and Diehr decisions to reject Bilski’s claims as unpatentable abstract ideas.342 Without articulating a clear test, the Court
concluded that “[t]he concept of hedging, described in claim 1 and
reduced to a mathematical formula in claim 4, is an unpatentable abstract idea, just like the algorithms at issue in Benson and Flook.”343
Justice Stevens and the concurring justices would have drawn a
clearer line in the sand. Relying on interpretation of “process” as a
term of art anchored in historical practice, the concurrence concluded
that “[a] business method is not a ‘process’” under Section 101, and
therefore not patentable.344 Justice Breyer, while agreeing with Stevens
that business methods are not patentable processes, wrote a separate

335 See id. at 3226–27, 3231 (majority opinion).
336 Id. at 3231.
337 Id. at 3227.
338 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227.
339 Id.
340 Id.
341 Id. at 3227–28.
342 See id. at 3229–30.
343 Id. at 3231.
344 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3249–50 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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concurrence to “highlight the substantial agreement among the many
Members of the Court.”345
Nevertheless, the case narrows the scope of patentable subject matter from the “useful, concrete and tangible result” test articulated in
State Street Bank.346 Rather than completely rejecting the machine or
physical transformation test, all three opinions agree that the test has
been a “useful and important clue” but not the “sole test” for determining patentability.347 This previously discarded test has thus regained the
stature it had under Benson, Flook, and Diehr. Although Justice Kennedy’s
opinion does not expressly reject the useful, concrete, and tangible test,
Kennedy’s opinion indirectly rejected past CAFC patent process subjectmatter decisions.348 Indeed, five justices in the two concurring opinions
went even further by explicitly rejecting the State Street Bank standard.349
Following Bilski v. Kappos, U.S. patent process subject-matter law
has thus returned to the 1980s, perhaps with a revitalized exclusion for
abstract ideas. Any mixed process claim that does not solely claim a law
of nature, physical transformation, or abstract idea meets the initial patent subject-matter threshold.350 Until the CAFC provides additional
guidance, however, the USPTO must apply the amorphous standards of
Benson,351 Flook,352 and Diehr.353 If the claim provides a physical transformation of matter, then the decisions agree that the claim is patentable.354 Otherwise, it is unclear whether and under what conditions
process claims will escape the abstract idea exclusion. Regardless, a
claim to a business method patent must also meet the other patent requirements of novelty and non-obviousness.355 Thus, as the majority
opinion obliquely suggests, the CAFC may shift the critical patentability
345 Id. at 3257–58 (Breyer, J., concurring).
346 Compare id. at 3227 (majority opinion), with State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373.
347 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227, 3232 (Stevens, J., concurring), 3258 (Breyer, J. concurring).
348 Id. at 3221 (majority opinion) (stating that the opinion should not “be read as endorsing interpretations of § 101 that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has used
in the past”).
349 See id. at 3232 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[I]t would be a grave mistake to assume that anything with a ‘useful, concrete and tangible result’ . . . is patentable.”) (citation omitted) (quoting State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1368), 3259 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[I]f
taken literally, the statement [that anything which produces a useful, concrete, and tangible result is patentable] would cover instances where this Court has held the contrary.”).
350 Id. at 3225 (majority opinion).
351 See Benson, 409 U.S. at 71–72.
352 See Flook, 437 U.S. at 594–95.
353 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92.
354 Id. at 192; Flook, 437 U.S. at 594; Benson, 409 U.S. at 71.
355 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103; see Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191.

266

Boston College International & Comparative Law Review

[Vol. 34:227

standard to these tests rather than to the subject-matter requirement of
Section 101.356
III. The European Patent Office Treatment of Software Patents
Direct comparison of U.S. and European patent law in the area of
software and business method patents is difficult for both systemic and
substantive reasons. The systematic reasons involve the lack of jurisprudential uniformity in Europe. Within Europe, the EPO as well as the
national patent offices and courts of the contracting states interpret
and apply the EPC.357 Each nation, in transposing EPC requirements
into national legislation, altered its own substantive and procedural law
to approximate its laws to the EPC.358 Although this has harmonized
the law to some extent, national patent offices and courts can and do
interpret the requirements of the EPC differently than the EPO and
other national courts.359
The substantive reasons for difficulty involve the “technical” requirement for patentability that exists at the heart of European patent
law.360 U.S. patent law does not have a direct corollary. The exact nature of the technical contribution requirement as it relates to computer
programs and business methods is chimerical. Not only have the tests
for technicality been a moving target, often conflicting within and
among jurisdictions, but the EPO has never provided a clear and workable legal definition of “technical” as it relates to software and business
method patents.361
356 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229–31. This is similar to the approach taken by the EPO in
determining whether business methods and software patent claims should be granted. See
Keith Beresford, Patenting Software Under the European Patent Convention 116
(2000); European Patent Office, Patents for Software? European Law and Practice 3 (2009) [hereinafter Patents for Software?].
357 See infra notes 679–682 and accompanying text.
358 See, e.g., infra Part III.A.
359 See infra Part IV.C. Failure to separate questions of patentability from those of enforcement of granted patent presents a weakness in the current debate over software patents in Europe. Andreas Grosche, Software Patent—Boon or Bane for Europe? 14 Inter. J. L. &
Info. Tech. 257, 269 (2006). Nevertheless, the possibility of differing interpretations by
patent granting offices and by the courts tasked with determining the validity of European
patents figure largely in the European problem. See infra Parts IV.C.3 and V.B.
360 Christopher Laub, Software Patenting: Legal Standards in Europe and the US in View of
Strategic Limitations of the IP Systems, 9 J. World Intell. Prop. 344, 344–46 (2007).
361 See Greg Aharonian, Why All Business Methods Achieve a Technical Effect?, Internet Patent News Service (Oct. 2001), http://www.bustpatents.com/aharonian/bzmtdtch.htm
(citing an EPO decision from September 2000, which recognizes that the meaning of the
term “technical” is not very clear). Aharonian subsequently quotes a private communication
between himself and an EPO official on the meaning of “technical”:
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In this Part, we begin with an introduction to the European patent
system to highlight the systemic difficulties in creating a unified law on
software and business method patents.362 We then examine the evolution and present state of patentability of computer programs and business methods in the European Patent Office.363 Part IV then addresses
the United Kingdom.364 The United Kingdom serves as an apt European comparative jurisdiction because of its recent history of patent
practice and EPC interpretation that is at odds with the EPO. Part IV
also includes a brief analysis of Germany’s patent practice in this area
due to Germany’s significance as the largest European Union state.365
A. The European Patent System
In the United States, the USPTO examines applications and decides whether to grant a patent.366 Only federal courts decide issues of
patent infringement and validity and only the CAFC hears patent appeals, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of patent law.367 As a
result, patent law is arguably one of the more unified areas of law in the
United States because there exists no possibility of conflicting interpretations of patent law among the circuits. The EU experience of patent
law over the last half century is fundamentally different. Unlike copyright and trademark law, the European Union has no directive or other
legal instrument harmonizing substantive patent law across the member states.368 Although pan-European agreements have developed for
patents, these agreements, including the EPC, are not instruments of

Technical. I’m glad you asked me about that. It’s a wonderful word, fuzzy and
yet sounds meaningful. We love it. Until 2001, it had no basis whatsoever in
the EPC, just a passing mention in a couple of rules. . . . I agree that we’ve
never defined ‘technical’. It’s deliberate and allows us to fine-tune as a consensus develops on what should be patentable. Yes, I do know the correct way
to do that is by amending the law, but have you any idea how hard it is to get
consensus on amending the EPC?
Id.

362 See infra Part III.A.
363 See infra Part III.B–D.
364 See infra Part IV.A.–C.
365 See infra Part IV.D.
366 See, e.g., Russel Burke Hill & Vince Cangolosi, United States of America § 2.1, in
Global Patent Litigation (Willem A. Hoyng & Frank W.E. Eijsvogels eds., 2006).
367 See, e.g., id. §§ 5.4.1, 5.4.5–6.
368 See Bakels & Hugenholtz, supra note 6, at 6 (“The only existing directive in this area
is the Biotechnology Directive adopted in 1998.”) The Proposed EU Directive on Patents
for Computer-Implemented Inventions failed. Ford, supra note 52, at 49.
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the European Union.369 Although each EU Member State is a contracting party to the EPC, it is a sui generis European convention developed
from efforts to harmonize both European and EU patent law. Within
the European Union it has been characterized as a “stop-gap approach
to a more far reaching harmonisation.”370
Currently, a person wishing to protect an invention in a particular
European Union member state has the option of filing an application
for a national patent or for a European patent.371 For the former, the
applicant files with the national patent office in the member state.372 For
the latter, application is made to EPO under the terms of the EPC,
which provides a mechanism for obtaining a “European patent” using
one central application procedure.373 The applicant then designates the
EPO contracting states in which he or she wants patent protection.374
Once the EPO grants the European patent, the patent holder must
register it in the appropriate contracting states, where it receives the
same rights that would be conferred by a patent granted in that country.375 The European patent becomes a “bundle of national rights.”376
369 See EPC 2000, supra note 14, arts. 1–2; Convention on the Unification of Certain
Points of Substantive Law on Patents for Invention, art. 1, opened for signature Mar. 24, 1971,
1249 U.N.T.S. 369 [hereinafter Strasbourg Convention].
370 Philip Leith, Harmonisation of Intellectual Property in Europe: A Case
Study of Patent Procedure 104 (Adrian Chandler ed., 1998). The prospect of an EU patent reemerged in December of 2009 when the Council of the European Union unanimously
supported a decision on the EU joining the EPC and creating a unified Patent Court. The
EU Council agrees on next steps regarding the Community patent (EU patent). See EU Council Agrees on Next Steps Regarding the Community Patent (Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.epo.org/
topics/news/2009/20091208.html. The European Court of Justice is expected to rule on
whether the proposal is compatible with the EU Treaty in 2010. If the result is favorable, the
proposal will proceed to the European Parliament. Benoit Strowel, IP: Latent Patent, The
Lawyer ( Jan. 18, 2010), http://www.thelawyer.com/latent-patent/1003177.article.
371 See Ian Judge, Developments in the Harmonisation of European Patent Law and Litigation,
in 7 International Intellectual Property Law and Policy 28–1, 28–1 (Hugh C. Hanson, ed., 2002). The WIPO-administered Patent Cooperation Treaty provides a third method for obtaining a patent in a European Union member state. See Cornish & Llewelyn,
supra note 18, at 124–25.
372 See Judge, supra note 371, at 28–1.
373 EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 75.
374 See Judge, supra note 371, at 28–1. The designation may include one or more of the 27
European Union contracting states, eight non-European Union EPO members and/or the
three EPO extension states. See Member States of the European Patent Organization, European
Patent Office, http://www.epo.org/about-us/epo/member-states.html (last updated Mar.
3, 2011). In addition to the 27 EU Member states, Albania, Croatia, Iceland, Lichtenstein,
Macedonia, Monaco, Norway, San Marino, Switzerland and Turkey are contracting states and
it is possible to extend patent protection to Bosnia & Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia.
Id.
375 EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 64.
376 Grosche, supra note 359, at 269.
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Theoretically, there is no difference between a European patent and
one granted by a national patent office, with the exception that the European patent may be subjected to a post-grant opposition procedure at
the EPO in Munich.377 Whether the patent is granted by the EPO or a
national patent office, the patent holder must enforce it in the national
courts in the countries in which the patent is registered.378 National
courts have the power to revoke a European patent on a number of
grounds, including invalidity, but the EPO does not have jurisdiction to
revoke a nationally granted patent.379 National courts interpreting their
substantive and procedural rules are not obligated to follow EPO cases
as precedents.380 Likewise, national court decisions have no direct consequence on EPO decisions, although EPO cases have considered national decisions and vice versa.381 A major implication of this structure is
that patent application, validity opposition, and litigation practice requires very sophisticated planning. It also opens the possibility of differing interpretations of the law and patentability standards among the
various entities charged with interpreting and applying the law.
Technical Boards of Appeal within the EPO interpret the EPC
through its case law.382 If an applicant is dissatisfied with a non-award,
or if a third party wishes to oppose the grant of a patent, that party may
appeal to the EPO Technical Board of Appeal.383 The Technical Boards
of Appeal are highly centralized as to subject matter and expertise, with
the same board deciding cases within a given technical area.384 Technical Board of Appeal 3.5.01 decides cases involving computer programs

377 Judge, supra note 371, at 28–1. The opposition must be commenced within nine
months of the grant. Id. An opposition may last for five years or more and may result in the
revocation of the patent or an amendment to the claims defining the scope of the patent.
Id. There is no similar opposition procedure in U.S. patent practice. Cf. Hill & Cangolosi,
supra note 366, § 5.2 (discussing the lack of role the USPTO plays in infringement litigation).
378 EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 64(3) (“[I]nfringement . . . shall be dealt with by national law.”).
379 See Willem A. Hoyng, Global Patent Litigation (Strategy) § 1, in Global Patent Litigation, supra note 366; Leith, supra note 370, at 103–04.
380 See Leith, supra note 370, at 104–07.
381 See id. at 111–13, 167, 169–70, 177.
382 See id. at 112–14.
383 EPC 2000, supra note 14, arts. 107, 110.
384 See Business Distribution Scheme of the Technical Boards of Appeal for the Year 2011, Eur.
Patent Office 1–3 (2011), http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/
E03905748280E6A5C12578080041D13A/$File/business_distribution_scheme_technical_0
1012011.pdf.
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and business methods as computer-implemented inventions.385 Technical Boards of Appeal have “interpretive supremacy” for the EPC.386 In
the majority of cases, a particular Technical Board functions as the
body of final appeal on matters of patent law.387 In narrowly defined
circumstances, a legal question may go to the Enlarged Board of Appeal “to ensure uniform application of the law, or if a point of law of
fundamental importance arises.”388 The President of the EPO or a
Technical Board of Appeal on its own motion or in granting a party’s
request, may refer questions on points of law to an Enlarged Board of
Appeal.389 The EPC substantially constrains the nature of questions the
Enlarged Board of Appeal may decide. It may only review Technical
Boards of Appeal decisions in narrowly defined circumstances and only
on narrowly defined legal issues.390 Therefore, the Enlarged Board of
Appeal does not function in the same manner as the CAFC or the U.S.
Supreme Court.
These limitations mean that the Enlarged Board has provided little
guidance for subject-matter questions. To date, despite a recommendation from an English judge,391 a request for a referral from a party to a
Technical Board of Appeal case,392 and a referral from the EPO Presi-

385 See id.; see also G06: Computing; Calculating; Counting, World Intell. Prop. Org. 8, 14–15
( Jan. 2010), http://www.wipo.int/ipc/itos4ipc/ITSupport_and_download_area/20100101/pdf/
scheme/advanced/en/g06.pdf (Technical Board of Appeal 3.5.01 has jurisdiction over patents with main international patent classifications G06F17 and G06Q, which cover digital
computing methods and data processing and other methods adapted for business purposes).
The EPO uses the terminology “computer-implemented invention” (CII), defined as “an
invention whose implementation involves the use of a computer, computer network or other
programmable apparatus, the invention having one or more features which are realised
wholly or partly by means of a computer program.” Patents for Software?, supra note 356,
at 3. The EPO explains the term “software” is too ambiguous. Id. Recently, however, CII has
become a euphemism for the more controversial “software patent.” Andrés Guadamuz González, The Software Patent Debate, 1 J. Intell. Prop. L. & Prac. 196, 198–99 (2006).
386 Case G-3/08, Programs for Computers, [2010] O.J.E.P.O. 10, 22 (Enlarged Bd. Appeal, May 12, 2010), available at http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj011/01_11/01_0101.
pdf.
387 See id. at 23.
388 EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 112(1).
389 Id. The Enlarged Board may also initiate a referral. See Leith, supra note 370, at
113–114.
390 See EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 112(1).
391 See Aerotel Ltd. v. Telco Holdings Ltd., [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1371, [75–76], [2007] 1
All E.R. 225 (A.C.) at 236 (Eng.).
392 Case T-154/04, Estimating Sales Activity/DUNS LICENSING ASSOCS., [2008]
O.J.E.P.O. 46, 46 (Technical Bd. Appeal 3.5.01, Nov. 15, 2006), available at http://archive.epo.
org/epo/pubs/oj008/02_08/02_0468.pdf.
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dent,393 the Enlarged Board of Appeal has not directly addressed questions on law relating to computer software.394 On May 12, 2010, after
eighteen months of deliberation, the Enlarged Board of Appeal declined to rule on the questions referred by the EPO President.395 The
Enlarged Board rejected the referral on grounds that the questions
were inadmissible or not subject to review because they did not meet the
narrow requirements for review under the EPC. The Enlarged Board
concluded that the EPC allows a review only when it is necessary to ensure uniform application of the law and when two Technical Boards of
Appeal have given “different decisions” on the question referred.396
After reviewing the relevant case law, the Enlarged Board determined that the cases identified as “different” did not meet EPC requirements.397 The Enlarged Board interpreted the EPC as requiring a
“conflict in the case law making it difficult if not impossible for the Office to bring its patent granting practice into line with the case law of
the Boards of Appeal.”398 The implications of this “non-ruling” are immense. The Technical Board of Appeal 3.5.01 remains the body of last
resort within the EPO for decisions concerning computer programs
and business methods and determines examining practice within the
EPO. Once a Technical Board of Appeal or Enlarged Board has decided a case, there is no recourse for review to a national or multinational court.399 Thus, it is unlikely that any judicial or quasi-judicial European entity will soon provide any software subject-matter guidance.
One objective of the EPC is for patent examination and patentability decisions to produce the same result whether the patent is examined
or opposed in the EPO, a national patent office in France or Germany,
or in an invalidity action in the United Kingdom or the Netherlands.400
393 Referral by the President of the European Patent Office to the Enlarged Board of
Appeal dated 23 October 2008 Regarding Divergent Decisions of Two Boards of Appeal,
[2009] O.J.E.P.O. 142, 142, available at http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj009/03_09/
03_1429.pdf.
394 Leith, supra note 370, at 26.
395 Programs for Computers, [2010] O.J.E.P.O. at 30.
396 Id. at 23.
397 See id. at 30.
398 Id. at 25.
399 See EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 112(3); Tritton et al., supra note 23, at 181 (explaining that national courts of Member States only have the right to try infringement actions).
400 See EPC 2000, supra note 14, at pmbl. Prior to implementation of the EPC, substantive
differences existed in national patent offices. See Leith, supra note 370, at 105. For example,
the United Kingdom was known for a very strict view of claim interpretation while the practice in Germany and the Netherlands extended to undefined inventive concepts. 1 Char-
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To facilitate harmonization of patent law through EPC implementation,
national examining offices and courts do not possess broad discretion to
interpret claims in accordance with what had been national practice
prior to the EPC. Instead, they should interpret according to EPO practice.401 Nevertheless, the structure of the system has precluded complete
harmonization. Variances between approaches to EPC substantive law in
national patent offices, which generally rule in accordance with national
decisions, mean that substantive differences remain.402 Under the current system, it is possible that an application for the same invention may
be granted by the EPO or the German patent office but denied by the
U.K. Intellectual Property Office, and a claim for invalidity of the same
European patent may be interpreted differently in different countries.403 These factors contribute to a lack of uniformity in the substantive law.
Furthermore, the absence of a multinational reviewing court to
rule on inconsistencies between national courts and the EPO interpretations has impeded harmonization. Because national courts decide cases
within their own legal traditions, they interpret provisions of the EPC
differently, as implemented into their national law. Thus a patent may
be revoked in one country that remains valid in another.404 This has led
to particular problems in the area of computer software and business
methods. In difficult cases, national courts applying national law do not
decide consistently.405 Furthermore, because the courts in the United
Kingdom are required to follow their precedents,406 and the EPO does
not recognize stare decisis, the possibility of differing results is magnified.
B. Origins of the “Technical” Requirement
The U.S. patent statute and EPC take differing approaches to patentability. U.S. law defines patentable inventions positively, as “any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
or any new and useful improvement thereof,”407 and leaves exclusions
tered Institute of Patent Agents, European Patents Handbook § 2.6.17 (Tim Roberts
et al. eds., 2d ed. Supp. 2009) [hereinafter CIPA].
401 Cf. Leith, supra note 370, at 111–13 (discussing the rise of courts in the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Germany adjusting to EPO jurisprudence).
402 See Tritton et al., supra note 23, at 86–87.
403 CIPA, supra note 400, § 2.6.17.
404 See Bakels & Hugenholtz, supra note 6, at 39.
405 See id.
406 See infra note 513 and accompanying text.
407 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). In a rather circular manner, the code defines invention as an
“invention or discovery” and process as “process, art, or method.” 35 U.S.C. § 100(a), (b).
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to judicial interpretation. The EPC—while setting out the general requirements of novelty, 408 inventive step, 409 and industrial application410—defines invention negatively, according to what is excluded. Article 52 presents a non-exclusive list of things not considered inventions, including: “discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical
methods”;411 “aesthetic creations”;412 and “schemes, rules and methods
for performing mental acts, playing games or doing business, and programs for computers.”413 The EPO’s “Guidelines for Examination” indicate that the items listed in Article 52(2) are those that are either abstract or do not have a technical character.414 The list of excluded noninventions, however, must be read in conjunction with Article 52(3),
which narrows the exclusion of these items and activities to the extent
that the patent application relates to excluded subject-matter “as
such.”415 This means that a claim to a business method or computer
program is not allowed, but “claims to physical entities or processes relating to such items may be allowable.”416 The exclusions and their limitations are understood to reinforce the requirement that “invention”
means technical invention.417
“Technical character” does not present a problem in traditional
fields such as chemistry or engineering.418 The requirement resides
deep in the origins of European patent law and has been “part of the
European legal tradition since the early days of the patent system.”419
According to the EPO, in order to be patentable, the subject matter
408 EPC 2000, supra note 14, arts. 52(1), 54.
409 Id. arts. 52(1), 56. Under U.S. law, this requirement is known as the “non-obvious”
condition for patentability. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
410 EPC 2000, supra note 14, arts. 52(1), 57.
411 Id. art. 52(2)(a).
412 Id. art. 52(2)(b).
413 Id. art. 52(2)(c).
414 European Patent Office, Guidelines for Examination in the EPO, pt. C, ch. IV, § 2.1
(Mar. 31, 2010), available at http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/guiex/e/
c_iv_2_1.htm.
415 EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 52(3).
416 CIPA, supra note 400, § 3.4.
417 Tritton et al., supra note 23, at 91.
418 Aloys Hüttermann & Ulrich Storz, A Comparison Between Biotech and Software Related Patents, 31 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 589, 589 (2009) (explaining that circumstances in which
chemical compounds may be patented were resolved decades ago, but the technicality of
biotech and software-related inventions are still in flux); see also Beresford, supra note 356, at
v–vi (explaining that Boards of Appeal cases reveal that some patents are rejected based on
the steps performed by an operator regardless of technical character); Grosche, supra note
359, at 271 (explaining that whether software makes a “technical contribution” turns on how
this term of art is defined).
419 Patents for Software?, supra note 356, at 9.
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must have “a ‘technical character’ or, to be more precise, involve a
‘technical teaching.’”420 Discussions of the technical requirement were
part of the earliest European harmonization efforts.421 The Strasbourg
Convention, the Council of Europe instrument that began the process
of harmonization of European patent law, did not mention a technical
requirement or expressly define the term “invention.”422 It required
signatory countries to grant patents “for any inventions which are susceptible of industrial application, which are new and which involve an
inventive step.”423 When the Strasbourg Convention was adopted in
1963, the six members of the European Economic Community—the
precursor to the European Union—were working toward both a single
patent legal system for the common market and a single system for
granting patents.424 During the first phase of the negotiations from
1961 to 1964, the delegations debated whether to follow the language
of the Strasbourg Convention or to adopt a new, positive definition of
inventions.425 The delegations rejected a proposal to make “technical
progress” an explicit requirement of patentability, reasoning that it was
unnecessary because the term “inventions” implies a contribution to
technical knowledge and technical progress.426 Therefore, including
“technical” in the language of the convention would be redundant.427
As a result, no positive legal definition of “technical” emerged from the

420 Id.
421 See id. As early as 1959, differences in national patent regimes acted as a barrier to
trade and movement of goods, so the members of the European Economic Community
convened a working group to discuss a unified patent system. See Cornish & Llewelyn,
supra note 18, at 127 (noting that efforts were set aside when Britain failed to enter the
EEC, because member states desired having Britain’s expertise in the matter). Such a system would include not only uniform substantive law, but a judicial system through the
European Union courts, as arbiter of European patent disputes. See id. at 127–29. Neither a
Community patent nor a patent court has been established within the European Union.
See id. at 128–29.
422 See Strasbourg Convention, supra note 369, arts. 1–6. The Convention was not limited to members of the Council of Europe. See id. at pmbl n.1. The Convention’s purpose
was to unify certain points of substantive patent law to assist European industry and, more
ambitiously, to contribute “to the creation of an international patent.” Id. at pmbl.
423 See id. art. 1.
424 See Justine Pila, Article 52(2) of the Convention on the Grant of European Patents: What
Did the Framers Intend? A Study of the Travaux Preparatoires, 36 Int’l Rev. Intell. Prop. &
Comp. L. 755, 757–58 (2005).
425 See id. at 758–59.
426 See Beresford, supra note 356, at 13; Pila, supra note 424, at 759.
427 See Beresford, supra note 356, at 13; Pila, supra note 424, at 759.
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conference and the travaux preparatoires provide no assistance in determining the framers’ intent on the issue.428
At the time the EPC was negotiated, computer programs existed,
but the software industry did not.429 The delegates feared that fixing
definitions of “invention” and “technicality” would impair the flexibility
of the EPC to accommodate developing technology.430 The EPC also
does not define “programs for computers” or the other exclusions.431
Although some delegations strongly opposed including “programs for
computers” in the list of Article 52(2) exclusions, the EPC ultimately
included it.432 The delegates concluded that any attempt to define this
term would be futile, and that interpretation should be left to the
EPO.433 Leaving interpretive decisions to the EPO has far from clarified
the legal definitions of “technical character,” “computer programs,”
and the “as such” limitation on exclusions.
In 2000, the contracting parties adopted a new version of the EPC.
Currently, Article 52(1) of the EPC mandates that European patents
shall be granted “for any inventions, in all fields of technology, provided
that they are new, involve an inventive step, and are susceptible of industrial application.”434 It has been suggested that the addition of language “in all fields of technology,” which did not appear in the original
EPC, codifies the technology requirement.435 Although commentators
characterize this change to Article 52 as one of the most significant
428 Pila, supra note 424, at 760. In examining Professor Pila’s work, Justice Jacob found
that her analysis of the Travaux Preparatoires led to this result. Aerotel, [2007] 1 All E.R. at 232.
429 See Martin Kretschmer, Software as Text and Machine: The Legal Capture of Digital Innovation, J. Info. L. & Tech., pt. 1 (July 4, 2003), http://www.cippm.org.uk/pdfs/JILT%20
kretschmer%2011_03.pdf.
430 Reinier B. Bakels, Should Only Technical Inventions Be Patentable, Following the European
Example?, 7 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 50, 55 (2008).
431 See EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 52(2). In addition to “programs for computers,”
the EPC excludes the following from patentability: “discoveries, scientific theories and
mathematical methods”; “aesthetic creations”; “presentations of information”; and
“schemes, rules, and methods for performing mental acts, playing games, or doing business.” Id.
432 See Pila, supra note 424, at 769.
433 See id.
434 EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 52(1) (emphasis added). The EPC 2000 applies to all
patent applications filed on or after December 13, 2007. The European Patent Convention,
Eur. Patent Office ( Jul. 1, 2011), http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/epc.html.
Most of the cases considered infra Part VI.B. were decided under EPC 1973, unless otherwise noted. See id.
435 See Bakels & Hugenholtz, supra note 6, at 54. EPC 2000 was adopted by decision on
June 28, 2001, in part to incorporate obligations imposed by the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) and the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT). Id.
at 54–55 (citing explanatory document from the Munich conference).

276

Boston College International & Comparative Law Review

[Vol. 34:227

changes in the EPC,436 they do not expect it to impact substantive law as
it relates to patentability.437 As discussed, under EPC 1973, technical
character acted as an implicit requirement of patentability.438 Moreover,
although a technical requirement is not expressly mentioned in the
EPC 1973, it is at the heart of Article 52 jurisprudence.439
Commentators have also suggested that the technical requirement
originates from the Article 57 requirement that inventions be “susceptible of industrial application.”440 The meaning of this phrase, however,
differs in various European translations.441 For example, the French
and Dutch languages use the term “industrie” only when referring to
manufacturing businesses. In comparison, the English language uses
“industry” more broadly.442 The German requirement of “gewerblich
anwedbar” (commercially applicable) is broader than technical manufacturing, but not as broad as the English meaning of industry.443
C. The EPO Technical Board of Appeal Decisions
Originally EPO examiners routinely denied any applications related to software inventions and programs under EPO examination
guidelines in place at the time.444 Since its first decision in 1986, however, the Technical Board of Appeal 3.5.01 has taken what could be
characterized as an expansive view of these inventions’ patent eligibility.
Once the board took the position that examiners should not deny an
application simply because it involved a computer program, the EPO
started down a slippery slope.445 The Technical Board of Appeal has
articulated various tests to delimit the contours of the technical charac436 CIPA supra note 400, § 2.7.2.
437 See Stefan Steinbrenner, The European Patent Convention 41–42 (Supp. 3 Aug. 2009),
in 1 Software Patents Worldwide (Gregory A. Stobbs ed., 2008).
438 See supra text accompanying notes 415–417.
439 See Steinbrenner, supra note 437, at 31–39 (discussing the development of Boards of
Appeal decisions relating to Article 52: each decision requires a computer program to have
a technical feature to be patentable).
440 Bakels & Hugenholtz, supra note 6, at 4.
441 Id.
442 Id. at 4–5.
443 Id. at 5.
444 See Leith, supra note 6, at 11.
445 Id. at 8–11. Because “any good patent attorney . . . could transmute a software invention into a hardware one,” once the decision was made that the inventions were not
automatically excludable, “any attempt to hold the line becomes untenable because the
definition of protectable technology changes under the continual assault of perceptive
patent attorneys who locate logical contradiction and push the examiners towards removing that logical weakness.” Id. at 9.
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ter requirement for computer-implemented inventions. 446 The tests
and results have often been contradictory, allowing a broader spectrum
of inventions to meet the technical requirement while never providing
a solid legal definition of “technical contribution.”447 The concept of
“technical,” although central to European patent subject-matter determinations, is a difficult legal concept to define. Scholars,448 judges,449
and more recently, the EPO president,450 have noted that the Technical
Board of Appeal tests, arguments, and justifications vary from case to
case. Moreover, the meaning of “as such” has been “anyone’s guess during the past two decades.”451 The scope of what is excluded from patent
subject matter based on 52(2) and (3) has progressively narrowed,
leading to a more liberal granting of software-related patents, and moving toward an approximation of U.S. practice.452
In its 2009 publication, Patents for Software? European Law and Practice, the EPO stated that it “does not grant patents for computer programs (‘software patents’) or computer-implemented business methods
that make no such technical contribution.”453 The EPO uses the term
“computer-implemented inventions” to describe inventions that involve
the use of a computer, a computer network, or a programmable apparatus, with features that are realized by a computer program.454 Despite
this assertion, a 2000 study indicates that the vast majority of software
patent applications up to that time proceeded through the EPO without
objection and the vast majority of appeals were granted, provided that
the claims were appropriately drafted.455 According to the EPO, computer-implemented inventions—whether claimed to a physical product
or apparatus or to a process or method—are patentable so long as they
involve an “inventive technical contribution to the prior art.”456 In addi446 See id.
447 See id.
448 See id. at 30; Aharonian, supra note 361, at pt. 3.
449 See Aerotel, [2007] 1 All E.R. at 232.
450 Referral by the President of the European Patent Office, [2009] O.J.E.P.O. at 144–45.
Aharonian characterizes the various definitions of technical as “pornographic,” or “I know
it when I see it.” Aharonian, supra note 361, at pt. 3.
451 Shemtov, supra note 7, at 507.
452 See Beresford, supra note 356, at v; Kretschmer, supra note 429, at 9–11.
453 Patents for Software?, supra note 356, at 3.
454 Id.; Shemtov, supra note 7, at 507.
455 Beresford, supra note 356, at v (explaining that in some cases, patents were
granted after amending the wording of the claims to meet the requirements of the EPC
and implementing regulations). Beresford’s book has been characterized as the “leading
study” on patenting under the EPC. Kretschmer, supra note 429, at 12–13.
456 Patents for Software?, supra note 356, at 10.
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tion, the EPO will grant claims to “computer program” products, such as
those stored on some kind of a carrier like a CD or DVD, provided they
cause a “further technical effect” beyond the “normal physical effects,”
such as the flow of electric current through a computer.457
EPO computer software patent subject-matter decisions have
shaped European law concerning business methods.458 Nevertheless,
business method examinations produce results that are markedly different from similar examinations of non-business related computer
programs. 459 Very few computer-implemented business methods are
successfully prosecuted in Europe.460 The EPO has recently stated that
computer programs that “implement business, mathematical or similar
methods and do not produce technical effects (e.g. because they solve
a business problem rather than a technical one) are not patentable.”461
Although the EPO considers technical innovations associated with
business methods, it does not conduct searches of business method
art.462
1. The Technical Contributions Approach
The 1987 decision Vicom/Computer Related Invention, 463 the first
Technical Board of Appeal 3.5.01 decision concerning computerimplemented inventions, is still central to the meaning of the term
“technical effect” in Europe.464 The Vicom Board considered whether a
CAD program—a mathematical method465 for improving digital images
by increasing processing speed—or a machine for carrying out the method were excluded from patentability “as such.”466 Following EPO Ex457 Id. at 11.
458 See Cornish & Llewelyn, supra note 18, at 829.
459 See Beresford, supra note 356, at 183.
460 Nicholas Fox & Alex Rees, A European Perspective on Business Method Patents, Landslide, July/August 2010 at 30, 30 (confirming that the examining division dealing with
business methods currently rejects approximately 95–97% of the applications).
461 Patents for Software?, supra note 356, at 12.
462 Gregory A. Stobbs, Business Method Patents §14.03[A] (Supp. 2004). Fox &
Rees assert that the applications for the three to five percent of business method patents
granted have avoided classification as a business method, emphasizing technical advantages and minimizing business benefits. Fox & Rees, supra note 460, at 35–37.
463 Case T-208/84, Computer-Related Invention/VICOM, [1987] O.J.E.P.O. 14 (Technical Bd. Appeal 3.5.01, July 15, 1986) available at http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj
1987/p001_046.pdf.
464 Leith, supra note 370, at 27.
465 VICOM, [1987] O.J.E.P.O. at 14. The EPO cases are more likely to use the term
“method,” whereas U. S. cases use “process,” as a result of differing statutory language. See
EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 52(2)(a); 35 U.S.C. § 100(b).
466 VICOM, [1987] O.J.E.P.O. at 14.
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amination Guidelines in place at the time, the examiners had rejected
the claim as a mathematical method “as such.”467 The Technical Board
of Appeal, which was not bound by the Examination Guidelines, found
the method to qualify as patent subject matter and not be excluded “as
such.”468
In delineating the difference between an excluded mathematical
method or algorithm and a technical process, the Technical Board of
Appeal stated that a mathematical method produced no direct technical result, being “an abstract concept prescribing how to operate on the
numbers.”469 But, the Board went on to note:
[I]f a mathematical method is used in a technical process,
that process is carried out on a physical entity (which may be a
material object but equally an image stored as an electric signal) by some technical means implementing the method and
provides as its result a certain change in that entity.470
Further, the Board of Appeal noted, “[t]he technical means might include a computer comprising suitable hardware or an appropriately
programmed general purpose computer.”471 As one scholar observed,
“[t]he Board held that where the claims relate to a technical process,
patentability may arise from novelty in the mathematical algorithm
employed for a technical benefit, and it was immaterial whether the
algorithm was to be implemented in hardware or software.”472
The Board’s reasoning failed to provide clarity. The Technical
Board of Appeal explained that even if the idea for the invention resides
in the non-patentable mathematical method, the applicant will not be
considered to seek protection for the mathematical method “as such” so
long as the claim is directed to a technical process in which the method
is used.473 The most oft-quoted Reason for the Decision provides:
Generally speaking, an invention which would be patentable
in accordance with conventional patentability criteria should
not be excluded from protection by the mere fact that for its
implementation modern technical means in the form of a
computer program are used. Decisive is what technical contribu467 Id.
468 See id.
469 See id.
470 Id.
471 Id.
472 Beresford, supra note 356, at 24; see VICOM, [1987] O.J.E.P.O. at 20.
473 VICOM, [1987] O.J.E.P.O. at 19.
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tion the invention as defined in the claim when considered as a whole
makes to the known art.474
Vicom established the importance of the overall technical contribution of the invention as the baseline for examining computer-related
inventions. This remains European law.475 Under Vicom, the invention as
a whole must provide some technical contribution over the state of the
art to be considered an invention within the meaning of Article 52.476
The overall reasoning is similar to the holistic approach taken in the
1981 U.S. Supreme Court decision Diamond v. Diehr, which produced a
similar result.477
The Technical Board of Appeal remitted the claim back to the examiners, holding that “[a] claim directed to a technical process which
process is carried out under the control of a program (whether by
means of hardware or software), cannot be regarded as relating to a
computer program as such.”478 Before the Board, Vicom had agreed to
amend its original patent claims to a multipurpose algorithm and a method of digital filtering, and to direct the claims more specifically to the
processing of digital images.479 Applying Vicom’s technical contribution
approach, the examiner allowed the amended and limited claims because they were amended for “the general functioning of the computer,
rather than to an application designed to execute particular tasks.”480
In taking this holistic approach, the form of the patent claim is not important; the examiner should “disregard the form or kind of claim and
concentrate on its content in order to identify the contribution which
the subject-matter claimed, considered as a whole, adds to the known
art.”481 As one scholar has noted, “[n]o distinction should be drawn
between implementation of a computational task in software or in
hardware since this does not affect the inventive concept.”482 Another
scholar adds that if the “contribution is not of a technical character (i.e.
if it falls exclusively within one of the excluded areas), then there is no
474 Id. at 21–22 (emphasis added).
475 Leith, supra note 6, at 28–29.
476 CIPA supra note 400, § 18A.4.1.
477 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981) (reasoning that an industrial claim that
employed a well-known mathematical algorithm was patentable even if the non-computerrelated aspects of the process were well known in the art).
478 VICOM, [1987] O.J.E.P.O. at 14.
479 Kretschmer, supra note 429, at 8.
480 Cornish & Llewelyn, supra note 18, at 824; see Kretschmer, supra note 429, at pt.
2.5.
481 Shemtov, supra note 7, at 507.
482 de Mauny, supra note 7, at 147.
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invention.”483 Vicom opened the door to computer-related inventions
being patentable “within the realms of computer science.”484
Vicom stands for the proposition that subject matter for controlling
or carrying out a technical process is patentable, regardless of whether it
is implemented on hardware or software.485 The involvement of a computer program is not sufficient grounds to deny patentability.486 Although the Technical Board of Appeal drew a line concerning “technical contributions” in Vicom, its reasoning is not compelling. The Board
used the term “technical” sixteen times without defining it; likewise, it
used the term technical “features” twice,487 technical “process” on six
occasions,488 technical “means” on four occasions,489 and technical “subject matter,” “result,” “considerations,” and “contribution” once each.490
The Technical Board of Appeal neither identified the particular technical contribution made by the invention in Vicom, nor did it discuss the
exact nature of that technical contribution. Thus, after Vicom, the meaning of technical contribution remained “a little elusive.”491
In 1987, the same year as Vicom, the second leading Technical
Board of Appeal decision, Koch & Sterzel, appeared. Koch & Sterzel concerned a patent claim to the use of a computer program to control an
X-ray machine to ensure optimal performance without overloading the
X-ray tube.492 In the opposition to this claim, Siemens and Philips argued that the only difference between the claim’s subject matter and
the state of the art was the use of a new program for a known computer.493 The essence of the invention was a computer program that
only produced a technical effect at the very end of the computing operation.494 Because the invention involved both a mathematical method
in the form of a computer program and a technical apparatus, the op483 Shemtov, supra note 7, at 507.
484 Kretschmer, supra note 429 at pt. 2.5. For example, procedures at the operating system level to improve machine functionality or generic algorithms at the application level
would normally be patentable. Id.
485 VICOM, [1987] O.J.E.P.O. at 14; Patents for Software?, supra note 356, at 11.
486 Patents for Software?, supra note 356, at 11.
487 VICOM, [1987] O.J.E.P.O. at 14, 16.
488 Id. at 14, 19.
489 Id. at 19–21.
490 Id. at 18–19, 21.
491 Aerotel, [2007] 1 All E.R. at 249.
492 Case T-26/86, X-ray Apparatus/KOCH & STERZEL, [1988] O.J.E.P.O. 19, 22
(Technical Bd. Appeal 3.4.1, May 21, 1987), available at http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/
oj1988/p001_080.pdf.
493 Id.
494 Id.

282

Boston College International & Comparative Law Review

[Vol. 34:227

ponents argued that the X-ray apparatus and the computer program
had to be considered separately for purposes of determining whether
the claim involved an invention.495 The opposition cited the German
Federal Court of Justice, which ruled as follows:
[A teaching in a claim is not technical if] in its essence it
states a rule that can be carried out without employing controllable natural forces other than human brainpower, even
if the use of a technical means appears expedient or indeed
the only sensible and hence the necessary procedure, and
even if reference is made to these technical means in the
claims or description.496
The Technical Board of Appeal rejected this approach and drew a
line of distinction between unpatentable computer programs on general purpose computers, in which the electrical signals produced
amounted to no more than a reproduction of the information, and
those that technically altered the functioning of the unit, which may be
patentable.497 Affirming Vicom, the Technical Board of Appeal held that
the invention must be assessed as a whole, because the EPC does not
prohibit patenting of inventions consisting of a mix of both technical
and non-technical means.498 Further, the Board held that there need
not be a constant interaction between the program and the apparatus:
“[w]hen the technical effect occurs is irrelevant to the question of
whether the subject matter claimed constitutes an invention under Article 52(1) EPC. The only fact of importance is that it occurs at all.”499
Therefore, under the technical contribution approach, it does not
matter that the contribution to the prior art is a mathematical algorithm so long as there is a technical effect in the apparatus beyond the
normal functioning of the computer.500 Neither the magnitude of the
effect, nor the point in the process at which the effect occurred, are
determinative.501 This reasoning is analogous to the line of reasoning
used in Diehr, which concluded that it was erroneous to take a point of
novelty approach.502 Rather, if the invention as a whole is different from
495 Id. at 21.
496 Id. at 22–23.
497 Id. at 23.
498 KOCH & STERZEL, [1988] O.J.E.P.O. at 24.
499 Id. at 22–23.
500 Id. at 24.
501 See id. at 22–23, 24.
502 See 450 U.S. at 189.
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the prior art, it is irrelevant that the source of novelty resides entirely in
a mathematical algorithm or computer program.503 The Diehr dissent
had predicted that this approach would open the floodgates to the patentability of computer software.504 Indeed, patenting strategy in the
United States shifted towards “indirect drafting” of software claims following Diehr, subverting the algorithm exclusion to practical nullity.505
One commentator has observed that the USPTO Guidelines acknowledged the practice, providing that “the utility of an invention must be
within the ‘technological’ arts. A computer-related invention is within
the technological arts.”506 Thus, the novelty of a patent claim may arise
in the software itself, not only through some physical transformation
brought about by software.507 The EPO developed a similar approach
post-Vicom.508
2. The Further Technical Effect Approach
Toward the end of the 1990s, the technical contribution approach
met criticism.509 Applicants claimed that when software is run on a
computer, there is always a machine involved and the invention was,
therefore, automatically technical.510 Another problem emerged. Vicom
and Koch & Sterzel dealt with apparatus claims and process or methods
claims.511 The EPO still disallowed direct patent claims to “computer
program products,” or software.512 This created an enforcement issue.
The only way to infringe a process or method patent on a computer
system solution in Europe was to run the patented program directly.513
503 See id. at 183.
504 See id. at 218 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
505 Kretschmer, supra note 429, at pt. 2.5.
506 Id. (citing Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg.
7478, 7479 (Feb. 28, 1996)).
507 See id.
508 Id.
509 Steinbrenner, supra note 437, at 37.
510 Laub, supra note 7, at 348.
511 KOCH & STERZEL, [1988] O.J.E.P.O. at 19 (involving the patenting of inventions
consisting of a mix of technical and non-technical features); VICOM, [1987] O.J.E.P.O. at
14 (involving a claim by which a technical process is considered to reside in a mathematical method).
512 See EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 52(2)(c) (barring computer programs from consideration as inventions eligible for patents).
513 But see Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Patentability of Computer-Implemented Inventions, Eur. Parl. Doc. (COM 92) 27 (2002), available
at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2002:0092:FIN:EN:PDF
(proposing that a computer program infringes only if it fulfills a certain patented function
in the way defined in the patent claim).
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Unlike the patent on the hardware component of the invention, putative infringers copying and distributing the process could only be liable
for indirect infringement, a much more difficult claim.514
In 1997, an IBM appeal clarified the issue concerning direct claims
to computer software and articulated what became known as the “further technical effect” approach.515 IBM/Computer Program Product involved a method claim and claims directed to “computer program
products directly loadable into the memory of the computer” and to a
“computer program product stored on a computer usable medium.”516
In a second unreported case decided by the Technical Board of Appeal
at the same time, IBM appealed an EPO examining division decision
refusing a patent application for a computer program.517 Following
EPO Examination Guidelines in place at the time, the examining division refused the computer program products claims, drawing a clear
line between patentable and unpatentable subject matter by disallowing
the computer program products claim to preclude the possibility of a
program written on a sheet of paper from patentability.518 The Technical Board of Appeal did not agree and considered whether and under
which circumstances a computer program product could be valid subject matter.519
The Board in IBM I interpreted the language of the EPC to mean
that the drafters had not intended to exclude all computer programs
from patentability, but only computer programs “as such.”520 Because
computer programs must be patentable when they have a technical
character, not all computer programs are prima facie excluded from patentability. 521 In delineating between patentable and non-patentable
programs, the Technical Board of Appeal again excluded from patentability programs causing common physical modifications to the
514 Steinbrenner, supra note 437, at 62.
515 See Case T-1173/97, Computer Program Product/IBM (IBM I ), [1999] O.J.E.P.O.
609, 620 (Technical Bd. Appeal 3.5.01, Jul. 1, 1998), available at http://archive.epo.org/
epo/pubs/oj99/10_99/10_6099.pdf.
516 Id. at 610, 611.
517 See Case T-935/97, IBM/Computer Programs (IBM II ), [1999] E.P.O.R. 301, 303
(Technical Bd. Appeal 3.5.01, Feb. 4, 1999), available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/
case-law-appeals/pdf/t970935eu1.pdf.
518See id.
519 See id. at 309. One commentator even suggests that IBM colluded with the EPO by
drafting its claims for direct patentability of the computer program, and not indirectly to a
system or method for inventions that would have “clearly” been patentable as method
claims in line with previous EPO decisions. See Kretschmer, supra note 429, § 2.5.
520 See IBM I, [1999] O.J.E.P.O. at 618–19.
521 See id. at 619.
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computer, such as electrical currents carrying out program instructions.522 The Board of Appeal held that a computer program may not
be excluded from patentability “[i]f the program, when running on a
computer or loaded into a computer, brings about, or is capable of
bringing about, a technical effect which goes beyond the ‘normal’
physical interactions between the program (software) and the computer (hardware on which it is run).”523 The Board found that the
technical character in the “further effects” derived from the hardware’s
execution of the instructions given by the computer program.524 This
further technical effect beyond the normal functioning of the computer may occur when the software manages an industrial process or
the working of a machine.525 A “further technical effect” also occurs in
cases where the computer is a necessary means to obtain the further
technical effect,526 although the Board neither defined nor provided
examples of when a computer might provide the necessary means.527 In
reaching its decision, the Technical Board of Appeal cited Vicom’s reasoning that it was illogical to grant a patent for the process, but not for
the apparatus for carrying out the method.528 The IBM I Board utilized
the reasoning of Vicom in concluding as follows:
[It would be illogical to] grant a patent for both a method
and the apparatus adapted for carrying out the same method, but not for the computer program product, which
comprises all the features enabling the implementation of
the method and which, when loaded in a computer, is indeed able to carry out that method.529
The Board distinguished its holding from the practice in U.S.
and Japanese patent offices, which allow patent claims to computer
522 See id. at 620.
523 Id. at 632 (emphasis added). The Technical Board of Appeal defined “running on a
computer” to mean that “the system comprising the computer program plus the computer
carries out a method or process.” Id. “Loaded into a computer,” according to the Board,
means that the programmed computer is capable of carrying out a method that constitutes a system, device, or apparatus. Id. Professor Kretschmer characterizes this reasoning
concerning further technical effect as “sailing close to the wind” and puts the reasoning in
plainer language: “software is not a computer program ‘as such’ if it is innovative and it
works.” See Kretschmer, supra note 429, § 2.5.
524 IBM I, [1999] O.J.E.P.O. at 620.
525 Id.
526 Id. at 620–21.
527 See id.
528 VICOM, [1987] O.J.E.P.O. at 21–22.
529 IBM I, [1999] O.J.E.P.O. at 626.
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programs, acknowledging that while these foreign practices represented a “useful indication of modern trends,” those legal systems did
not contain exclusions to patentability similar to those in Articles
52(2) and (3).530
Prior to IBM I, the EPO had focused on putting computerimplemented inventions into the framework of tangible, physical machines.531 After IBM I, the focus shifted to the nebulous “further technical effect” caused by the computer program.532 One scholar suggests
that this transition provides evidence that the Board changed from its
previous machine metaphor to an analogy that the software itself is
“machine-like” and that the Board thus “dropped the fiction that a patentable invention was in the machine which was part hardware and
part software.”533 Nevertheless, the IBM I case narrowed the scope of
the exclusion so that more inventions achieved patentability. The requirement of a “further technical effect” is not a bar to patentability:
“[a]ny computer program that works is not a computer program” as
such if a carefully drafted claim refers to technical considerations.534
Despite the Board’s statement to the contrary, it is difficult to avoid
speculating that the U.S. treatment of software influenced the EPO to
liberalize its treatment of computer program patent validity questions.
By the time of the IBM I decision, the CAFC had largely removed patent subject-matter restrictions with respect to computer software and
business methods.535 In light of this real or apparent pressure, it is not
surprising that the EPO may have been motivated to loosen constraints
in order to allow European inventors to compete more evenly with U.S.
inventors.
Ultimately, the reasoning in IBM I is unsatisfying and does little to
advance the meaning of either technical contribution or the boundaries of the “as such” exception. The circular reasoning that computer
programs “as such” are not patentable because they are not technical,
and that programs with technical character are valid patent subject
matter because they are not programs “as such,” is not illuminating.
Without further articulating the nature of the “further technical effect”
test, the IBM I decision failed to delineate the exact nature and scope
530 See id. at 617.
531 See Leith, supra note 6, at 29–31.
532 See id. at 33.
533 Id. at 32–33.
534 Grosche, supra note 359, at 273.
535 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177–78; State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp. Inc.,
149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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of the computer program exclusion.536 To many, IBM I formally ended
the computer program exclusion in the EPC and the fiction of a limitation based on technical character, technical contribution, or technical
effect.537
3. The Any Hardware Approach
Until 2000, the EPO applied three concepts in evaluating the patent eligibility of computer-implemented inventions: first, there must be
a technical contribution (Vicom); second, in determining technicality,
the invention must be evaluated as a whole (Koch & Sterzel ); and third,
the contribution must cause a further technical effect (IBM). 538 In
2000, however, the EPO clearly departed from requiring a technical
contribution as part of the Article 52 analysis in a series of cases beginning with PBS Partnership.539
PBS, decided one year after IBM I, did not involve a patent claim to
a computer program, but claimed a method and an apparatus, where
the apparatus was a computer programmed to run the method.540 The
method used data processing to control pension benefit programs for
subscriber employers by using standard factors, such as actuarial life
spans, for calculating pensions.541 The Technical Board of Appeal denied the method claim as a method for doing business “as such,” and
accordingly, relied on Article 52(2) and (3) to preclude the claim.542
The Board acknowledged the technical effects test and found that all of
the steps involved in processing and producing the information had a
“purely administrative, actuarial and/or financial character.”543 It rejected the appellant’s argument that referring to data processing and
computing means in the claims conferred technical character on the
536 See Leith, supra note 6, at 33.
537 See Kretschmer, supra note 429, § 2.5. Nevertheless, Beresford’s work demonstrates
that the exclusions on patentability under the EPC were almost equivalent to United States
practice by 2000, and that the “technical effect” criterion, which applies to all EPO examinations, could be met with careful drafting of claims. Id. Under EPO practice, most innovative software includes a technical effect, such as higher speed, more economical use of
memory, or an improved user interface. Id. § 3.1
538 See Laub, supra note 7, at 349; see also IBM I, [1999] O.J.E.P.O. at 620; KOCH &
STERZEL, [1988] O.J.E.P.O at 24; VICOM, [1987] O.J.E.P.O. at 21–22.
539 See CaseT-931/95, Controlling Pension Benefit Systems Partnership/PBS PARTNERSHIP, [2001] O.J.E.P.O. 441, 448 (Technical Bd. Appeal 3.5.01, Sept. 8, 2000) available
at http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj001/10_01/10_4411.pdf.
540 See id. at 441–42.
541 See id. at 445.
542 Id. at 449.
543 Id.
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method, and concluded that “[a] feature of a method which concerns
the use of technical means for a purely nontechnical purpose and/or
for processing purely non-technical information does not necessarily
confer a technical character to such a method.”544 There is nothing in
PBS’s holding regarding the method claim that departed from previous
EPO cases.545
By contrast, the Board treated the apparatus claim differently, signaling a “substantial departure from previous case law.”546 The Technical Board of Appeal found that an apparatus programmed for use in a
particular field was an invention within the meaning of Article 52(1),
even if the field was business, because it involved a physical entity.547 If
the patent claim was directed to the apparatus, the formal category of
the claim implied physical features which could qualify as technical features of the invention.548 Therefore, use of any physical entity would
bring the claim outside the Article 52(2) and (3) exclusions.549 Lord
Justice Jacob in Aerotel coined the descriptive nomenclature “any hardware” to refer to this approach.550
The PBS reasoning appears formalistic rather than substantive.
Article 52(2)(c) excludes “methods” of doing business, but not “apparatuses” or “products.”551 Although the claim proceeded as an Article
52 invention, the Technical Board of Appeal ultimately found that the
apparatus was nonetheless not patent subject matter because it did not
meet the requirements of “inventive step” under Article 56.552 In making this determination, the Board found no non-obvious improvement
over the identified prior art of “existing private pension plans,” because
the improvement was essentially economic and not technical.553 The

544 Id. at 450.
545 See Aerotel, [2007] 1 All E.R. at 264–65 (noting an English judge’s observation that
“it [would be] difficult to think of a concrete case where the approaches [in VICOM and
PBS] would lead to a different result, but . . . they could.”).
546 See id. at 264 (“Thus far there is nothing remarkable about [PBS]. It is the reasoning in relation to the apparatus claim which represented a substantial departure from previous case law.”).
547 See PBS, [2001] O.J.E.P.O. at 452.
548 See id.
549 See id.
550 Aerotel, [2007] 1 All E.R. at 237.
551 See PBS, [2001] O.J.E.P.O. at 452.
552 See EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 56 (“An invention shall be considered as involving
an inventive step if, having regard to the state of the art, it is not obvious to a person
skilled in the art.”).
553 See PBS, [2001] O.J.E.P.O. at 456.
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claimed invention did not provide a technical solution to a technical
problem.554
Hitachi/Auction Method, the next EPO case decided using the “any
hardware” approach, is the more important of the two cases in that it set
the standard for EPO examination of business method and business systems patents.555 Hitachi involved a method claim for the automated auction method, an apparatus claim for running the auction via a network,
and a computer program claim.556 The Hitachi Board, following PBS,
explained that the technical contribution approach was incorrect in that
an invention’s technical contribution was more appropriately considered for determining novelty and inventive step rather than subject matter.557 The Hitachi board instructed that “[a] mix of technical and nontechnical features may be regarded as an invention within the meaning
of 52(1) EPC and that the prior art should not be considered when deciding whether the claimed subject matter is such an invention.”558
The Hitachi Board found that the apparatus claim was outside of
the Article 52 exclusions because it possessed technical features, such as
a “service computer,” “client computer,” and “network.”559 The claim
thus met the requirements of technicality.560 This conclusion was consistent with the PBS finding that “[a]n apparatus constituting a physical
entity or concrete product, suitable for performing or supporting an
economic activity is an invention within the meaning of Article
52(1).”561 In this reasoning, both Hitachi and PBS depart dramatically
from the technical contribution requirements of Vicom and Koch &
Sterzel. Rather than achieving technical character by making a computer run better or faster, the claimed inventions in Hitachi and PBS
achieved technical character by virtue of being loaded onto the ma-

554 See id. at 456–57.
555 Case T-258/03, Auction Method/HITACHI, [2004] O.J.E.P.O. 575, 587 (Technical
Bd. Appeal 3.5.01, Apr. 21, 2004), available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-lawappeals/pdf/t030258ex1.pdf (“Method steps consisting of modifications to a business
scheme and aimed at circumventing a technical problem rather than solving it by technical means cannot contribute to the technical character of the subject-matter claimed.”).
556 Id. at 579.
557 Id. at 581–82.
558 Id. at 582.
559 Id. at 583.
560 See id.
561 PBS, [2001] O.J.E.P.O. at 451.
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chine. Therefore, the claimed inventions escaped classification as a
computer program or a business method “as such.”562
Hitachi also changed course from PBS in finding that the method
claim was not excludable as a business method “as such.”563 The PBS
Board had found that use of a technical means for purely non-technical
purposes did not confer technical character on the method.564 A different Technical Board of Appeal panel, roughly forty months after PBS,
found that it was inappropriate to quantify or weigh the technical aspects of the method claim as part of the Article 52 analysis.565 Doing so
would require consideration of possible novel or inventive contributions to the prior art, which the Article 52 analysis of invention does not
allow.566 The Hitachi Board mandated that method claims and apparatus claims be treated the same for purposes of Article 52 analysis.567 In
both instances a physical feature of the entity, or the nature of the activity, could imply technical character.568 Therefore, what examiners and
practitioners had previously considered a non-technical activity now
achieved technical character and could not be dismissed as a noninvention “as such.”569 This interpretation of Articles 52(2) and (3) substantially broadened the concept of “invention.” The Technical Board
of Appeal acknowledged this expansion, noting that technical acts as
familiar as writing with pen and paper would meet its Article 52 technical criteria.570 Under the Hitachi analysis, then, the first step in determining patentability was whether the claimed subject matter has a
prima facie technical effect.571 A business method passes the Article 52
test as long as it is attached to “any hardware.”572 But such inventions
must also pass the Article 56 inventive step test.

562 See HITACHI, [2004] O.J.E.P.O. at 583; PBS, [2001] O.J.E.P.O. at 453 (“An apparatus constituting a physical entity . . . suitable for performing or supporting an economic
activity, is an invention.”).
563 HITACHI, [2004] O.J.E.P.O. at 584.
564 See PBS, [2001] O.J.E.P.O. at 441.
565 See HITACHI, [2004] O.J.E.P.O. at 584–85.
566 Id.
567 See id. at 585 (“[T]he Board . . . is not convinced that the wording of Article
52(2)(c) EPC . . . imposes a different treatment of claims directed to activities and claims
directed to entities for carrying out these activities.”).
568 Id.
569 See id.
570 Id.
571 See Fox & Rees, supra note 460, at 32 (“[Following Hitachi,] this initial hurdle is not
hard to overcome as the presence of involvement of any physical apparatus is sufficient.”).
572 See HITACHI, [2004] O.J.E.P.O. at 583; PBS, [2001] O.J.E.P.O. at 453.
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Article 56 provides that “[a]n invention shall be considered as involving an inventive step if, having regard to the state of the art, it is not
obvious to a person skilled in the art.”573 The EPC follows a “problemand-solution” approach to the inventive step analysis. For there to be an
inventive step, there must be an objective technical problem with a
technical solution, and the EPC considers whether the claimed invention would have been obvious to a skilled person starting from the closest prior art.574 Patent examiners often break this approach into four
steps: first, determine the closest prior art;575 second, determine the
distinguishing technical feature and its technical effect;576 third, formulate the objective technical problem;577 and fourth, determine whether
a skilled person would have solved the technical problem by the solution specified in the patent claim. 578 The problem-and-solution approach requires analysis of the prior art, but only takes into account
features of the invention that contribute to the technical character of
the invention.579 Thus, it is the second step, technical effect, at which
most business methods fail.580 The central feature of Hitachi’s auction
method automatically increased the auction price if more than one
bidder offered the same “desired price.”581 Although Hitachi argued
that the technical effect resided in the claimed invention’s ability to
overcome delay between bidders and the server,582 the Board found the
invention claimed was “a mere automation of the non-technical activity
of performing a Dutch auction.”583 The Board also acknowledged that
the invention might have contained a technical feature that went beyond how a human auctioneer would perform the auction without
technical support.584 Because the programming measure required to
rank such bids “would have been obvious” to anyone skilled in data

573 EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 56. The EPC’s inventive step is similar to nonobviousness in the United States, although the approaches are different. See Gwilym V.
Roberts et al., Transatlantic Patenting, Landslide, Nov./Dec. 2009, at 32, 33.
574 See Laub, supra note 7, at 349, 360 (comparing the EPO and USPTO approaches to
the examination of the patentability of computer-implemented inventions).
575 Guidelines for Examination in the EPO, supra note 414, Part C, ch. IV, § 11.5.
576 Fox & Rees, supra note 460, at 32.
577 Guidelines for Examination in the EPO, supra note 414, Part C, ch. IV, § 11.5.
578 Id.
579 HITACHI, [2004] O.J.E.P.O. at 586–87.
580 Fox & Rees, supra note 460, at 32.
581 See HITACHI, [2004] O.J.E.P.O. at 588.
582 Id. at 587.
583 Id. at 588.
584 Id. at 589.
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processing, however, the invention did not meet the requirements of an
inventive step.585
EPO boards have continued to refine their approach. Less than two
years after deciding Hitachi, the Technical Board of Appeal decided a
third case. Microsoft/Clipboard Formats involved an appeal from the examining division’s refusal of claims to a method that improved the functionality of Windows 3.1, including a computer program to execute the
method.586 The Technical Board of Appeal set aside the appeal, remitting the claim to the examining division to grant the patent.587 Following Hitachi’s approach that a method using technical means is an invention within the meaning of Article 52, the Board found the clipboard
method claim eligible for patent protection because a “computer system
including a memory is a technical means.”588 Rather than moving to the
Article 56 analysis, however, the Board took the opportunity to distinguish a patentable method implemented in a computer system from
non-patentable programs. The former “represents a sequence of steps
actually performed and achieving an effect”589 while the latter “just have
the potential of achieving such an effect when loaded into, and run on,
a computer.”590 The Board further explained that even though a method of operating a computer may use a computer program, a claim to
the method is not a claim to the computer program “as such.”591
In applying their reasoning to the claim in question, the Microsoft
Board delineated their divergent approach. Claim 5 covered a “computer-readable medium having computer-executable instructions (i.e.
computer program)” to perform the method.592 Citing Hitachi, the Microsoft Board found that the computer software passed the Article 52
hurdle because it “relates to a computer-readable medium, i.e. a technical product involving a carrier.”593 The Board cited IBM I to support
its finding that:

585 Id.
586 See Case T-424/03, MICROSOFT/Clipboard Formats I, [2006] E.P.O.R. 414, 417
(Technical Bd. Appeal 3.5.01, Feb. 23, 2006), available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/
case-law-appeals/pdf/t030424eu1.pdf.
587 Id. at 422.
588 Id. at 419–20.
589 Id. at 420.
590 Id.
591 Id.
592MICROSOFT, [2006] E.P.O.R. at 420.
593Id. (finding that the software possessed the technical character necessary under Article 52).
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[The] computer-executable instructions have the potential of
achieving the . . . further technical effect of enhancing the
internal operation of the computer, which goes beyond the
elementary interaction of any hardware and software data
processing . . . The computer program recorded on the medium is therefore not to be considered a computer program
as such.594
This conclusion does not follow from IBM I, however, because IBM I determined that a computer program could not be considered a technical
means unless it produced a “further technical effect.”595 Thus, Microsoft
seemed to carve out a sui generis category for computer programs.596 As
one scholar summarized the Microsoft holding, “a computer-reusable
medium, including a program stored on it, has technical character because the computer-readable medium is a technical product.”597
The Technical Board of Appeal subsequently determined that the
method claim met the Article 56 requirement of inventive step. Referring to Windows 3.1, the closest prior art, the Board found the method
“solves the problem of how to facilitate a data exchange across different
data formats, in particular when transferring non-file data.” 598 The
Board never identified the problem-solution approach, but merely
concluded that there is a problem, there is a solution, and that the invention “does not derive in an obvious manner from the pre-existing
operating system.”599 The Microsoft Board found that the method thus
met the requirement of inventive step because the method “solves the
problem of how to facilitate a data exchange across different data formats.”600 The Board also found that the method met the novelty requirement.601 The Board noted that the method “solve[d] a technical
problem by technical means . . . in order to enhance the internal operation of a computer.”602
Although Microsoft followed PBS and Hitachi in the “any hardware”
approach to Article 52 analysis, it departed in its Article 56 analysis of
inventive step. The Microsoft Board did not treat the computer program
594 Id.
595 See IBM I, [1999] O.J.E.P.O. at 621.
596 Steinbrenner, supra note 437, at 66.
597 Id.
598 MICROSOFT, [2006] E.P.O.R. at 421.
599 Id. at 421–22.
600 Id.
601 Id. at 421.
602 Id. at 420.
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as excludable prior art, as the business methods had been in the previous cases.603 The Technical Board of Appeal examined the computer
program along more conventional lines without explaining why the
approach was different.604 Without explaining what made the method
and computer claims different from those in PBS and Hitachi, the
Technical Board of Appeal directed the Examining Board to grant the
patent.605 This order “opens the way to the patentability in principle of
any computer program in Europe,”606 and indeed, the Technical Board
of Appeal and national courts have recently moved in this direction.607
The difference in analysis and results in the recent “any hardware” trilogy of Technical Board decisions depends on whether the prior art is a
“business method,” as in PBS and Hitachi,608 or a computer program, as
in Microsoft. 609 Although neither is excluded from patentability “as
such” if they are present on any hardware, there appears less hostility to
the patentability of computer programs than to business methods.610
Thus, the Technical Board of Appeal provided a much higher exclusionary bar for business methods under Article 56.611 Nonetheless, even
with this refinement, subject-matter boundaries remained unclear.
Confusion persisted after Microsoft. Duns Licensing, decided months
after Microsoft, is significant not only for applying the any hardware test,
but for addressing differences between the EPO and English Court of
Appeal approaches to the “technical” requirement.612 Duns Licensing
claimed a research method of estimating sales activity by correlating
sales activities at reporting outlets according to certain criteria, and
claimed an apparatus for maintaining inventory based on the method’s
results.613 The Technical Board of Appeal articulated the EPO’s pro603 See id. at 420–21.
604 Ballardini, supra note 7, at 567.
605 MICROSOFT, [2006] E.P.O.R. at 422.
606 Ballardini, supra note 7, at 567.
607 See Steinbrenner, supra note 437, at 66 (citing a number of cases in which computer
programs have been patented, including software to control a car radio module—the only
case to meet the prior art hurdle—a garbage collection in a computer memory, and a data
retrieval method).
608 See Ballardini, supra note 7, at 566–67.
609 See id. at 567.
610 See id. (claiming that the scope of patent protection for computer programs has
narrowed to the requirement of technicality).
611 See EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 56; Fox & Rees, supra note 460, at 32.
612 DUNS LICENSING, [2008] O.J.E.P.O. at 70–71 (showing EPO characterizing the divergent U.K. software subject matter approach as “not consistent with a good-faith interpretation of the European Patent Convention” in part because the U.K. approach relied
on the technical contribution approach that the EPO had previously abandoned).
613 See id. at 51–52, 54.
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patent approach, stating that Article 52(1) presents the “fundamental
maxim of the general entitlement to patent protection for any invention in all technical fields.”614 The Board continued on to explain that
EPC 52(2) and (3) embody the technical character requirement. Despite acknowledging that Article 52 presented interpretive problems
because there was no legal or commonly accepted definition of “invention,”615 the Board insisted that by not defining “invention” the EPO
had allowed new technologies to develop.616
Reviewing the legislative history of EPC 52(2), the Duns Licensing
Technical Board of Appeal found that the EPC introduced Article
52(3) to prevent a broad interpretation of Article 52(2) excluded matter.617 The Board considered the revised language in Article 52 in EPC
2000—requiring examiners to grant patents “in all fields of technology” —as expressly confirming technical character as a legal requirement for an invention.618 Citing the Basic Proposal for EPC 2000, the
Board asserted that claimed subject matter is reserved for inventions
“with ‘technical character’ or to be more precise—[inventions that]
involve a ‘technical teaching’, i.e. an instruction addressed to a skilled
person as to how to solve a particular technical problem using particular technical means.”619 In the same paragraph, the Board emphasized
that creations in engineering and technology are entitled to protection
under the EPC.620
The Duns Licensing Board then explained the relationship between
the Article 52 and Article 56 tests. The first question is whether the
claimed subject matter meets the Article 52 requirements for invention.621 This analysis should be “strictly separated from and not mixed
up with” the other patentability requirements, including inventive
step. 622 When evaluating claims with a mix of technical and nontechnical features, Article 56—the inventive step requirement—is key
to distinguishing between valid patent subject matter and claims not
614 Id. at 62.
615 Id. at 60, 62.
616 See id. at 62 (“[T]he EPO has not developed any such explicit definition . . . for
good reasons.”).
617 Id. at 63.
618 DUNS LICENSING, [2008] O.J.E.P.O. at 62.
619 Id. at 65.
620 Id at 64.
621 See id. at 67 (quoting an earlier decision where the Technical Board of Appeal first
determined whether the claim constituted an invention within the meaning of Article
52(1)).
622 Id. at 68.
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entitled to patent protection.623 Only technical features of a claimed
invention are relevant when assessing inventive step because the innovation must be in a technical field, not in an unpatentable field.624
Based on this framework, the Duns Licensing method claim failed
the Article 52 analysis. The Board determined that “gathering and evaluating data as part of a business research method do not convey technical character to the business research method if such steps do not contribute to the technical solution of a technical problem.”625 The method
claim had referred to a database, which did not confer technical character because it was not a technical system.626 Therefore, it did not solve a
technical problem and the claim was not eligible for patent protection.627 The Technical Board of Appeal was explicit in its conclusion that
business research activities do not solve a technical problem related to a
technical field: “interaction with and exploiting information about the
physical world belongs to the very nature of any business” and accepting
those features as technical would “render the exclusion for business
methods under Article 52(2)(c) EPC meaningless.”628
The Duns Licensing analysis differed in addressing the claim to a
central processor to perform the individual steps of the method.629 The
Board concluded, without analysis, that under Hitachi the claim to the
technical apparatus qualified it as an Article 52 invention.630 In line
with Hitachi, however, the claim failed on the inventive step analysis.
The Board found that the new algorithm used and the method of estimating sales activity on a known system were “part of a business research method and do not contribute to the solution of any technical
problem.”631 Therefore the examiner should not consider such methods in assessing inventive step because they were inherently nontechnical, as well as being known.632
These cases illustrate both the difficulty in drawing a line in the
patent subject-matter sands, and the shifting of the line when applying
623 See id. at 61 (stating principles of patentability, one of which is that an “inventive
step” can only be based on technical features and that non-technical features “as such” do
not provide a technical contribution and are ignored when assessing the “inventive step”
element of the analysis).
624 See DUNS LICENSING [2008] O.J.E.P.O. at 61, 65, 73–74.
625 Id. at 46.
626 Id. at 75–76.
627 Id.
628 Id. at 75.
629 Id. at 76.
630 DUNS LICENSING, [2008] O.J.E.P.O. at 76.
631 Id. at 78.
632 See id. at 77–78.
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the “technical” requirements test. More than two decades of patent case
law demonstrate that the technical character tests draw a somewhat arbitrary line.633 The primary reason to stick to the requirement of technicality appears to be that it has “always existed in Europe.”634 Nevertheless, considerable consensus exists that the rule in Europe is nebulous and that clarification is needed.635
The EPO, in seeking to define the relevant criteria for determining patent subject matter, began by focusing its Article 52 analysis on
whether there is an invention and whether that invention is technical in
nature and makes a technical contribution.636 The EPO then changed
course, with claimed inventions perfunctorily passing the technicality
requirement under Article 52 if the claim explicitly included any hardware.637 Evaluation of technicality shifted to the problem-and-solution
approach under the Article 56 inventive step analysis.638 Difficulty in
defining the terms “technical contribution” and “as such” has resulted
in various and inconsistent approaches which have undermined predictability in the field, as the “any hardware” approach has shown.639
Furthermore, the EPO draws the line differently when the excluded
category is a “business method” as opposed to a “computer program.”640
Although Article 52(2) expressly excludes both claim types,641 postMicrosoft it appears that a computer program is more likely to clear the
inventive step hurdle, whereas computer-implemented pension benefit
systems, auctions, and sales estimating activities will not.642 Regardless
of which “technical” test reviewing bodies employ, or whether they
conduct the analysis under Article 52 or 56, such reviews do not yield
clear and satisfying results.643

633 Bakels & Hugenholtz, supra note 6, at 33.
634 Id.
635 See id.
636 See Ballardini, supra note 7, at 567.
637 See id.
638 See Guidelines for Examination in the EPO, supra note 414, Part C, ch. IV, § 11.5.
639 See Ballardini, supra note 7, at 567, 570.
640 See id. at 566–67.
641 See EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 52.
642 See Ballardini, supra note 7, at 567 (observing that, in Microsoft, the Board was able
to avoid the Article 52 “as such” exclusion and set the stage for future computer program
patentability in Europe, although the Board had excluded, for example, pension benefit
systems in Pension Benefits Systems and auctions in Hitachi).
643 See id. (“[T]he difficulty in pinpointing . . . a criterion [for assessing the patentability of computer programs] has caused the Boards to embrace various and inconsistent approaches, leading to a general lack of legal coherency in the field.”).
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D. Decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeal
On October 22, 2008, Alison Brimlow—then President of the
EPO—referred questions to the Enlarged Board of Appeal under Article 112(1)(b), asking for clarification on a number of issues concerning
the patentability of computer-implemented inventions.644 Her referral
was not the first request for clarification. Although national court justices have no standing to refer cases to the EPO, Lord Justice Jacob of
the English Court of Appeal had suggested in Aerotel that certain issues
needed clarification through a referral to the Enlarged Board.645 The
EPO did not agree. In an informal letter dated February 22, 2007, the
EPO President, Alain Pompidou, found the request for referral unnecessary.646 During oral arguments, the appellant in Duns Licensing submitted Justice Jacob’s questions for referral to the Enlarged Board of
Appeal.647 The Duns Licensing Board rejected the request, explaining
that diverging decisions were allowable in the EPC legal system as part
of the “evolution of the jurisprudence,” unlike “‘case law’ in the strict
Anglo-Saxon meaning of the term.”648
Eighteen months after President Brimlow’s referral, the Enlarged
Board of Appeal issued what amounted to a non-decision and did not
reach the merits of the questions referred, finding the referral did not
meet the requirements of EPC 112(1)(b).649 When an EPO President
refers questions to the Enlarged Board of Appeal, the EPC has two requirements for admissibility: first, either the questions must be answered to ensure uniform application of the law, or the questions concern points of law of fundamental importance; and second, two Boards
of Appeal must have promulgated different decisions on the question
referred.650 Addressing the first requirement, the Enlarged Board observed that the general subject of the patentability of computerimplemented inventions is of fundamental importance, noting the
“heated debate in administrative and judicial practice” and the prob644 See Referral by the President of the European Patent Office, [2009] O.J.E.P.O. at 142–43.
645 Aerotel, [2007] 1 All E.R. at 236. The questions were different from those ultimately
submitted by the EPO president to the Enlarged Board of Appeal. Justice Jacob specifically
asked for clarification on the key characteristics of the method of doing business exclusion. See id. at 236, 241. This was a question not addressed by the Enlarged Board. See Reinier B. Bakels, Software Patentability: What Are the Right Questions? 31 Eur. Intell. Prop.
Rev. 514, 520 (2009).
646 See Programs for Computers, [2010] O.J.E.P.O. at 12.
647 See DUNS LICENSING, [2008] O.J.E.P.O. at 53.
648 Id. at 59.
649 See Programs for Computers, [2010] O.J.E.P.O. at 59.
650 EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 112.
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lem of EPC contracting states applying different reasoning.651 The Enlarged Board noted internationally “increasingly convergent decisions,”652 which included Duns Licensing,653 the 2008 English Court of
Appeal decision Symbian Ltd v. Comptroller-General of Patents,654 and the
CAFC case In re Bilski.655 The Enlarged Board also noted that the failure
of the European Union to harmonize EU patent law for computerimplemented inventions was evidence that where to “draw the dividing
line between applications relating to programs for computers as such”
and “applications related to patentable technical solutions, in the form
of [computer-implemented inventions], still cannot be assumed.”656
Nonetheless, despite worldwide disharmony, the Enlarged Board did
not consider the worldwide debate on the patentability of computerimplemented inventions, and diverging national decisions, relevant to
their resolution of the referral.657
In addressing the second part of the test, the Enlarged Board concluded—without deciding the issue—that existing EPO case law provided for a consistent approach.658 In construing the meaning of “different decision” in the context of the EPC second requirement,659 the
Enlarged Board stressed the “interpretative supremacy” of the Technical Boards of Appeal and noted that the Enlarged Board cannot develop law as do the Technical Boards of Appeal.660 The Enlarged Board
found “different decisions” to mean a “conflict in case law making it
difficult if not impossible for the Office to bring its patent granting
practice into line with the case law of the Boards of Appeal.”661 In making this determination, the Board stated:

651 See Programs for Computers, [2010] O.J.E.P.O. at 15.
652 Id. at 16.
653 See DUNS LICENSING, [2008] O.J.E.P.O. at 78.
654 See Symbian Ltd v. Comptroller-General of Patents, [2008] EWCA (Civ) 1066, [2009]
R.P.C. 1 (A.C.) at 15–18 (Eng.).
655 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 997–98 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos,
130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
656 See Programs for Computers, [2010] O.J.E.P.O. at 15–16.
657 Id. at 17.
658 See Computer-Implemented Inventions (CII) in Europe–G 3/08, Fish & Richardson (May
20, 2010), http://www.fr.com/Computer-Implemented-Inventions-CII-in-Europe---G-308-0520-2010/.
659 Programs for Computers, [2010] O.J.E.P.O. at 20–21 (finding that the provision for
“different decisions” was ambiguous in the English, French, and German versions of the
EPC, and resorting to the guiding principles of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties to determine the intent of the EPC framers).
660 Id. at 22.
661 Id. at 25.
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[T]he Enlarged Board must also consider whether the divergent decisions might not be part of a constant development,
possibility still ongoing, in jurisprudence on recent patent law
issues, in the course of which older decisions have lost their
significance and so can no longer be considered in connection with newer decisions. Such putative differences do not
justify presidential referrals, legal development being one of
the principal duties of the Boards of Appeal, in particular in
new territory.662
The Enlarged Board then proceeded to review decisions in light of the
referred questions to determine whether a conflict existed. The only
inconsistencies the Enlarged Board found related to the referred question, “[c]an a computer program only be excluded as a computer program as such if it is explicitly claimed as a computer program?”663 The
only “divergence” in case law the Enlarged Board identified was between the IBM I and Microsoft cases. In IBM I, the Technical Board of
Appeal had determined that a claim to a computer program itself is
patentable if it produces a “further technical effect” while it runs.664
The definition of “further technical effect” did not mention the state of
the art, so that the Article 52(2) and (3) determination did not consider the prior art.665 The further technical effect does not have to be
new. 666 The Enlarged Board affirmed that IBM I consciously abandoned the “contribution approach,” and observed that the Technical
Board of Appeal has not contested this shift in any decision since.667
The Enlarged Board subsequently discussed PBS and Hitachi, noting that neither case addressed whether a claim to a program on a computer readable medium avoided exclusion. 668 The Enlarged Board
found that Microsoft had extended the reasoning of Hitachi to decide
that such claims have technical character because they relate to a computer readable medium.669 Although the positions taken in IBM I and
Microsoft were different, the Enlarged Board found the differences reflected development in the case law over seven years, not different opin-

662 Id. at 30.
663 Id. at 32.
664 Id. at 35, 37.
665 See Programs for Computers, [2010] O.J.E.P.O. at 37.
666 Id.
667 Id.
668 See id. at 39.
669 See id.
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ions meriting a referral.670 To support this conclusion, the Enlarged
Board indicated that although IBM I remained seminal on the further
technical effect requirement for claims directed to computer software,
no Technical Board of Appeal had followed IBM I on its technical contribution approach, and no Technical Board of Appeal had challenged
the Microsoft approach.671
In addition to acknowledging that the law in the EPO is in a state
of development, the Enlarged Board expressly declined to define the
term “technical.”672 Addressing the question of whether the activity of
programming a computer includes technical considerations, the Enlarged Board conceded that computer algorithms can genuinely be
viewed as either a pure mathematical-logical exercise or as defining a
procedure to make a machine carry out a certain task.673 The Enlarged
Board found that the EPC takes the former view: abstract formulations
of algorithms do not belong to a technical field, but require “further”
technical effects to be patentable.674
The Enlarged Board’s decision neither advances the law nor clarifies where to draw the line in these cases.675 Although it did not expressly address the issue of business method patents, the Enlarged
Board cited Duns Licensing as laying out the “elaborate system” developed by the EPO for taking the list of excluded subject matter in Article
52(2) into account in assessing the inventive step. 676 The Enlarged
Board did not “judge whether this system is correct.”677 Rather, it found
that “it is evident from its frequent use in decisions of the Boards of Appeal that the list of ‘non-inventions’ in Article 52(2) EPC can play a very
important role in determining whether claimed subject-matter is inventive.”678 Therefore, the problem-and-solution approach of Article 56
now determines whether a computer-implemented invention achieves
the technical character required for patentability, and the Article 56
670 Id. at 45.
671 See Programs for Computers, [2010] O.J.E.P.O at 41–42.
672 Id. at 31.
673 See id. at 58.
674 See id. at 58–59.
675 See id. at 31, 45. Nevertheless, the decision’s impact may be persuasive in shifting
the practice in the U.K. Patent Office to a more favorable approach to computerimplemented inventions. See Chris Benson, United Kingdom: Business as Usual for Software
Patents at the EPO, Mondaq Business Briefing (May 18, 2010), http://www.mondaq.com/
article.asp?articleid=100752.
676 See Programs for Computers, [2010] O.J.E.P.O. at 47.
677 Id.
678 Id.
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hurdle is higher for computer-implemented business methods than for
computer programs.
IV. The U.K. and German Judicial Treatment of Software Patents
In this Part, we consider national treatment of software and business method patent subject-matter questions in the United Kingdom
and Germany. Not only are the United Kingdom and Germany two of
the most influential countries in Europe, the two countries have the
most developed patent law jurisprudence in Europe.679 The U.K. patent
jurisprudence in particular is well-developed, and its patent subjectmatter approach to software and business method claims has clashed
with EPO rulings.680 German practice, while not as divergent as U.K.
practice, is likely to differ from EPO approaches in at least some respects.681 We start our national analysis with a discussion of U.K. patent
subject-matter practice.
A. U.K. Patent Subject-Matter Treatment of Software and
Business Method Claims
In 1977, the United Kingdom transposed the EPC into law.682 The
Patents Act altered both substantive and procedural law so extensively
that it caused the “largest culture shock in [U.K. patent] history.”683 Although one purpose of the EPC is harmonization of substantive patent
law among the contracting states, the United Kingdom chose statutory
language different from EPC Article 52.684 Differences in the wording
in the U.K. statute may contribute to differing interpretations of what

679 See Ballardini, supra note 7, at 567 (referring to the United Kingdom and Germany
as European Patent Convention “major players”).
680 See infra text accompanying notes 679–690.
681 See infra text accompanying notes 843–860.
682 Patents Act, 1977, c. 37 (U.K.); Robin Jacob, The Herchel Smith Lecture 1993, 15 Eur.
Intell. Prop. Rev. 312, 312 (1993).
683 Cornish & Llewelyn, supra note 18, at 113–14, 124 (explaining that the culture
shock was due in part to subjecting national and EPO patents to the same substantive regimes, and also because there was no international patent system prior to 1977). In addition to the EPC, the Patents Act implemented the Patent Cooperation Treaty and the
Community Patent Convention. Patents Act, c. 37, §130(7); Jacob, supra note 682, at 312.
684 Compare Patents Act, c. 37, §1(2) (excluding, among other things: discoveries; aesthetic creations; methods for performing mental acts, doing business, or a computer program; and the presentation of information), with EPC supra note 14, art. 52(2) (excluding:
discoveries; aesthetic creations; methods for performing mental acts, doing business, and
computer programs; and presentation of information).
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constitutes an invention.685 English courts have resorted to bypassing
the Patents Act, instead directly interpreting the EPC.686 The English
courts have also demonstrated a strong preference for construing the
substance of a claim over its form.687 As a result, the United Kingdom’s
approach to excluded subject matter is much stricter than that of the
EPO. One scholar noted that a “UK-based applicant for a computerimplemented invention, if he is interested solely in the British market,
would be well advised to apply for such a patent at the EPO level, designating the UK as the relevant jurisdiction.”688 This divergence in practice may be partially due to the nature of the legal system in the United
Kingdom where stare decisis constrains judicial decision making.689 Although English courts make an effort to defer to EPO decisions, Technical Board of Appeal decisions are not binding.690 Rather, British patent examiners must follow English court decisions.691 Thus, unless the
courts have expressly approved a Technical Board of Appeal decision,
the decision will have only persuasive effect before the U.K. Intellectual
Property Office (UKIPO).692 The differences in policy regarding software patent protection have resulted in a “deep rift” between EPO and
British practice.693 The following section traces the development of the
differing tests and standards in one of the most important patentgranting jurisdictions in Europe, and its convergence with and divergence from EPO standards.
685 Disaster Pending? EPO v. English Court of Appeal on Excluded Subject Matter, 21 World
Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 25, 26 (Aug.1, 2007).
686 Cornish & Llewelyn, supra note 18, at 144 (“When an issue arises which is governed by the UK counterpart of an EPC . . . provision within s.130(7), an English court
will . . . treat the Convention provision directly.”).
687 See Jacob, supra note 682, at 312 (“There was, among the framers of the Convention, the notion that the British . . . read a claim in the abstract and ignored the specification.”).
688 Shemtov, supra note7, at 514.
689 See id. at 510.
690 See id. (arguing that the Aerotel court decided to follow the 1986 EPO decision in Vicom, rather than the newer “trilogy” of PBS, Hitachi, and Microsoft, both to uphold longstanding English precedent and because they considered the approaches in the “trilogy”
cases to be incorrect with regards to the language of the EPC).
691 See Richard Willoughby, United Kingdom, in Global Patent Litigation: Strategy
and Practice 1, 19 (Willem A. Hoyng & Frank W.E. Eijsvogels eds. 2006).
692 See Robert B. Franks, United Kingdom, at 18 (Supp. 2 Nov. 2008) in 1 Software Patent Worldwide, supra note 437. The United Kingdom is composed of three jurisdictions:
England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. Willoughby, supra note 691, at 19.
Most patent litigation takes place in the London-based Patents Court (High Court) and
the Patents County Court. Id.
693 See Ballardini, supra note 7, at 569.
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B. Early English Cases
Before implementing the EPC, English courts had shown a “distinct readiness” to allow patent claims for computer programs even if
such claims did not affect the production of a distinct product.694 After
the United Kingdom became a signatory of the EPC, its patent Court of
Appeal cases initially tracked Technical Board of Appeals law. Nevertheless, the approaches have diverged.
Merrill Lynch’s Application,695 decided a few years after Vicom, was
the first English Court of Appeal case to address excluded subject matter under the Patents Act Section 1(2). Merrill Lynch claimed “an improved data processing based system for implementing an automated
trading market for one or more securities.”696 The program automatically executed stock transactions against a customer’s orders using
known data-processing equipment. Both the Patents Office and the Patents Court (High Court) rejected Merrill Lynch’s claim.697 The Court
of Appeal agreed and by taking judicial notice of the EPO’s Vicom decision,698 made the technical contribution approach part of U.K. precedent. The court interpreted the approach as requiring a technical advance over the prior art in the form of a new result.699 The court explained: “it cannot be permissible to patent an item excluded by
Section 1(2) under the guise of an article which contains that item—
that is to say, in the case of a computer program, the patenting of a
conventional computer containing that program. Something further is
necessary.”700 The court did not find the “something further,” like the
substantially increased processing speed of the CAD program in Vicom.701
The approach taken in Merrill Lynch indicated a preference for the
substance of the patent claim over the claim’s form. In determining
whether the claim was eligible for patent protection, the court considered both the nature of the invention and the nature of the result.702
Although a data processing system may be valid patent subject matter, if
694 Cornish & Llewelyn, supra note 18, at 823 n.94.
695 Merrill Lynch’s Application, [1989] R.P.C. 561 (A.C.) 561 (Eng.).
696 Id. at 562.
697 Id. at 561.
698 Id. at 567 (stating that “[t]he decision of the board is a matter of which we are required, by section 91(1) of the Patents Act 1977, to take ‘judicial notice’”).
699 See id. at 569.
700 Id.
701 See Merrill Lynch, [1989] R.P.C. at 569.
702 See id.

2011]

Software & Business Method Patents in Europe & the United States

305

Patents Act Section 1(2)(c) excludes what it produces, the invention is
not valid subject matter.703 Even if a computer program itself is nonobvious, Section 1(2)(c) excludes the claim as a whole unless it contains non-excluded subject matter which is also non-obvious and contains an inventive step.704 The excluded subject matter is not considered for purposes of establishing inventive step.705 The court found the
Merrill Lynch claim to a “data-processing system . . . making a trading
market in securities” to be an excluded business method.706 Commentators have criticized the English approach as “applying a convoluted
decision process” of determining whether a purported invention is excluded subject matter, rather than applying section 1(2) as a selfcontained filter.707 The methodology adopted in Merrill Lynch has led to
what some commentators describe as an “undue level of exclusion” in
the U.K. patent system.708
The English courts consistently employ the approach of disallowing software inventions cloaked as machines or technical inventions.709
In 1991, the English Court of Appeal in Gale’s Application addressed
whether a ROM containing a computer program is valid subject matter.710 The claim described the invention as an improved iterative algorithm for computing a square root stored on the Read-Only-Memory
(ROM) of a computer.711 The applicant argued that the characteristic
distinguishing the claim from a pure abstract idea was its storage in the
electronic circuitry of the computer.712 The examiner rejected the application as excluded subject matter because it was a computer program “as such.” The Patents Court reversed, however, on the grounds
that the claim was not disqualified under Section 1(2) because the
claim related to a new technical product.713 Distinguishing between a
non-patentable program loaded on a disk from a program loaded on
the ROM, the court reasoned that “[t]here is a difference between a
claim which relates to a disc containing a program and a ROM with
703 See id.
704 See Franks, supra note 692, at 41.
705 See id.
706 Merrill Lynch, [1989] R.P.C. at 569.
707 Franks, supra note 692, at 40.
708 Cornish & Llewelyn, supra note 18, at 826.
709 See e.g., Gale’s Application, [1991] R.P.C. 305 (A.C.) 316, 325, 328 (Eng.); Merrill
Lynch, [1989] R.P.C. at 569.
710 See Gale’s Application, [1991] R.P.C. at 307.
711 See id. at 308.
712 See id. at 308–09.
713 Id. at 306.
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particular circuitry.”714 According to the court, the key difference was
that the disk carried the program, whereas the programmed ROM’s
structure was altered by the program such that it became a “dedicated
piece of apparatus.”715
The Court of Appeal did not agree. It characterized a “program
for a computer” as “essentially a series of instructions capable of being
followed by a cpu to produce a desired result.”716 The Court of Appeal
accurately recognized that the disk and ROM were merely different
kinds of artifacts on which a program may be carried.717 Comparing
programs on these media to different pieces of music loaded onto
compact disks, the court found the differences in storage media immaterial for purposes of determining patent eligibility.718 The music was
the same regardless of the chosen storage media.719 Similarly, the instructions stored on a disk or ROM were also the same.720 The court
noted that deciding otherwise would exalt “form over substance.”721
Following the reasoning of Vicom, the English Court of Appeal
questioned whether the instructions contained on the ROM include
more than disqualified subject matter.722 The court found Gale’s claim
not eligible subject matter because “the claim is in substance a claim to a
computer program, being the particular instructions embodied in a
conventional type of ROM circuitry, and those instructions do not represent a technical process outside the computer or a solution to a technical problem within the computer.”723 Even though the program arguably made the computer more efficient, the Court of Appeal rejected
the claim because it only provided the CPU with a different set of calculations for determining a square root.724 The program was not valid patent subject matter because it did not define a new way of operating the
computer.725 Therefore, the claim was to the instructions, a computer
program “as such.”726 Both Merrill Lynch and Gale’s Application illustrate
the English courts’ early attempts to avoid the problem of clever draft714 Id. at 316–17.
715 Id. 317.
716 Gale’s Application, [1991] R.P.C. at 324.
717 Id. at 325.
718 Id.
719 See id.
720 See id.
721 Id.
722 Gale’s Application, [1991] R.P.C. at 327.
723 Id. at 328.
724 See id. at 327–28.
725 See id.
726 See id.
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ing to avoid exclusion, by directly addressing the issue of substance over
form in determining the nature of the invention claimed.727
In 1997, the English Court of Appeal heard a case involving a patent granted in Japan and submitted to the UKIPO as a matter of priority. 728 The invention in Fujitsu involved both a “method and apparatus”
for modeling synthetic crystal structures used for designing semiconductors and superconductors.729 The court noted that ordinarily a person would assemble plastic models of the structures by hand to model
the new crystal structure.730 The claimed invention used a computer
programmed to allow a human operator to “select an atom, a lattice
vector and a crystal face in each of two crystal structures.”731 The program converted the data representing the two crystal structures into
data representing the physical layout of the combined structure and a
pictorial display of the new structure.732 Both the UKIPO and the trial
court rejected the application as a computer program and “a method
for performing a mental act” excluded under Section 1(2) of the 1977
Patents Act.733 The Court of Appeal, applying the technical contributions approach, also rejected the application.734 Following English practice of construing the invention as a whole, the court concluded as follows: “[c]learly the whole operation revolves around the computer program and the question for decision is whether there is a technical
contribution so that it cannot be said that the invention consists of a
computer program as such.”735
The result—rejecting an “invention” that used computer imaging
to make the process of assembling crystal structures faster—seemed to
contradict the EPO’s Vicom decision. The Court of Appeal in Fujitsu
distinguished the computer imaging found patentable in Vicom by the
way it enhanced the image produced.736 The court noted that the only
advance made by the invention was to “enable[] the combined structure to be portrayed quicker.”737 The operator was still required to produce two displays of the crystal structures and the appropriate way for
727 See id. at 315.
728 Fujitsu Ltd.’s Application, [1997] R.P.C. 608 (A.C.) 610 (Eng.).
729 Id. at 612.
730 Id.
731 Id.
732 Id.
733 Id. at 610; see Patents Act, c. 37, § 1(2).
734 Fujitsu, [1997] R.P.C. at 614–19.
735 Id. at 618.
736 Id. at 618–19.
737 Id. at 619.
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them to be superimposed.738 The Court of Appeal found that Fujitsu’s
use of computer imaging simply made the computer function more
rapidly, but did not change the computer’s ordinary function.739 The
court concluded that a claim to a method for carrying out a calculation, or a method of performing a mental act, cannot be valid subject
matter merely because the process is completed on a computer unless
there is a technical contribution present.740 The fact that the computer
performed the operation more quickly is not sufficient.741
During the first decade of English jurisprudence regarding computer programs, English courts tracked the jurisprudence of the
EPO.742 By requiring the invention to be construed as a whole, however,
English application of the technical contribution test resulted in a stricter review of claims, and thus fewer patent grants.743 Of the three English Court of Appeal cases applying Patents Act Section 1(2), none
found the claimed invention to have sufficient technical character to
fall outside the exclusions.744 The different results from the English
Court of Appeal in Fujitsu and the EPO Technical Board of Appeal in
Vicom are particularly difficult to reconcile.745 Both cases used a computer program that caused computer images to be completed more
rapidly and efficiently than could be done manually.746
C. Recent Jurisprudence (Divergence and Convergence)
Nearly a decade had passed since Fujitsu when the English Court
of Appeal issued its next EPC Articles 52(2) and (3) patent subjectmatter decision.747 During that period, EPO jurisprudence had rejected
738 Id. at 619–21.
739 See id. at 621.
740 Fujitsu, [1997] R.P.C. at 621.
741 See id.
742 See Ballardini, supra note 7, at 568.
743 See id.
744 See Fujitsu, [1997] R.P.C. at 614, 619; Gale’s Application, [1991] R.P.C. at 316–17
(Aldous J.); Merrill Lynch, [1989] R.P.C. at 569.
745 See Fujitsu, [1997] R.P.C. at 618 (attempting to distinguish the facts of Vicom from
the facts of Fujitsu in order to reach a different outcome).
746 See id. at 612, 618; T-208/84, Computer-Related Invention/VICOM, [1987]
O.J.E.P.O. 14, 17 (Technical Bd. Appeal 3.5.01, July 15, 1986), available at http://archive.
epo.org/epo/pubs/oj1987/p001_046.pdf.
747 Aerotel Ltd. v. Telco Holdings Ltd., [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1371, [75–76], [2007] 1 All
E.R. 225 (A.C.) at 229 (Eng.); Fujitsu, [1997] 114 R.P.C. at 608. In Aerotel, Justice Jacob
referred directly to the EPC, rather than to the similar language that had been implemented in the U.K. Patents Act 1977. See Aerotel, [2007] 1 All E.R. at 230. Various reasons
contributed to this decision: differences in wording could lead to erroneous construction;
the EPO Technical Board of Appeal decisions have strong persuasive authority; and the

2011]

Software & Business Method Patents in Europe & the United States

309

Vicom’s “technical contribution approach”748 in favor of the “any hardware approach” of PBS, Hitachi, and Microsoft.749 In 2006, a Court of
Appeal decision rejected the EPO’s “any hardware” approach in Aerotel,
affirming the rupture between U.K. and EPO practices which began in
2002 with PBS.750 Aerotel was actually two cases joined together on appeal: Aerotel Ltd. v. Telco Holdings Ltd. and Re Macrossan’s Application.751
In the first case, Aerotel sued Telco for infringing its U.K. patent on a
telephone system that provided prepayment for telephone calls.752 Telco counterclaimed for revocation on the basis that the invention was
excluded as a method for doing business.753 The trial court agreed with
Telco and revoked the patent. Aerotel appealed.754 In the second consolidated case, Macrossan, the court considered a computerized method
of obtaining the forms needed for incorporating a company.755 The
examiner rejected the application as a method of doing business.756
The High Court affirmed that merely automating a general purpose
computer to produce documents necessary to incorporate an entity,
where there is no underlying technical improvement, was not valid subject matter because the essence of the invention was the automation of
a mental act.757 Macrossan also appealed.758
Despite acknowledging the weight properly placed on EPO board
decisions, the Court of Appeal declined to follow the trilogy of PBS,
language of the EPC creates greater potential for harmonization, as there can be more
consistency in interpreting national laws that implemented the EPC. See Franks, supra note
692, at 65–66.
748 See VICOM, [1987] O.J.E.P.O. at 21; Laub, supra note 7, at 346 (describing the technical contribution approach).
749 See Case T-424/03, MICROSOFT/Clipboard Formats, [2006] E.P.O.R. 414, 419–20
(Technical Bd. Appeal 3.5.01, Feb. 23, 2006), available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/
case-law-appeals/pdf/t030424eu1.pdf; Case T-258/03, Auction Method/HITACHI, [2004]
O.J.E.P.O. 575, 584 (Technical Bd. Appeal 3.5.01, Apr. 21, 2004) available at http://archive.
epo.org/epo/pubs/oj004/12_04/12_5754.pdf; Case T-931/95, Controlling Pension Benefit
Systems Partnership/PBS PARTNERSHIP, [2001] O.J.E.P.O. 441, 448–49 (Technical Bd.
Appeal 3.5.01, Sept. 8, 2000) available at http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj001/10_01/
10_4411.pdf.
750 Aplin, supra note 7, at 380, 381.
751 See Aerotel, [2007] 1 All E.R. at 228–30.
752 Id. at 229, 241–42.
753 Id. at 229.
754 Id. Although the parties settled prior to the substantive hearing and Telco did not
take part in the appeal, Aerotel continued to have an interest in the patent, having sued
another party for infringement. Id.
755 Id. at 243.
756 Franks, supra note 692, at 63.
757 Id. at 63–66.
758 Id. at 64.
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Hitachi, and Microsoft, characterizing them as the “‘any hardware approach.’”759 In a lengthy opinion and appendix, Justice Jacob highlighted the differences and inconsistencies of the approaches articulated in those cases.760 Key in his criticism was that the EPO cases
treated the various categories of Article 52(2) exclusions as being limited to “something abstract or intangible.”761 The English Court of Appeal disagreed, noting that the categories “are disparate with differing
policies behind each.”762 Taking computer programs as an example,
the court observed that the trio of cases takes a “narrow view” of the
Article 52 computer program exclusion in only excluding abstract sets
of instructions.763 The court implicitly found that such a broad definition of valid subject matter encompassed the instructions on a disk or
hard drive which “causes a computer to execute the program.”764 The
court determined that the framers meant to exclude computer programs “in a practical and operable form . . . not just an abstract series
of instructions.”765 Thus, the court declined to adopt the EPO’s narrower view of the exclusion into English law.766
The court went on to emphasize that it was bound by its own precedents and obligated to follow the technical contributions approach
from Vicom as interpreted in previous English Court of Appeal cases.767
Justice Jacob synthesized the English approach, which he labeled the
“technical effect approach with the rider,” as a structured four-step approach to analyzing claims. The steps include: “(1) properly construe
the claim; (2) identify the actual contribution; (3) ask whether it falls
solely within the excluded subject matter; (4) check whether the actual
or alleged contribution is actually technical in nature.”768
Applying the four-step approach to the Aerotel claim, the court reversed the trial court and found for the patentee.769 In construing the
system claim, the court found that the system was “actually a claim to a
physical device consisting of various components.”770 Although the in759 Aerotel, [2007]1 All E.R. at 237–38.
760 See id. at 238, 254–63.
761 Id. at 238.
762 Id.
763 Id.
764 Id.
765 Aerotel, [2007] 1 All E.R. at 238.
766 Id.
767 Id. at 236–37, 239.
768 Id. at 239–40.
769 Id. at 241–43.
770 Id. at 242.
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vention used conventional telephone exchanges, the patentee added
an extra piece of equipment called a “special exchange.”771 The actual
contribution made was a new system requiring a new physical combination of hardware—more than a method of doing business.772 Aerotel’s
use of hardware, even though it was known digital communications exchange hardware, provided the technical contribution.773 Justice Jacob
stated, “it is true that it could be implemented using conventional
computers, but the key to it is a new physical combination of hardware. It
seems to us clear that there is here more than just a method of doing
business as such.”774
By contrast, Macrossan’s invention did not fare as well. The court
found the invention ineligible for patent protection because it was both
a method of doing business as such and a computer program as such.775
In applying the third step, determining whether the claim’s contribution was to excluded subject matter, the claim failed.776 Justice Jacobs
reasoned that “Mr. Macrossan’s method is for the very business itself,
the business of advising upon and creating appropriate company formation documents.”777 The court thus rejected Macrossan’s method as
a quintessential business method.778 The court distinguished this result
from Aerotel, in which a free standing device implemented the business
method.779 The court found that the contribution under step two—
providing a computer program, or interactive website, to carry out the
method—was a contribution exclusively to excluded matter, and therefore was not a technical contribution.780 Additionally, the claim failed
the fourth step in that there was no technical contribution “beyond the
mere fact of the running of a computer program.”781
The divergence from EPO approaches in Aerotel may be due to
weak logic and inconsistencies in EPO jurisprudence rather than U.K.
idiosyncrasies. One scholar suggests that the primary reason the Aerotel
court chose to follow Vicom was not strict adherence to English prece771 Aerotel, [2007] 1 All E.R. at 242.
772 Id.
773 See id.; Leith, supra note 6, at 151.
774 Aerotel, [2007] 1 All E.R. at 242 (emphasis added).
775 Id. at 245 (disagreeing in part with the trial court that found the claim to a method
of performing mental acts “as such,” not a method of doing business, and a computer
program “as such”).
776 Id. at 245–47.
777 Id. at 247.
778 Cornish & Llewelyn, supra note 18, at 828.
779 See id.
780 Aerotel, [2007] 1 All E.R. at 247.
781 Id.
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dent, but because the court found none of the EPO “any hardware”
approaches valid in light of EPC text.782 On this reading, the Court of
Appeal found it impossible to reconcile PBS, Hitachi, and Microsoft. Although PBS had addressed and rejected the method claim on fairly
conventional grounds, the apparatus claim signaled a “substantial departure from previous case law” in holding “that a computer programmed to carry out the unpatentable method was not within the categories of art[icle] 52(2).”783 In Hitachi, the Board of Appeal held that
the apparatus claim was neither a business method nor a computer
program as such because it “comprise[d] clearly technical features,
such as a ‘server computer’, ‘client computers’ and ‘a network.’”784 According to Justice Jacob, the Hitachi logic “most dramatically articulates
the departure from earlier [EPO] reasoning—a computer when programmed to conduct a business method is not excluded by Art[icle]
52(2).”785
The Aerotel court was also highly critical of treating excluded matter as part of the prior art. The court used an example outside the context of computer programs and business methods to illustrate the
point: “Consider for instance . . . a claim to a book . . . containing a
new story the key elements of which are set out in the claim.”786 Justice
Jacob characterized deeming the story part of the prior art by applying
the PBS or Hitachi case reasoning as “simply not intellectually honest.”787 He also seemed “puzzled” as to why the EPO rejected applications for non-compliance with Article 56 particularly when doing so led
to the same outcome as applying the test from Vicom at the stage of Article 52(2) analysis.788 The court criticized Microsoft on a number of
points, but in particular targeted its very narrow definition of excludable computer programs as “just the abstract set of instructions” rather
than a broader view that the term covers instructions on any medium
that causes the computer to execute the program. 789 Justice Jacob
found this result inconsistent with decisions in both the United Kingdom and the EPO, and stated that this result would “seem to open the
way in practice to the patentability in principle of any computer pro782 Shemtov, supra note 7, at 510.
783 Aerotel, [2007] 1 All E.R. at 256–57.
784 Id. at 258.
785 Id.
786 Id. at 237.
787 Id.
788 Shemtov, supra note 7, at 510.
789 Aerotel, [2007] 1 All E.R. at 262.
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gram.”790 Hence, the court’s real concern with the any hardware approach was the elevation of form over substance.791
Following Aerotel, patent practices employed by the EPO and the
UKIPO diverged significantly.792 The Aerotel court did not intend its decision to be a radical departure from prior case law. Nevertheless, in applying the four-part test, the UKIPO rejected most claims directed to
computer programs, even if the claim would have been valid patent subject matter prior to Aerotel.793 In summarizing the differing approaches
between the UKIPO and EPO in a guide for patent practitioners, one
scholar posits that the difference in current subject-matter treatments
reveals different policy approaches to the subject-matter analyses.794 In
the United Kingdom, the policy enshrined in the third step of the Aerotel
test requires that if the computer-related invention falls within an excluded category, then the examiner must reject the entire claim even if
parts of the claim are novel, achieve an inventive step, and make a technical contribution.795 By contrast, EPO policy favors granting patents for
computer-related inventions if these requirements are met.796 In practice, applicants for computer program patents in the United Kingdom
favor the EPO because the probability of receiving a patent for a computer-implemented invention in the United Kingdom remains low.797
But this divergence in approaches creates the possibility that a patent
examined and granted by the EPO and registered as a patent in the
United Kingdom could be invalidated under U.K. law.
Since Aerotel, the EPO Technical Board of Appeal has issued several decisions reaffirming the approach in Hitachi. Duns Licensing798
responded directly to the Aerotel court’s criticism of EPO case law and
condemned the four-step approach as not “consistent with a good-faith
interpretation of the European Patent Convention.”799 In light of the
increasing tension between U.K. and EPO law and practice, the English
790 Id.
791 Aplin, supra note 7, at 382.
792 See Ballardini, supra note 7, at 569.
793 See Richard Taylor, Legal Update: Hard Choices over Software, L. Soc’y Gazette, Jan.
22, 2009, at 14, 14; Wallis, supra note 7, at 4.
794 See Franks, supra note 692, at 72.
795 See id.
796 See id.
797 See id.; see also Wallis, supra note 7, at 4.
798 Case T154/04, Estimating Sales Activity/DUNS LICENSING ASSOCS., [2008]
O.J.E.P.O. 46 (Technical Bd. Appeal 3.5.01, Nov. 15, 2006), available at http://archive.epo.
org/epo/pubs/oj008/02_08/02_0468.pdf.
799 See id. at 70.
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Court of Appeal took a second case only two years after Aerotel.800 The
composition of the appellate panel in Symbian Ltd v. Comptroller-General
of Patents indicated the importance of the decision.801 Two of the three
justices, Justice Jacob and Justice Neuberger, sat on the Aerotel panel.802
Lord Neuberger took the third spot on the panel as a special visitor to
the Court of Appeal from the supreme judicial body of the United
Kingdom, the House of Lords.803 The tone of the Symbian case, while
markedly more deferential to European Patent Office precedent than
Aerotel, ultimately did not change English patent law.804
The claim in Symbian covered a computer program for a method
of “[m]apping dynamic link libraries in a computing device.”805 Link
libraries are a package of small programs relating to general computer
functions.806 Providing libraries allows function programs to be called
up when needed, rather than replicated by each computer program.807
For instance, when a word processing program needs to use a printing
function, the function can be called up from the library so that it does
not need to be included in the word processing program.808 Dynamic
link libraries in the prior art could be either “linked by name” or
“linked by ordinal” systems. 809 The patent application claimed that
Symbian Ltd.’s invention would avoid difficulties and potential unreliability of prior art linked by ordinal systems.810 The UKIPO denied the
claim as a claim to a computer program “as such.”811 The English High
Court ruled that by providing a technical contribution, the invention

800 See Symbian Ltd v. Comptroller-General of Patents, [2008] EWCA (Civ) 1066,
[2009] R.P.C. 1 (A.C.) at 7 (Eng.).
801 See id. at 1; see also Symbian Legal Appeal Throws UK Software Patents into Confusion,
Cellular-News (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.cellular-news.com/story/35181.php [hereinafter Symbian Legal Appeal] (noting Judge Lord Neuberger came down from the highest
U.K. court, the House of Lords, expressly to hear this case).
802 See Symbian, [2009] R.P.C. at 1; Aerotel, [2007] 1 All E.R. at 225.
803 See Symbian, [2009] R.P.C. at 1; Symbian Legal Appeal, supra note 801.
804 Compare Symbian, [2009] R.P.C. at 14 (electing to follow established English precedent
while politely declining to follow EPO decisions), and de Mauny, supra note 7, at 150 (noting
that Symbian was dismissed, in part, to leave precedent standing), with Aerotel, [2007] 1 All
E.R. at 238 (declining to follow EPO precedent without apology).
805Symbian, [2009] R.P.C. at 5.
806 See de Mauny, supra note 7, at 148.
807 See id.
808 See id.
809 See id.
810 See Symbian, [2009] R.P.C. at 5.
811 See id. at 6.
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was not precluded from registration under Section 1(2) of the Patent
Act and Article 52(2) of the EPC.812 The Court of Appeal affirmed.813
The Court of Appeal began with a recitation of the statutory provisions and articulated its obligations to follow previous decisions as
precedent.814 The court also noted that it had the freedom to depart
from its previous decisions in the field of patent law if the EPO Board
had formed a settled view on that point of law that differed from previous decisions, but that it was not bound to do so.815 The Court of Appeal concluded that “we should try to follow previous authority, we
should seek to steer a relatively unadventurous and uncontroversial
course, and we should be particularly concerned to minimise complexity and uncertainty.”816 Nevertheless, despite three EPO cases decided
after Aerotel applying the test from Hitachi,817 the Court of Appeal declined to follow the approach.818 In part, the court chose to do so because the law still seemed to be in a state of flux; the Enlarged Board
had not settled the issue, the post-Aerotel decisions by the EPO were inconsistent, and the German judiciary also expressed doubts about the
“any hardware approach.”819
Instead of following EPO cases, the Symbian court employed the
“technical contribution approach” introduced in Gale’s Application.820
Under this computer-targeted approach, a computer program must be
more than just a “better program to qualify as patent subject matter.”821
Something more is needed, for instance, a change in speed with which
the computer works.822 The claim must also “solve a ‘technical’ problem
812 See de Mauny, supra note 7, at 149–50 (explaining the prior history of the case, the
judge’s reluctance to grant permission to appeal to the Comptroller of Patents, and recognizing that the appeal was expedited due to the impact it would have on pending British
patent applications).
813 See Symbian, [2009] R.P.C. at 18.
814 See id. at 11–12 (“In principle the Court of Appeal is bound by one of its previous
decisions unless that previous decision is inconsistent with a subsequent decision of the
House of Lords . . . is inconsistent with an earlier Court of Appeal decision . . . or can be
shown to have been arrived at per curiam (i.e. without reference to the relevant statutory
provision or authority).”).
815 See id. at 12.
816 See id. at 16. The court reached its conclusion despite acknowledging, in the previous paragraph, that “the boundary between what is and is not a technical contribution is
imprecise” and may not be soluble in a wholly satisfying way. Id. at 15.
817See id. at 14.
818 See id.
819 See Symbian, [2009] R.P.C. at 14–15.
820 See id. at 15.
821 See id. at 16–17.
822 Id. at 16.
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lying within the computer itself.”823 The court concluded that a computer with the claimed program operated better than the prior art and
was thus valid patent subject matter.824 The court considered its conclusion in light of the four-part test articulated in Aerotel and began with the
second step because they had already sufficiently characterized the patent claim.825 The program’s actual contribution identified under the
second step was that it made a computer operate faster and more reliably than the prior art by virtue of the claimed feature.826 Addressing the
third step of the analysis, the court found that the claim was not solely to
excluded subject matter because it included the “knock-on” effect of a
computer working better.827 The court concluded that the invention was
technical “on any view as to the meaning of the word technical.”828
Despite acknowledging the inevitability of the EPO granting software and business method patents where the UKIPO would not,829 the
Court of Appeal minimized the differences in their approaches. What
differs, according to the court, is where the “technical” determination
is made. In the United Kingdom it remains part of the Article 52 analysis,830 while in the EPO it is completed with reference to Article 56.831
The court emphasized “the strong desirability of the approaches and
principles in the two offices marching together as far as possible,”832
concluding that “where there may be a difference of approach or of
principle, one must try to minimize the consequent differences in
terms of the outcome in particular patent cases.”833
Achieving a common result is exactly what the Symbian court accomplished. The EPO Examining Division had already indicated it
would grant a patent for Symbian’s invention.834 Had the Symbian court
found the invention not valid subject matter under previous precedents
and the Aerotel test,835 the conflict in approaches between the United
823 Id. (quoting Gale’s Application, [1991] R.P.C. at 328) (noting that the Symbian invention meets this requirement).
824 See id. at 17.
825 See Symbian, [2009] R.P.C. at 7.
826 See id. at 16–17.
827 See id. at 17.
828 Id.
829 Id. at 17.
830 See id. at 7.
831 See PBS, [2001] O.J.E.P.O. at 456 (denying a patent because it did not meet the inventive step criterion defined in Article 56).
832 See Symbian, [2009] R.P.C. at 7.
833 Id. at 18.
834 Id. at 17.
835 See id. at 17–18; Aerotel, [2007] 1 All E.R. at 240; de Mauny, supra note 7, at 151.
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Kingdom and the EPO would have widened considerably. By ruling
that software that improves the operation of a computer is valid patent
subject matter, Symbian moderated the UKIPO practice of rejecting applications that did not have an external effect.836 On December 8, 2008,
the UKIPO issued a Practice Notice837 based on Symbian that confirmed
the four-step test.838 The Practice Notice concluded that “a program
that results in a computer running faster or more reliably may be considered to provide a technical contribution even if the invention solely
addresses a problem in the programming.”839 Some commentators have
concluded that Symbian will result in the UKIPO issuing more patents
on computer-implemented inventions, 840 particularly because patent
attorneys will make sure to emphasize the “knock-on” technical effects
in patent applications.841
Although the U.K. and EPO results converged in Symbian, the saga
is far from over.842 The approaches to determining technicality still differ. What might be a technical solution to a technical problem under
EPO Article 56 analysis will not necessarily constitute a technical contribution under U.K. Article 52(2) analysis.843 Because a European patent may be challenged for validity in an English court,844 courts could
find themselves in a dilemma if one of those instances presaged in the
Symbian decision845 occurred, in which the different approaches lead to
divergent results. Further, at least one commentator describes the UKIPO Practice Notice as “a grudging concession” that computerimplemented inventions may be patented if there is no external effect.846 The Practice Notice explicitly states that “examiners will object
to the computerization of what would be a pure mental act if done
without the aid of a computer as both a mental act and a computer
program as such.”847 Nevertheless, it is possible the UKIPO may reject
836 See Symbian, [2009] R.P.C. at 17; Intellectual Prop. Office, Practice Notices: Patents Act 1977: Patentability of Computer Programs ¶ 3 (Dec. 8, 2008) available at
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/pro-types/pro-patent/p-law/p-pn/p-pn-computer.htm [hereinafter IPO].
837 See IPO, supra note 836, ¶ 1.
838 See Symbian, [2009] R.P.C. at 1.
839 See IPO, supra note 836, ¶ 5.
840 Wallis, supra note 7, at 4.
841 Taylor, supra note 793, at 15.
842 See de Mauny, supra note 7, at 151; Renao Marchini, Patently Better, 83 Eur. Law.14,
15 (2008).
843 See Shemtov, supra note 7, at 512.
844 Patents Act, c.37, § 74.
845 Symbian, [2009] R.P.C. at 14–15.
846 See Symbian Legal Appeal, supra note 801; see also Wallis, supra note 7, at 4.
847 IPO, supra note 836, ¶ 8.
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applications based on the mental acts exclusion where it would have
previously done so under the computer program exclusion.
D. German Patent Subject-Matter Treatment of Software and
Business Method Claims
A robust analysis of German law and practice in the area of computer software and business methods is beyond the scope of this Article.
Nevertheless, a brief discussion serves to highlight problems within the
European patent community, accentuating the need for clear definitions of the EPC exceptions and an appellate body to resolve interpretive differences among the national jurisdictions.
The Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) has attempted to articulate an appropriate test for technicality in the context of computer-implemented
inventions over the last decade.848 Despite the BGH’s repeated assertions that its decisions are in line with EPO case law, its interpretations
may differ.849 Commentators have characterized Germany’s approach to
software patents as more cautious than the EPO.850 As a result, the validity of EPO patents is frequently contested in infringement proceedings
in the German Patent Court.851 The BGH has developed a two-part test
that appears roughly equivalent to the general contours of EPO practice, in which technicality is assessed as part of both Article 52 and Article 56 analyses.852 In German practice, the invention must possess technical character, which is assessed independently from novelty and inventive step criteria.853 The second step requires an objective technical
contribution over the prior art and a solution to a technical problem.854
This step mandates a technical teaching directed to the solution of a

848 See Hans Wegner, Germany, 12 in 1 Software Patents Worldwide (Supp.4 Dec.
2009), supra note 437. Although, as a civil law system, these cases do not have the precedential weight, examiners of the German Patent and Trademark Office typically refer directly to decisions of the Federal Patent Court and the BGH, giving these cases practical
importance. See id. at 10.
849 Id. at 11. But see Aerotel, [2007] 1 All E.R. at 269 (noting that the BGH did not consider the computer program exclusion from EPO case law, and so neglected to take EPO
case law into account).
850 See Stephan Dorn, German Supreme Court Widens the Door for Software Patents, Intell.
Prop. Expert Group (May 30, 2010), http://www.ipeg.eu/?p=1347.
851 See id.
852 See Wegner, supra note 848, at 6.
853 Id.
854 Id. at 6, 17 (describing a test for an objective technical contribution and summarizing BGH case law requiring a solution to a technical problem).
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specific technical problem.855 The two criteria have changed in importance over the last several years. Currently the latter step is more important.856
The April 2010 decision, Dynamische Dokumentenverwetung (Siemens)
is the most recent attempt to articulate the contours of German law.857
As one scholar points out, the fact that the BGH has decided two cases
in 2009 and 2010 indicates that the Federal Patent Court is “trying to
understand the boundaries” of patent law in this area.858 The Federal
Patent Court determines which appeals to send to the BGH,859 and only
certifies appeals if there is “a legal question of fundamental importance”
or a BGH decision is “needed for consistent interpretation” of the law.
Thus, having the BGH decide two cases in this time span is significant.860
Commentators and even legal practitioners are unable to agree on the
impact of the Siemens decision. Whereas some commentators hail the
Siemens case as a “landmark decision” that marks a break from past decisions and goes much further than EPO practice,861 other commentators
view the decision as “a continuation of a long line of thinking by the
German courts” that is very similar to the EPO approach.862
Regardless of Siemens’s impact, looking to German decisions for a
definition of “technical” is not fruitful. In 2000, the BGH expressly acknowledged that there is no objective definition of technology in the
context of determining whether a particular claimed invention is technical.863 Therefore, “technical” has a dynamic meaning which can be

855 See Klaus Melullis, Some Problems of Patent Law from a German Viewpoint, 13th European
Patent Judges’ Symposium, [2007] O.J.E.P.O. (Special Edition 2), 184, 184–86.
856 See id. at 186.
857 Beschluss Xa ZB 20/08: Dynamische Dokumentengenerierung [Dynamic Document, Generation] Bundesgerichtshof (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.bundesgerichtshof.de/cln_134/DE/
Entscheidungen/EntscheidungenBGH/entscheidungenBGH_node.html (click on “Zugang
zur Entscheidungsdatenbank des Bundesgerichtshofs”; in “Dokumentsuche” box on left,
type “Xa ZB 20/08” in “Aktenzeichen” field; click “Suchen”; follow the hyperlink to “Xa ZB
20/08”).
858See Rob Harrison, Flooding Germany with Software Patents?, Tangible IP (May 23,
2010), http://www.tangible-ip.com/2010/flooding-germany-with-software-patents.htm.
859 Id.
860 Wegner, supra note 848, at 9.
861 German Federal Supreme Court Opens the Door for Software Patents, Kaye Scholer LLP ( June
10, 2010), http://www.kayescholer.com/news/client_alerts/20100610/_res/id=sa_File1/IPCA
20100610.pdf.
862 See Harrison, supra note 858.
863 See Case No. X ZB 15/98, Speech Analysis Apparatus, [2002] 3 Int’l Rev. Indus.
Prop. Copyright L. 343, 344–45 (Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May
11, 2000) (Ger.); see also Ballardini, supra note 7, at 572.
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treated differently in the context of technological developments.864 In
extrajudicial comments, Judge Melullis of the BGH marginalized the
word “technical” because “when assessing software as such, the program’s interdependence with the technical device makes the technical
content too hard to deny.” 865 Hence, in the context of computerimplemented inventions, the meaning of technical as used by German
courts remains unclear.
Conclusion
In addressing Justice Ginsburg’s query about whether Europe provides a solution to the U.S. business method and software patent conundrum, our analysis clearly answers in the negative. As the Bilski v.
Kappos petitioner stated with respect to Europe’s technology requirement, “technology . . . can be a difficult term.”866 Technology is a difficult term, particularly as it relates to whether and under what conditions business methods, computer programs, algorithms, and mental
acts that are embodied in machines should receive patents as a matter
of policy and practice. Instead of serving as a panacea for U.S. patent
examiners and courts, the European technical requirement fails to
provide a meaningful constraint for software patents and many business
method patents on either side of the Atlantic.
Uncertainty and evolving standards characterize all patent systems
examined in this Article. The United States treats all business methods
and software as eligible patent subject matter, whereas the EPC, U.K.,
and German patent systems exclude all business methods that are not
computer implemented.867 Beyond these basic observations, ambiguity
about the nature and extent of patent subject matter permeates all
these patent systems. Bilski injected significant uncertainty in a relatively
settled area of law by rejecting State Street Bank’s “useful, concrete, and
tangible result” test and inviting the CAFC to develop a new subjectmatter test based on the abstract ideas exclusion.868 In Europe, the certainty of the business method and software exclusions vanishes where
patent claims include a computer or software component. For such applications, European patent courts analyze the technicality of the com864 See Ballardini, supra note 7, at 572.
865 See Symbian, [2009] R.P.C. at 11 (quoting Judge Melullis of the BGH at a 2006
Symposium for European Patent Judges).
866 Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08964).
867 See supra Parts II–IV.
868 See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3259 (2010) (Breyer, J. concurring).
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ponent, where there is no commonly recognized definition of technical.869 Thus, in the United States uncertainty of subject-matter exclusion exists for business methods only, whereas in Europe business
methods and software are excluded unless they constitute parts of a
mixed claim involving “something more.”870
It is this “something more” that is so difficult to characterize and
that results in uncertainty. In the United Kingdom, the analysis of technicality is part of the subject-matter test, where English courts require a
“technical contribution” or external “knock on” effect of a computer
working better.871 The closest U.S. analog to the U.K. external effect
requirement would be a weak physical transformation test.872 German
courts and the EPO have moved the computer-implemented business
method and software technicality determination to their inventive step
or obviousness analysis.873 This test asks whether the invention provides
a technical solution to a technical problem.874 This appears somewhat
analogous to the now-discredited test proposed in Parker v. Flook, which
required examiners to evaluate the novelty and non-obviousness contributions of an invention only after completely discounting any contribution due to a mathematical algorithm.875 In order to provide a closer
analogy to tests used in Europe, the Flook test would need to treat the
business method component of patent claims as contributions that are
well known in the art.876
The European test—pejoratively labeled the “any hardware test” —
has evolved to bar naked business methods and little else.877 Like the
U.S. pattern, where incrementally more types of inventions receive sub869 See supra text accompanying notes 359, 861; see also CFPH LLC’S Application,
[2005] EWHC (Pat) [14], [2006] R.P.C. 259, 267 (Eng.) (“[T]he word ‘technical’ is not a
solution. It is merely a restatement of the problem in different and more imprecise language.”).
870 See, e.g., Case T-208/84, Computer-Related Invention/VICOM, [1987] O.J.E.P.O.
14, 21–22 (Technical Bd. Appeal 3.5.01, July 15, 1986), available at http://archive.epo.org/
epo/pubs/oj1987/p001_046.pdf (reasoning that a traditionally patentable technical process involving computer software and a computer apparatus should not be excluded solely
by virtue of the fact that software is part of the claim, thereby suggesting that the hardware
component of the claim was “something more”).
871 See supra text accompanying notes 820–828.
872 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962–63 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Bilski, 130 S. Ct.
3218.
873 See Wegner, supra note 848, at 6.
874 See id.; Melullis, supra note 855, at 186.
875 See 437 U.S. 584, 595–96 (1978).
876 See id.
877 See Aerotel Ltd. v. Telco Holdings Ltd., [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1371, [75–76], [2007] 1
All E.R. 225 (A.C.) at 237 (Eng.); Steinbrenner, supra note 437, at 66.
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ject-matter treatment, following the 2006 EPO decision in Microsoft
even computer programs are patentable provided they achieve a further technical effect.878 The European analogy to U.S. patent law development differs in two significant respects. First, there is no evidence
that European patent law will continue expanding patent protection to
business methods. No case in any of the examined jurisdictions has
granted patent protection to “naked” business methods or business methods “as such.”879 Second, English patent courts appear only grudgingly to acquiesce to the EPO practice of granting patents on computer
programs that lack an external effect.880 Hence, whereas European patent reviewing bodies are in consensus about business methods, there is
considerable uncertainty surrounding the boundaries of software patentability—and likely significant discord between patent jurisdictions
over the proper treatment of software patents. Thus, other than Europe’s unified support for its business method exclusion—an exclusion
that the Supreme Court in Bilski refused to embrace881—Europe has
little to offer the United States that can enhance clarity and certainty in
U.S. patent subject-matter practice.
Unfortunately, the U.S. approach to business method and software
subject-matter review could use an infusion of outside guidance. Rather
than increase clarity, Bilski has increased ambiguity and uncertainty
about what inventions constitute eligible subject matter. By rejecting the
machine or physical transformation test882 as the threshold requirement
for patentability and likely rejecting the CAFC’s useful, concrete and
tangible test,883 the USPTO and practitioners are left with no test—
other than the abstract ideas exclusion884—to provide guidance. Bilski
provides neither a clear rule nor a prohibition on the patenting of naked business methods unless they constitute abstract ideas. Further, as
the Kennedy plurality observes, the suggestion that the “machine-ortransformation test is useful ‘for evaluating processes similar to those in
878 See Case T-424/03, MICROSOFT/Clipboard Formats I, [2006] E.P.O.R. 414, 420
(Technical Bd. Appeal 3.5.01, Feb. 23, 2006), available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/
case-law-appeals/pdf/t030424eu1.pdf; Laub, supra note 7, at 351–54.
879 See supra Parts III–IV; see also Bakels & Hugenholtz, supra note 6, at 21–22 (“To
many European observers business method patents represent a horrific prospect—yet
another example of unwanted ‘Americanisation’. Even those who are in favour of software
patenting usually are vehemently opposed to patenting business methods.”).
880 See supra text accompanying note 846.
881 See 130 S. Ct. at 3229.
882 See id. at 3225.
883 See id. at 3232 (Stevens, J., concurring).
884 See id. at 3229 (majority opinion) (“In searching for a limiting principle, this
Court’s precedents on the unpatentability provide useful tools.”).
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the Industrial Age,’ but is less useful ‘for determining the patentability
of inventions in the Information Age’” indicates that the courts may
employ different subject-matter tests for new technologies.885
This Article contends that such movement is in error. Informationage technology is not qualitatively different from industrial-age technology. It still must qualify as either a process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter.886 Pre-information-age patent jurisprudence
is capable of providing the clarity sorely lacking in current U.S. patent
jurisprudence. Rather than rendering cautious decisions based on future unimagined and unimaginable technological developments, U.S.
courts should rely on legislative bodies to address gaping legal deficiencies with respect to new technologies if such technologies develop.
Ironically, both the EPO Enlarged Board of Appeal and the U.S.
Supreme Court fail to provide or increase clarity concerning the subject-matter treatment of software and business method patents in their
recent opinions.887 What prevents the finding of a consistent approach
to patent subject-matter determinations is the absence of any significant policy guidance in a highly politicized arena. This absence has
been particularly problematic in Europe due to the plethora of national patent systems governed predominantly by a civil-law tradition
that does not adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis. The result has been
a multiplicity of approaches to the software patent subject-matter question in the EPO and national courts, with no clear definition of what is
“technical” over the last twenty years.888 The absence of sufficient political willpower to provide policy guidance is evident from the failure of
the European Union to implement a directive harmonizing the treatment of computer-implemented inventions. Moreover, the inability to
remove “programs for computers” from the list of excluded subject
matter in EPC 2000, despite years of granting patents for computer
software products, further evidences this inertia.889
885 Id. at 3235 (Stevens, J., concurring) (describing the plurality’s suggestion).
886 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
887 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228–30 (declining to adopt general principles of patent protection and issuing a narrow holding for the case at hand); Case T-154/04, Estimating
Sales Activity/DUNS LICENSING ASSOCS., [2008] O.J.E.P.O. 46, 66 (Technical Bd. of
Appeal 3.5.01, Nov. 15, 2006), available at http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj008/02_
08/02_0468.pdf (“Thus it will remain incumbent on office practice and case law to determine whether subject-matter claimed as an invention has a technical character.”); see also
Ballardini, supra note 7, at 563.
888 See Ballardini, supra note 7, at 567.
889 Cf. EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 52 (maintaining computer program exception in
the amended provision).
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By contrast, changes in the U.S. approach have spanned a much
greater time period and have not suffered the European problem of
conflicting contemporaneous treatments of the patent subject-matter
question. The U.S. constitutional mandate is to grant patents that promote the useful arts.890 The legislative mandate includes patent protection for “new and useful processes.”891 No inventions or advances are
explicitly excluded under U.S. law. This approach differs sharply from
the EPC. EPC Article 52 explicitly excludes business methods and computer programs from patent subject matter.892 Nonetheless, the Article
52 exclusion includes the cryptic “as such” modifier.893 The meaning of
this terse phrase is the root of the controversy in Europe.
In the absence of legislative guidance, U.S. common law developed
a seemingly sound approach to dealing with subject-matter issues for
patent process claims. This case law excluded claims for abstract ideas,
laws of nature, and mathematical expressions and algorithms.894 The
machine or physical transformation test was a product of this case
law.895 Due to the absence of clear standards, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has been hesitant to extend these principles to new, and
ostensibly different, information-age technology. In the past, this reticence facilitated the expansion of patent subject matter to include all
new inventions regardless of application or type.896
In Bilski, the Court also failed to provide clarification or guidance
in this area, by “not commenting on the patentability of any particular
invention, let alone holding that any of the above-mentioned technologies from the Information Age should or should not receive patent protection.”897 Whether or not the Court’s reticence is warranted, its reluctance to act emphatically is likely due to the legislative nature of the
requested decision. The task of drawing patent subject-matter boundaries is a policy decision that the courts have been uncomfortable making. In Bilski, the Supreme Court continued its practice of asking Con890 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
891 See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
892 See EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 52.
893 See id. art. 52(3).
894 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (acknowledging the existence of only three exclusions
from patent subject matter: laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas) (citing Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309); see also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–73 (1972)
(finding mathematical formulas and algorithms to be non-patentable).
895 See, e.g., Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1876).
896 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (acknowledging “broad patent-eligibility principles”
with relatively few exceptions).
897 Id. at 3228.
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gress to address “the great challenge in striking the balance between
protecting inventors and not granting monopolies over procedures that
others would discover by independent, creative application of general
principles.”898 Thus far, Congress has not responded to such entreaties.
In fact, other than adding a section to the Patent Act that provides a
prior-use defense for business method patents, Congress has not addressed business method or software patent claims at all.899
Europe has lagged in this seemingly inexorable march to remove
most restrictions on patent subject matter, but may not be far behind.
The trend in Europe is toward recognizing claims as valid patent subject matter as long as they are computer implemented.900 The United
Kingdom—with its strong common law tradition of limiting patent subject matter—has offered the most resistance to this trend, but may be
forced to yield under pressure to make its patent law consistent with
EPO practice.901 It is telling that the Enlarged Board of Appeal recently
ruled that there is no conflict in patent subject-matter treatment under
the EPC, despite multiple Technical Board of Appeal decisions with
seemingly conflicting approaches. 902 First, nothing but the elusive
“technical” requirement is left to prevent EPO case law from continuing its evolution in the direction of the more lax U.S. approach to patent subject-matter treatment. Whereas Europe is unlikely to adopt the
complete absence of restrictions characteristic of U.S. patent practice,
the dissipation of any remaining restrictions on software patents in Europe is a real possibility. Second, it is clear that the United States will
not find any answers to its software and business method patent conundrum from the European patent system.
The curious reference to In re Bilski in the Enlarged Board of Appeal decision903 suggests that the EPO may have been looking to the
United States for leadership and that it approved an approach that
demonstrated a movement toward harmonization. The type of judicial
leadership that Europe would most likely accept is an unequivocal policy statement that provides concrete and practical restrictions to business method and computer-implemented inventions. Bilski did not pro898 Id.
899 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(1) (2006); see Hill & Cangolosi, supra note 366, § 7 (concluding that there have been few legislative amendments to U.S. patent law since 1952).
900 See Grosche, supra note 359, at 273–74; Thomas & DiMatteo, supra note 1, at 21–23.
901 See Aplin, supra note 7, at 379–80; Shemtov, supra note 7, at 510.
902 See Case G-3/08, Programs for Computers, [2010] O.J.E.P.O. 10, 30 (Enlarged Bd.
Appeal, May 12, 2010) available at http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj011/01_11/01_
0101.pdf (dismissing President’s referral to establish uniformity under the EPC 2000).
903 See id. at 16.
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vide such a clear elucidating standard.904 It is thus unlikely that European courts will consider anything in the decision worth emulating.
U.S. courts, including the Bilski Court, erroneously suggest that
case law is inadequate to deal with rapidly changing technology.905 The
Supreme Court’s final two statutory subject-matter decisions of the
twentieth century ruled on cutting edge patent claims. In Diamond v.
Diehr, the Court validated a computer-controlled rubber curing process.906 In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Court validated a patent for a genetically engineered microorganism capable of oil decomposition
processes.907 Although the technology in the two cases was pioneering,
both claims fit into categories that were clearly envisioned during the
time of the first Patent Act. The Diehr claim covered an industrial process908 and the Chakrabarty claim covered a manufacture,909 two types of
innovation that are listed in Section 101 of the Patent Act.910 By contrast, the alarm limit and BCD processes invalidated in Flook and Benson,
respectively, would not qualify as industrial processes.911 Bilski is in line
with these results because the machine-or-transformation test remains a
“useful and important clue” to patentability. The petitioners’ claims to
the concept of “hedging,” and its reduction to a mathematical formula,
were unanimously invalidated.912 Nevertheless, the plurality refused to
draw a clear line for a case more difficult than Bilski.913
The Supreme Court missed the opportunity to bring U.S. patent
law closer to that of the EPO by failing to resurrect the moribund business method patent exclusion that the CAFC nullified in State Street
Bank.914 Nevertheless, in holding that the machine-or-transformation
test is “a useful and important clue” to the patentability of processes,
and not endorsing the State Street Bank test,915 the Court moved toward
904 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228.
905 See id. at 3227; see also Benson, 409 U.S. at 72–73.
906 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981).
907 See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305.
908 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184.
909 See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
910 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
911 See Flook, 437 U.S. at 594–95; Benson, 409 U.S. at 71–72.
912 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231, 3232 (Stevens, J., concurring), 3257–58 (Breyer, J. concurring). The majority held that the claim was not patentable because it represented an
abstract idea, but Justices Stevens and Breyer would have held that the method was not a
process, and therefore not patentable. Id. at 3231–32, 3257–58.
913 See id. at 3231(Stevens, J., concurring).
914 See id.; State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp. Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
915 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227; State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1375.
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limiting the patentability of naked business methods. Still, a more clearly delineated test that could provide guidance in both the United States
and Europe would be far better than the Bilski outcome.
This Article suggests that judicial bodies in the United States and
Europe have weakened statutory subject-matter standards in favor of
protecting business methods and software patent claims, due to the
lack of clear policy mandates. Even the United Kingdom, perhaps the
last holdout against the movement in favor of expansive coverage, has
started to relent under pressure to be consistent with EPO practice.
The U.S. Supreme Court had the opportunity to institute legal standards that provide welfare-enhancing innovation incentives and reduce
the anti-competitive effects from broad recognition of business method
and software patents. Although the Court recognized the need to balance protecting inventors with protecting the community against government-sanctioned monopolies, the Court declined to indicate “where
that balance ought to be struck.”916 Unfortunately, the United States
Supreme Court missed the opportunity to create clear limits to statutory subject matter. Doing so may have encouraged Europe to reform
its patent policy, and perhaps brought both sides of the Atlantic closer
to a truly harmonized patent policy.

916 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228.
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